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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the 1992 attempt to legislate for the introduction
into the French civil code of a "trust-like" device, the Fiducie.Through a study
of the 1992 Bill's Fiducie, it is hoped to contribute to a socio-theoretical
understanding of the workings of French legal culture, in the specific context
of this recent confrontation with the common law trust.
On the basis of the works of Foucault, Lenoble and Ost, French legal culture
will be theoretically constructed as an epistemic entity shaped by two types of
discourses: the juridical discourse of sovereignty and the discourse of
Governmentality. In the light of the works of Bourdieu and Dezalay, it will be
argued that these discourses are connected to the conflictual dynamics of
societal fields, identified as the juridical field and the field of
Governmentality.
As a result of the operation of the juridical discourse of sovereignty, the
Fiducie cannot reproduce the dual ownership structure of the trust. This is due
in particular to the symbolic potency of the principle of absolute ownership, a
product of the juridical discourse of sovereignty. This discourse forms the
basis of the French epistemic tradition and is rooted in struggles amongst
lawyers for the symbolic authority of law.
The second epistemic level relevant to our study is identified as
Governmentality, a discourse concerned with the construction of the proper
objects, means and ends of government, understood in the broad Foucauldian
sense. The Fiducie 's limitations as regards tax planning result from the fiscal
provisions of the Bill and the impossibility to fragment ownership rights. Such
limitations illustrate the imperative of surveillance in French Governmentality.
But the Bill also reflects a contradictory tension towards a more liberal
understanding of the Fiducie as a flexible and almost unregulated contractual
device destined to compete with the trust on the global market.
The conflicting tensions apparent in the legislative formulation of the Fiducie
echo struggles within the juridical field and in the governmental field. These
struggles involve an emerging elite of international legal experts seeking a
dominant position internationally and within their own national fields.
On the basis of this analysis, it will be possible to formulate a number of
concluding hypotheses as to the reasons for the 1992 Bill's failure and its
possible future revival.
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INTRODUCTION
In a 1953 article, V Bolgar was already posing the question "Why no
trusts in the civil law?", noting that "[i]n the field of property, the trust
furnishes a striking antinomy between the common law and the civillaw".l
Indeed, there is still no trust in French law, despite an attempt in the early
1990s to introduce a Bill which would have incorporated into the Civil code a
"trust-like" device, named Fiducie.
The Bill was entitled "De la Fiducie" and laid before the French
Parliament on the 20 February 1992.1 This was the first attempt to introduce
the trust into French law, which had and still has no comparable device.
Indeed, prior to the 1789 Revolution and the 1804 codification of pri vate law,
there were a few institutions and practices which resembled the trust. The
substitution, for instance served similar purposes to the dynastic trust, and for
this reason was expressly prohibited in the new Civil code. Other practices,
such as the pre-revolutionary Fiducie, which were not expressly prohibited in
the new codified law, did not survive the demise of the Ancien Regime.
There does not seem to have been a need for the trust, as a variety of
other institutions can fulfil its numerous functions. The fondation for instance,
can be used for the same functional purposes of the trust. This creature of
Equity has traditionally been perceived amongst civilians as a curiosity
typifying the common law systems. It is not until the early 1980s that serious
academic thought was given to the necessity and possibility of introducing a
trust-like device, the Fiducie. The idea was mooted by C Witz in an important
1 "Why no trusts in the civil law", (1953), 2, American Journal of Comparative law,
204 at p 204.
2 The Bill will be referred to as "the 1992 Bill". Its documentary reference is Doc. Ass.
Nat. 2583.
1
doctoral study entitled, "La Fiducie en droit prive francais't.' The suggestion
was the slow introduction by the courts of the new Fiducie device, for which
Witz proposed a definition and a legal framework. Witz's study was used and
referred to by the drafters of the 1992 Bill.
The Bill was never debated in Parliament and was finally withdrawn in
late 1994. There has been no further attempt to introduce the Fiducie, although
there is ongoing governmental research and academic and professional
discussion on the subject. It is doubtful whether the 1992 Bill would have
introduced an institution sufficiently similar to the trust to share the same
functional applications. Indeed, the Fiducie lacks a fundamental characteristic
of tQ.~.~.1]!~J~.!h~.gj.~!jJ)~t.i.9.Q.P.~tw.~~.t).l~_g~J..tiH~.~mg.J?~n~fi.9.i.~ljn!~r~~t:
Nevertheless, the Bill is of great intellectual interest to common law
and civil law jurists alike. It reveals a certain civilian way of interpreting the
trust and the stark differences in the legal modes of thinking, in particular as
regards ownership. The Bill seems to be the result of a confrontation between
the common law and French civil law. This is a sufficiently compelling reason
to prompt research on the Fiducie.
There has not yet been any in depth-study of the 1992 Bill which is the
empirical starting point and focus of this thesis. However, recent doctoral
theses have included brief case-studies on the Fiducie. For instance, a 1998
theoretical thesis on the concept of ownership in French law referred to the
Fiducie, amongst other institutions." The study seemed to consider the Fiducie
as part of positive law, although it has not yet been introduced. In the thesis,
the argument was that a number of existing legal devices, including the
3 Economica, Paris, 1981.
4 G Blanluet, Essai sur la notion de propriete economique en droit prive franr;ais,
Thesis, Paris II, 1998.
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Fiducie, demonstrate an evolution of the abstract idea of ownership towards a
more pragmatic concept of economic ownership.
The present study is original in its chosen object, the 1992 Bill's
formulation of the Fiducie, but also in its approach. It provides a socio-
theoretical analysis of this technical and practitioner-oriented area of the law.
As such, it is far removed from the traditional doctrinal, or even more practice-
minded, doctoral work undertaken in France.
Within the latter perspective, the questions which could have guided a
reflection about the 1992 Bill would have focussed on the technical
shortcomings of the Fiducie and the possibility of improving on the Bill's
framework for the device. The need for such a device could also have been
assessed with regard to existing legal instruments or practices. A comparative
survey of other trust-like devices could have been the basis of a proposed
regulatory framework for a French trust ...
The questions which the present study seeks to address reflect a very
different approach and diverging assumptions. What can the Fiducie tell us
about social processes pertinent to the workings of French legal culture? What
is French legal culture?Why is the trust incompatible with French legal
culture? Why this attempt to introduce it?
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that the 1992 Bill's Fiducie is the
result of epistemic tensions inscribed in power struggles within French legal
culture.i Indeed, the contradictions within the Bill can be explained in terms
of the tensions in the workings of legal knowledge, but these tensions are both
the stake and the outcome of the conflictual dynamics of social power
struggles. The tensions exist at two epistemic levels: first, at the level of
doctrinal knowledge and the French epistemic tradition, principles such as
S The word "epistemic" is a Foucauldian deformation and results from an
interpretation of epistemology.
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absolute ownership have constituted the basis of both the rejection of the trust,
and of the legitimacy of the Fiducie- the latter does not reproduce the dual
ownership structure of the trust. Secondly, as regards the epistemic processes
concerning the constitution of the proper means and ends of government and
the role of law within this problematic, the Bill expresses both a liberal and
facilitative ethos, and an impulse to police through surveillance the opened-up
space of (mainly fiscal) freedom.
These tensions and contradictions are the discursive counterpart of two
types of struggles: the struggle amongst lawyers, doctrinal academics and
practitioners for the ultimate authority and symbolic power of legitimate legal
knowledge and discourse. Such authority can only be acquired if the rules of
legitimate legal discourse are obeyed; hence, the Fiducie had to be
incorporated in the mythology of French law, and thus reinforced it. The
second struggle opposes an emerging intemationallegal elite to French
administrative technocracy. The Fiducie, if it could have fulfilled the same
fund management functions of the trust, would have been one of the means of
increasing the economic power (understood here as a broad notion of
economic government) of international legal experts, marginalising that of
French state technocrats. However, there is no clear victory of one type of
agent, or of one type of knowledge, over another in the conflictual dynamics of
the Fiducie.
The first chapter of this thesis lays down the empirical foundations of
the present doctoral study by providing a description of the 1992 Bill and of
the context of its emergence (Chapter I, Section I). It then explains the adopted
approach, and in particular, the understanding of "legal culture" and its role as
an analytical and structuring element in this thesis (Chapter I, Section IT). The
theoretical framework grants a central place to the epistemological processes
in French legal culture. These processes are understood not as systemic
4
abstractions but as processes grounded in professional struggles and practices
of power. The theoretical framework is built on Foucauldian discursive
analysis, which will be complemented by P Bourdieu's understanding of social
"fields", allowing to establish a connection between discursive sites and power
struggles.
Within this discursive analysis, specific reference will be made to
Lenoble & Ost's idea of "mytho-logic", according to which legal discourse
uses reason and logic to reinforce its own mythology of law, represented as
unitary and coherent. The Foucauldian notion of Governmentality will then be
used to understand a second discursive dimension of French legal culture.
Finally. Pierre Bourdieu's work on the notion of field will be referred to and
complemented by Yves Dezalay's studies on the recent influence of
international legal practice on the French fields of law and power.
Chapters II and illdelve deeper into the French law's epistemic
tradition, dominated by legal doctrine and shaped by the juridical discourse of
sovereignty. Legal doctrine is understood here as a form of knowledge
governed by certain discursive rules and traditionally produced by academic
lawyers or professors. It is the knowledge of the "Keepers of the Temple" as
Dezalay would put it, that is, the sacred mythology deployed to protect the
God-like figure of law." In our opinion, it does not belong to a certain type of
agents as, to a certain extent, anyone can perform the function of "Keeper of
the Temple".
The relevant discursive rules are those imposed by the juridical
discourse of sovereignty, a mytho-Iogic rooted in history and in French law's
origins in the medieval cross-fertilisation of the sacred and human law. The
nature and power of such discourse is symbolic. Chapter II provides a general
6 Dezalay, "Des Grands Pretres du droit au marchs de I'expertise juridique", Politiques
et Management Public, vol 12, n 2, juin 1994,203.
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theoretical map for this discourse and then applies its theoretical findings to
the specifics of doctrinal discourse on the trust and the Fiducie. The principle
of absolute ownership, which grounds the rejection of the trust, is particularly
illustrative of the functionings of the juridical discourse of sovereignty. This is
why this concept and principle will be explored in detail in Chapter m. In
particular, there will be a study of doctrinal arguments raised in other civilian
jurisdictions which have been faced with the issue of introducing the common
law trust: Louisiana and Quebec. The epistemological role and importance of
absolute ownership will be described as one of the main reasons why the
Fiducie fails to reproduce the split ownership of the trust.
The 1992 Bill also includes a detailed anti-evasion/avoidance tax
section. The tax regulation is only one, albeit the most important, of the
numerous illustrations on the imperative of surveillance which has dictated the
rejection of the trust and the absence of any similar flexible screen-like devices
in French law. The surveillance of ownership, the idea of a governable society
and individual as transparent units, the theme of visibility are the product of a
certain mentality of rule or Governmentality as Foucault would put it.
proper means and ends of government. Chapter IV explores the notion of
Governmentality and argues that it is historically rooted in Napoleonic rule.
The statutory formulation of the Fiducie, explored in chapter V, provides an
insight into the existing dialectical tensions in Governmentality between
liberalism and the impulse to police and constrain freedom in a grid of
visibility.
The 1992 Bill also indicates a transitional moment, a change in
discursive equilibrium, as it seems that, as a whole, it is reflects an unspoken
questioning of the very possibility of economic government. Indeed, the fiscal
administration's anxieties, reflected in the tax section of the Bill, are
symptomatic of a fear of loss of control over resources because of the
6
possibilities opened up by global financial management. Similarly, the Bill
seems to indicate a certain resignation in the face of pressures on French law
and lawyers to compete on a global level. The emerging globalization rhetoric
which underlies the Bill is not a purely abstract discursive phenomenon.
Chapter VI seeks to establish a link between the discursive phenomena
described above and recent changes linked to the internationalisation of law
and legal practice, and the new deal this entails at the level of power struggles.
The Fiducie is not simply the product of an abstract evolution of French law
towards "global law". The emergence of this new institution is to be seen in
the light of a changing equilibrium in relations of power within the juridical
field of legal expertise, as well as in the light of the emerging role of a new
legal elite in the field of economic power. The conclusion will consider, in the
light of this thesis, what hypotheses can be formulated as to the reasons for the
Bill's failure and the future of the Fiducie.
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CHAPTER I
THE FIDUCIE, AN EMPIRICAL VEHICLE FOR A
JOURNEY THROUGH FRENCH LEGAL CULTURE
This first chapter has two purposes. First, it seeks to provide sufficient
information on the event which represents the empirical focus of this thesis:
the 1992 legislative proposal to introduce the trust, under the name of Fiducie,
into French law. The second aim is to sketch a clear picture of the theoretical
inspirations and resulting framework within which the analysis of the Fiducie
is developed in this thesis. The text and context of the Bill form the raw
material of this doctoral study, and a clear conceptual map of the chosen
theoretical approach of this technical topic will be provided in this chapter and
developed in the subsequent chapters.
SECTION I • EMPIRICAL BASES
In this section we examine both the text and the context of the 1992
Bill entitled "De la Fiducie" and laid before the French Parliament on the 20
February 1992.1
1. Context
The genesis of the Bill is to be found in the interplay of three types of
factors: (i) a persuasive doctrinal challenge to the orthodox view which
established the incompatibility of the trust with French law, (ii) the 1985
Hague Convention on the law applicable to trusts and on the recognition of
1Doc. Ass. Nat. 2583.
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trusts in "non-trust" countries, and in the late eighties, (iii) a proposal by
professional organisations to integrate into French law fiduciary techniques
under the generic term of affidation/'
The thesis of C Witz on the Fiducie which was published in 1981 and
widely praised for its persuasive, thoroughly researched and grounded
arguments, is an important landmark in the genesis of the Fiducie.3 The
drafters have referred to Witz's work to ground their proposal." The thesis of
C Witz subtly undermines the three-decade reign of the orthodox doctrinal
view, established in 1948 by Motulsky, according to which the trust is
incompatible with French law.s Witz does not directly challenge the orthodoxy
and indeed reasserts the fact that, the rights created under a trust cannot fit into
existing categories. However, he argues that it is possible to create and
introduce a modem legal institution similar to the trust and inspired by the
Roman law Fiducia and existing fiduciary practices. The new Fiducie
proposed by Witz would, according to its creator, respond to a need linked to
the deficiencies of existing techniques of management and provision of a
security in business transactions. Witz defines the Fiducie as:
" a legal act by which a person, the fiduciary, who has become the holder of a
property right, is restricted in the exercise of that right by a number of duties,
amongst which there generally is a duty to transfer his right after a certain
period has lapsed, to either the settlor or a third party beneficiary"."
2 The term "affidation" has the same Latin root as the Fiducie, that is "fides" which
means "trust".
3 La Fiducie en droit prive fran9ais, Economica, Paris, 1981. For a more detailed
discussion see Chapter II.
4 J de Guillenchmidt, "La Fiducie pour quai faire? Presentation de I'avant-projet de loi
relatif a la Fiducie", Rev ue de Droit bancaire, n 19, Mai/Juin 1990, 105.
S See discussion in Chapter" of Motulsky's "De I'impossibilite juridique de creer un
trust anglo-saxon sous I'empire de la loi francaise", Revue Critique de Droit
International Prive, 1948, 451.
6 My translation of "La fiducie est un acte juridique par lequel une personne, Ie
fiduciaire, rendue titulaire d'un droit patrimonial, voit I'exercice de son droit limite par
une serle d'obfigations, parmi lesquelles figure generalement celie de transferer Ie
droit au bout d'une certaine perlods soit au fiduciant, soit a un tiers beneficiaire", in
Witz op.cit. note 3 at p 15.
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The definition proposed by Witz has not been adhered to by the drafters, who
were much more influenced by the 1985 Hague Convention. Witz envisaged
the introduction of the new device through practice and its progressive
acceptance by the courts. Hence, his definition reflects this perspective and
lacks legal precision. He does not define the nature of the fiduciary's and the
beneficiary's rights, or that of the act from which the Fiducie would stem. His
focus is on the limitation of the fiduciary's title by the beneficiary's rights.
Witz's definition remains incomplete as it does not reflect the division of
ownership into legal and equitable rights, which is unknown to French law
and stands in conflict with the fundamental notion of absolute ownership.
One of the aims, also echoed in the 1992 Bill, was to provide a
general framework upon which new techniques would develop independently
of any legislative recognition or regulation. However, his definition is too
imprecise to be included in a statute.
On the other hand, the 1985 Hague Convention provided a definition
of the trust which was sufficiently precise to be included in a statute and does
not contain any reference to the division of ownership into legal title and
beneficial title.The aim of this private international law convention is to
ensure the worldwide recognition of trusts, even in countries which do not
have and may not wish to introduce this institution. The drafters of the
Convention wanted to make it possible for civil lawyers to understand and
think of the trust without the obstacle of fragmented titles and equitable rights.
Their "translation" of the trust inspired the drafters of the 1992 Bill.7
The third factor in the genesis of the 1992 Bill was to be found in an
initiative of the Association Francaise des Entreprises Privees (A.F.E.P).
7 See Chapter VI for a detailed account of the Convention.
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This body, representing private businesses in France, issued a draft legislative
text proposing the introduction of an institution similar to the trust and named
affidation. This text was not adopted. Another text, proposed by the C.S.N, the
national Council of Notaries, also failed. Nevertheless, the pressure from the
representatives of branches of business and of the legal profession was evident
and increasing. As a result of these initiatives, a proposal for a new Bill was
then issued by the French Ministry of Justice and presented by their drafters in
December 1989, at a professional symposium organised by "Legal Studies and
Services Limited" and chaired by a renowned practitioner.i This proposal was
then formulated as a Bill and, after three years of discussions between the
Ministry of Justice and the tax authorities,. the Bill was laid before the French
Parliament in 1992.9
The inventors of the Bill's Fiducie clearly set out their aims and
methodology in a presentation and commentary of the Bill for the benefit of
practitioners and the business world. 10 The drafters of the part of the Bill
which constituted the Fiducie as a new institution were J de Guillenchmidt
and A Chapelle, in charge of the Commercial law section of the Civil Affairs
department in the Ministry of Justice. The part of the Bill dealing with the
fiscal regulation of the Fiducie was drafted separately and anonymously by the
Ministere des Finances.
The drafters justified their proposal by referring to the implications of
developments in the international context; the ratification of the 1985
Convention would allow an even easier recourse to common law trust
techniques which would have to be recognised as valid by French courts.
8 This information stems from the drafters themselves, see "Trusts, business trusts et
Fiducie" , Les Petites Affiches, n 76, 25.06.90, 4.
9 See Le Monde, 19.02.1992
10 See Chapelle, de Guillenchmidt, op. cit. note 8, see also an interview with J de
Guillenchmidt in dissertation by T Clay, "La Fiducie au regard du Trust", D.E.A, Paris
II, 1993.
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There would be an even greater incentive to export business transactions to
trust countries. Thus, a French trust would respond to the emerging needs of
international legal practice in France in the face of the pressures on regulatory
competition, that is, of competition to attract businesses on the basis of
favourable legal and fiscal rules. It would also fit into a more general
evolution of property and the use of full ownership as a security in commercial .'_I
transactions.
The term Fiducie was preferred both to the English word "trust" and to
"affidation" suggested by the world of practice. The word Fiducie has no
pejorative undertone and suggests a connection with the Roman law
institution named ''fiducia''. The single notion of Fiducie would cover a wide
range of applications in the area of finance and banking, in labour relations
and in most family situations, including the specific case of the transfer of a
business unit from one generation to the next. The use of the Fiducie for
charitable and public interest purposes would offer more flexible solutions
than the foundation. The aim was to provide a general framework for this
variety of possible applications, as opposed to a specific regulation envisaging
all possible uses. The drafters asserted that they wanted to stand against the
contemporary tendency of the legislature to provide a plethora of specific
regulations.
The drafters reasserted the impossibility of transplanting the trust. In
their view, this would have been impossible given the importance for the trust
of equitable rights, the existence of specific means of enforcement in Common
Law courts and of an organised body of professional trustees. The Fiducie had
to be formulated as a French institution, fitting into its legal context. In
particular, the Fiducie was constructed independently from the trust so as to
respect fundamental principles in French law, i.e, the principle of unity of
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patrimony, the protection of inheritance rights and the notion of absolute
ownership. 11 The Fiducie was also to be required to fit into the general spirit
and texts of the Civil Code. Itwas defined simply as a transfer of full
ownership by the settlor to the fiduciary who must thereby act according to a
specified aim or for a public interest purpose. The fiduciary would have full
ownership rights and the settlor and beneficiary would have only rights in
personam against the fiduciary.
The drafters chose to be more specific than the 1985 Convention in
one important aspect: they preferred the notion of transfer of rights and assets,
rather than just the legally unspecific idea of "control and powers" of the
trustee over the trust fund. Under article 2 of the Convention, assets are placed
under the control of the trustee who has "the power and the duty" to manage
the fund. The drafters preferred to specify that a transfer of property rights
determines the legal origin and nature of the fiduciary's rights. The fiduciary is
the owner although his rights are limited by a general contractual duty of
management of the assets transferred.
The Fiducie, although it was designed to fit into French positive law,
would be a new institution which could not be compared to any existing
corporate entities. It was not an artificial legal person. The constitution of this
new institution was based on three key axes. First, the transferred rights and
assets were to form an autonomous fund. Secondly, the function and liability
of the fiduciary were to be precisely defined. Lastly, the protection of third
party interests had to be ensured.We will look at each of these in tum.
The protection of the beneficiary's interest was organised around the
idea that the assets and rights transferred to the fiduciary would form a
11 See Chapter II for a full discussion of these princlples.
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separate and autonomous fund within the fiduciary's patrimony.V This is an
exception to the rule of unity of patrimony, according to which each legal
subject owns only one patrimonial unit. The fiduciary would have had two
patrimonies and would have been obliged to clearly separate his/her own
assets from those of the Fiducie. Even if the full ownership of the assets was
transferred to the fiduciary, his/her prerogatives over the assets were to be
limited by a number of duties and obligations defined in the instrument. The
beneficiary's rights stemmed from these duties, which were to be enforceable
and controllable by the courts. The constitution of an autonomous fund was
intended to protect the beneficiary against the fiduciary's personal creditors.
Furthermore, the autonomous fiduciary fund could not be part of the estate of
the deceased trustee. The drafters did not go any further in the protection of
the beneficiary, especially as regards the issue of third parties with notice of
the beneficial entitlement. Such entitlements were not defined as a property
right. It is unclear what rights a beneficiary could have had against a third
party with notice to whom the trust property was fraudulently transferred. 13
The drafters underlined that the second major axis of their new
institutional construction was to be the central role of the fiduciary. The
fiduciary was to be required to act with due regard to the confidence invested
in himlher by the settlor. This goes further than the general requirement of
good faith in legal relations and implies that this relation relies on the personal
qualities of the fiduciary, who would not normally have been allowed to
delegate his/her functions. There was no specific qualification required to be
appointed as a fiduciary apart from the usual requirements of a minimum
12 A patrimony is the totality of assets, rights and also liabilities and debts that a legal
subject accumulates during hislher lifetime.
13 The proposed legislation did not envisage the issue of tracing as a possible remedy
for the beneficiary although the "droit de suite" of secured creditors could have
provided an equivalent solution.
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standard of competence and ethics common to most professions. The
fiduciary's liability would have been determined according to existing general
rules, except as regards criminal liability. Moreover, the court could have
intervened to replace the fiduciary. Nothing more was provided regarding the
the powers of the fiduciary. J de Guillenchmidt stated that the aim was to
avoid a heavy and detailed regulation of the fiduciary contract. Case law and
the courts would have provided a more detailed regulation. Following the
tradition of codification, the Fiducie was to be a flexible and barely regulated
contractual structure.l"
The third organising principle of the new institution was the protection
of third parties. The third parties who were to benefit from a special protection
are the settlor's creditors as the Fiducie could be used to make the settlor
appear insolvent. No specific registration scheme would have been set up as
this would have increased the burden of formalities. However, a Fiducie could
have been declared unenforceable by a court as a result of the application of
three existing procedures: (i)The action paulienne of Article 1167 of the Civil
Code would have allowed the settlor's creditors to chaIlenge any fraudulent
transfer by the settlor in order to defeat their rights. (ii) The settlor's secured
creditors would be able to trace the property offered as a guarantee for their
debt even if it had been transferred to a fiduciary. (iii) Any transfer of a
company's assets during the periode suspecte, that is a period of maximum
two years before the company is declared bankrupt, could be held fraudulent.
In the face of this movement to create a sphere of contractual self-
determination where the settlor could shape the future of hislher assets and
freely organise their management, the fiscal administration imposed detailed
restrictions. A 1992 budgetary statute illustrates this bureaucratic reaction. In
14 See interview op. cit. note 10.
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its article 55, it institutes a mechanism allowing the fiscal administration to
take into account revenues produced by assets transferred abroad. The 1993
Budget generalised this principle; it provides that any French business
acquiring a share of at least 10 percent of the capital of a company located in a
tax haven will have to deal with the revenues of this company as if it were
theirs. These revenues will be taxed. IS
This budgetary initiative is an attempt to regulate techniques of
defeasance, used by big companies such as Peugeot, that entail the setting up
of a foreign trust and the transfer abroad of a debt and of a portfolio of assets
intended to service the debt at a minimum fiscal cost. Article 55 of the 1992
statute provides that the revenue of such assets transferred to a trust are
taxable. This illustrates the approach of the fiscal administration and explains
its defensive attitude as regards the Fiducie, which was perceived as enabling
the defeasance technique.
The hostile response of the fiscal administration was not countered by
enthusiasm amongst the legal profession. Some have regretted that the Bill did
not specifically attribute the drafting of fiduciary instruments to notaries.i'' It
seems that the use and advantages of the Fiducie for the legal profession were
not clearly or at least generally identified. Itwas perceived as an ideal way of
organising the succession to small family businesses. 17 At the forefront of this
activity would have been thefiduciaire and practitioners have identified this
function as an emerging area of professional and deontologically organised
practice." The importance of this particular application of the device has
IS See J P Le Gall, "La 'butte ternoln' de la Fiducie", JCP (E), 1993, n 1-2, 85.
16 Jeantet, "Projet d'introduction du trust en France sous Ie nom de Fiducie", Revue
Juridique at Politique, 1990, 280.
17 P Decheix, "La Fiducie, mode de transmission de I'entreprise?" and Y Streiff "Le
droit civil au secours de la transmission des entreprises; I'avant-projet de la loi sur
laFfiducie", both in Les Petites Affiches, 9 Mai 1990, n 56,18 and 23.
IS D Desurvire, "Bientat un trust franco-trancals?", Les Petites Affiches, 22.02.1993, n
23,14.
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been questioned by J de Guillenchmidt who has noted that the Fiducie would
only be useful in the rare situations where the head of the family business
retires or dies and there is no immediate successor."
A further example of the weaknesses in the drafting concerned the
specification of the rights of the beneficiaries. During the discussions prior to
the formulation of the Bill, a group of experts in banking law pointed out this
shortcoming in the proposal, which was not resolved in the later Bil1.2oThe
beneficiary's precise entitlements as regards third parties were unclear, as the
Bill did not specify whether third parties with notice of the beneficiary's rights
would be bound by them, let alone what type of notice (actual, constructive)
would operate. The beneficiary's rights were ill-defined and seem less than the
beneficial ownership protected by Equity.21 The nature and extent of the
fiduciary's obligations were also uncertain. Too much reliance was placed on
the courts to regulate these issues.
The Bill, which was initiated by the French Ministry of Justice, was
never debated in Parliament and was finally dropped from the legislati ve
agenda in Autumn 1994. Despite some concern about the effect of the Fiducie
on entrenched inheritance rights, there was no real opposition to the Bill,
which was simply not perceived as a legislative priority and, eventually,
forgotten. Nevertheless, the Fiducie remains a topic of discussion in
professional and doctrinal literature. Professional symposia are still organised
on the subject. Since 1994, the Bar has been ready to recognise the function of
19 See interview op. cit. note 10.
20 "La Fiducie: Contributions a I'avant-projet de loi", Revue de droit Bancaire, sept/oct
1990, n 21,176.
21See also M cantin Cumyn, "L'avant-projet de loi relatif a la fiducie, un point de vue
civiliste d'outre-atlantique", Dalloz, Chronique, 1992, 117.
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trustee. Article 3-26 of the Internal Regulation of the Bar of Paris allows
avocats to undertake duties as a trustee or ajiduciaire.22
The Fiducie has indirectly reappeared in Parliament on three recent
occasions. In 1996, a parliamentary report, known as the rapport Marini,
proposed a general reform of company law. The introduction of the Fiducie
was included as part of a general framework of legislative reform and
modernization. The primary objective would be to provide a piece of
legislation ensuring the competitiveness of French law in years to come. This
implies a questioning of the institutional structure of corporations and a return
to the flexibility of contract, favourable to the interests of shareholders.f The
Fiducie would be one of the more flexible contractual tools offered to
corporate organization. More flexibility would not entail less regulation of
corporate activity. Such regulation would be indirect and organised through
means of internal control. Emphasis would be placed on informing
shareholders and the use of accounting methods and professional controls. The
Fiducie would fit into this new framework.
The second occasion where the Fiducie might be said to have appeared
also occurred in 1996. InJuly, a short and technical text was passed which, in
its article 49, allows the protection of assets deposited in a bank through a
transfer of ownership to the bank holding the property for the depositor. The
assets cannot be claimed by either the depositor's creditors or the banks.
Whether this amount to a division of ownership similar to the trust's is
debatable but similarities have been drawn. Indeed, it has been argued that it
introduced the Fiducie by the back door.24
22Droit et Patrimoine Hebdo., 20.12.94.
23 Bonneau, Hovasse, Vidal "La Modernisation du Droit des Societas: Ie Rapport
Marini", Jurisclasseur, Droit des Socletes, nov .1996,4.
24Decheix, "La Fiducie ou du sens des mots", Dalloz, 1997, n 6, 35.
18
The same year, another proposal drafted by an organisation of regional
businessmen located in the West of France was submitted to the Ministry of
Economy and Finances.2s The Fiducie was presented, once again, as a useful
tool to ensure the survival of small and medium regional businesses through
their preservation as economic entities over several generations. The Fiducie
would enable this preservation of a family business as economic entity despite
the French succession laws' requirement to divide ownership amongst
protected heirs. The entrenched succession rights would be moved onto
property placed in trust and producing revenue. The Minister welcomed this
initiative and created a new study group on the Fiducie. However, the work of
this think tank, directed by C Champaud, has still not been concretised
because of the inertia of the tax authorities.i"
At the doctrinal level too, academic interest in the Fiducie has not
altogether disappeared. Recent doctoral studies have addressed the issue of the
Fiducie. An important recent thesis has referred to the Fiducie to demonstrate
the current evolution of the notion of ownership towards a recognition of its
economic, as opposed to strictly legal, dimension.f This recent doctoral work
adopts a traditional approach, focussing on the conceptualisation of ownership
in French law, arguing that this central concept should and will adapt to
current changes in order to take into account the reality of economic
ownership. The Fiducie is, according to the thesis, one of the new institutions
2S See C Champaud, "La Transmission des Entreprises Patrimoniales", Revue
Internationale de Droit Economique, 1998, n 1, 35.
26 C Champaud who headed this study group claims in the above article that this may
be linked to the strategy of state technocrats who intend to convert to a career in the
private financial sector and are thereby preserving their future interest in business
concentration.
27 G Blanluet, "Essai sur la notion de propriete economlqua en droit prive francais-
Recherches au confluent du droit fiscal et du droit civil", These, Paris II, 1998. See
Intoduction and Conclusion.
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which reflects a more economic understanding of ownership and which a more
up-to-date doctrinal notion of ownership should be able to encompass.
At the level of practice too a process of reconceptualisation of well-
established legal forms is emerging. Institutions which were not previously
named as Fiducies are now being identified as fiduciary devices." One of
these is based on an well-established institution: the usufruct. Le quasi-
usufruit sur valeurs mobilieres is based on article 587 of the Civil Code,
which allows the usufruct of moveable and consumable property. This quasi-
usufruct of stocks and shares enables the title holder to dispose of the property
and replace it by new securities, just as a trustee would. The freedom of
management within this type of arrangement is only limited by the
requirement that the assets of the usufruct be at least equal to their initial value
when they have to be returned to the beneficiary of the usufruct. The
beneficiary is the person to whom the property will be re-transferred after it
has been managed and possibly increased in value by the quasi-usufruitier, the
trustee-like temporary title holder.
As regards new fiduciary practices, it has been argued that there have
been new discoveries in a variety of fields.29 Even if the Bill did not focus on
the possible charitable applications of the new device, there have been new
applications of the law regarding foundations and associations which suggest a
more trust-inspired approach to the field of charitable activity.'"
New fiduciary mechanisms have been constructed by practitioners,
such as the defeasance .Trust-like devices are also used in the context of legal
practices relating to insurance services. Insurance policies are increasingly
based on the insurer taking up the function of an investor, with the obligation
28 See Gobin, "Fiducies sans la Fiducie", J.C.P (N), n 44-45, 1994, 315.
29 ibidI I .
30 ibid, at p 318.
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.,
to return the invested sums if and when the risk realises. In the area of
pensions, trust-like practices have become the basis of significant changes,
with the increasing prominence of insurance policies as investment pension
schemes."
The Bill has widened the perspective of French legal analysis by
adding to law a new conceptual element, a new way of analysing legal
relations, despite its lack of regulated status. This could also indicate a
pragmatic recourse to fiduciary devices despite the lack of a regulatory
framework for the Fiducie.32
2. Text
The text of the Bill comprised 64 sections and was divided into four
parts. It was presented with the usual introductory Preamble setting out the
rationale and spirit of the proposed legislation. The following gives a
descriptive account of the most important aspects of the Bill and Preamble.V
2.1 The Preamble and the legal classification a/the Fiducie
The Preamble follows the structure of the Bill. It also has four parts;
the first deals with the Bill's general provisions: the parties, the essential
terms, the object of the Fiducie, the protection of third parties, the protection
of entrenched inheritance rights and the role of control of the court. The
second part explains the accounting provisions and the third, fiscal regulation.
Finally the fourth part deals with consequential provisions.
The Preamble begins with an explanatory definition of the trust. It
claims that the Civil Code contains no institution similar to the trust, through
31 ibid at p 322.
32 See also Lucas,Thesis, 1995, "Le Droit des Societes et Ie Droit des Contrats a
I'epreuve des transferts temporaires de valeurs immobilieres".
33 The full text in French is given in appendix A.
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which ownership of assets is transferred to a trustee with a duty of
management. The specificity of this device is identified in the Preamble as the
fact that the trust creates a patrimony or fund managed for a particular
purpose, and independent from the personal patrimony of the legal owner
(patrimoine d'affectation). As a result, this patrimony cannot be reached by
the private creditors of the fiduciaire and will not be part of his estate.
The Preamble incorporates the policy arguments developed by the
drafters and already set out in this chapter. In particular, it asserts the
importance of the protection of third parties and protected heirs. It represents
the Fiducie as a necessary measure intended as a response to the emerging
needs of the legal profession. It underlines that the Fiducie was expected to be
used primarily as an instrument of wealth management and as a security,
replacing existing and more formal devices or complex and uncertain
practices. The fiduciaire is put at the forefront of the proposed Bill. He was to
be the "mainspring" of the device. The word Fiducie, derived form the Latin
wordfides (trust), was chosen to reflect the specific and inherent element of
trust in the relationship between the settlor and thefiduciaire. This
relationship is a contractual one: this is a central tenet of the proposed
institution.
2.1.1 The Fiducie as a contract
The Preamble stresses that the Fiducie must fit into the existing legal
order, and to this end, it was defined as an ordinary contract governed by the
general principles of the law of contract. The classification of the Fiducie as a
contract was an important aspect of its legitirnisation and differentiation from
the trust. C Witz, in his doctoral study, had argued that a modern Fiducie
would nevertheless be rooted in the Roman contractual device calledfiducia.
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The drafters have clearly expressed that the Fiducie was inspired by the trust.
The Preamble argues that the Fiducie reproduced one of the essential
characteristics of the trust by entailing the creation of a patrimony or fund
managed for a particular purpose and separate from the jiduciaire's own assets
(patrimoine d'affectation). As a result, this patrimony cannot be reached by the
private creditors of the jiduciaire and will not be part of his estate.
However, the legitimisation of the Fiducie implicitly depends on
distinguishing it from the trust as a structure of ownership and property
institution. The drafters were even tempted to avoid any reference to a transfer
of ownership at all, and instead, to mention only a transfer of rights and assets
to the jiduciaire. Thus, the legal definition of the Fiducie as a contract is an
attempt to embrace only certain aspects of the trust, whilst discarding the
trust's conceptualisation of ownership. Underlying this complex and
paradoxical characterisation is an implicit understanding of the trust as
predominantly a means of splitting ownership.
2.1.2 The Bill's understanding of the trust and its limitations
The Bill's definition of the Fiducie betrays the following vision of the
trust: a division of ownership between the trustee and the beneficiary, where
the beneficiary has a definable right in rem, a type of ownership. InEnglish
law, this understanding of the trust reached its Zenith with the rule in
Saunders v Vautier.34 In this case, it was held that a beneficiary entitled to the
full equitable interest can require the trustees to transfer the trust property to
him and to end the trust. This rule seemed to indicate a recognition that the
beneficiary's right is an entitlement to the property itself: the beneficiary's
interest is ownership. This doctrine was taken one step further with the claim
34[1841] 4 Beav 115.
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that for a trust to exist, it must be possible to identify all the beneficiaries and
therefore, ultimately, where the equitable ownership lies.
The post-war development of the discretionary trust brought about
changes as regards this idea of equitable ownership. The tax-planning
advantages of the discretionary trust depend precisely on the fact that the
rights of the beneficiaries are kept vague and variable and are therefore more
difficult to tax. To accommodate these developments in the use of trusts, the
courts, in a series of cases culminating with the decision of House of Lords in
McPhail v Doulton, considerably relaxed the certainty of object requirement."
Thus, the focus of trust law shifted from the ascertainable beneficiary to the
trustee's duties and the ability of the courts to control and execute the trust.
"Trustees' duties which, by being made more central to the institution of
discretionary trusts, are coming to take the place once reserved as sacred to
equitable beneficial interests"."
It seems that "[d]iscretionary trust powers are coming to colour the
whole law of trusts and powers' and it has become "evident that the law is less
firmly attached to the concept of trustees holding a legal interest and
beneficiaries holding an equitable interest".37 Hence, the traditional view of
the trust as a "property receptacle" or a structure of divided ownership coexists
with a vision and practice of trust centred on the duties of trustees, enforced
and controlled by the courts without the need for a beneficiary with locus
standi. With the development of the discretionary trust, trust law has adapted
its understanding of trusts and granted more importance to the contract-like
relationship binding the trustee to the settlor's wishea."
35[1970] 2 All ER 228
36Davies [1970] ASCL 189.
37ibid.
38Seechapter VI, from p 191 for similar developments in international trust law.
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By refusing to model the Fiducie on the traditional property view of
trusts, the Bill has, purposefully or not, constructed a device close to current
trust practice and understanding. However, the unlike the trust, the Fiducie
does operate a full transfer of ownership and as such, is unable to make the
beneficial ownership disappear. Whereas in modern trust practice, beneficial
ownership has become increasingly elusive, the Fiducie does not even enable
its conceptualisation as a separate entity. With the Fiducie, beneficial
ownership cannot be made to disappear as it can never exist. 39
2.2 The Bill
The substance of the Bill has to be considered in order to fully
appreciate how the Civil Code was intended to be amended and the Fiducie
generally regulated. We will therefore look at the abridged translation (in
italics) of key articles, sometimes commented, and a summary of less
important provisions.
The Bill' s first section, which corresponds to the whole of Part I,
details nine articles to be included in the Civil Code. In this first Part, it is
provided that an additional 16th title (sixteenth bis ) is incorporated in Book
three of the Civil Code. It is named "De la Fiducie " and details articles 2062
to 2070-11 as follows:
Art 2062-The Fiducie is a contract by virtue of which a settlor transfers all or
part of his assets and rights to afiduciary who, holding the same separate
from his personal patrimony, deals therewith for a specific purpose benefiting
one or more beneficiaries in accordance with the provisions therein
contained. The settlor himself may be a beneficiary (...)
39See chapter VI.
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A Fiducie cannot be created by will or by a court decision. It is
intended to be the equivalent of the inter vivos private express trust as the
following provision confirms.
Art 2063- To be valid the contract must contain a description of the property
and rights transferred, the mission and the extent of the powers of the trustee,
the names of the beneficiaries or the rules allowing their designation, (...) the
duration of the Fiducie (not more than 99 years).
The contract must be in writing and requires a notarial deed if created to
donate assets.
The Fiducie can only be created expressly and cannot be implied.
Art 2064- When the Fiducie is created for the purpose of donating assets, the
name of the beneficiaries cannot be changed.
Fiscal considerations underlie this provision.
Art 2066- To hold a position as afiduciaire or the director of a body with
fiduciary duties, a person must not have been previously convicted or
declared bankrupt or barredfrom any professional corporation on the basis
of behaviour contrary to honour, honesty and morality.
Art 2067- The fiduciaire must perform his duties personally but may delegate
specific tasks, for which he remains responsible.
Art 2068- In his relationship to third parties, the fiduciary is deemed to enjoy
the fullest powers over the rights and assets of the contract, unless it can be
proved that the third parties had notice of the limitations on his rights.
Art 2069- The fiduciaire has a duty to avoid any mixing of the assets of the
Fiducie with his own assets or those of other Fiducies.
Except as regards the settlor's creditors who have registered their security
prior to the creation of a Fiducie and those Who are the victim of a fraudulent
transfer of assets, the assets of a Fiducie can only be seized as a result of non-
26
payment of the debts incurred in the process of the preservation or
management of the assets in Fiducie.
The assets in the Fiducie, although they form an autonomous
ensemble, are part of thefiduciaire's patrimony, unlike in The Hague
Convention's article 2 trust, according to which the patrimoine d'affectation
does not belong either to the trustee or to the beneficiary.
Art 2070- Where the Fiducie comprises property which has to be transferred
by registered conveyancing, the name ofthefiduciaire in his capacity as such
must be mentioned
Art 2070-1- The fiduciaire must perform his duties in accordance with the
trust invested in him by the settlor.
If the fiduciaire acts in breach of trust or acts in conflict with the interests
entrusted to him, the settlor or the beneficiaries may ask the courts to
intervene to replace the trustee by a temporary administrator or a new
fiduciary, or to terminate the contract.
This provision applies in case of breach of article 2066.
Art 2070-3- The Fiducie cannot be used to deprive the protected class of heirs
from their legally entitled minimum share in the estate. The fund held for the
beneficiaries of a Fiducie may be reduced (...) in accordance with the rules in
articles 2070-5,2070-7 and 2070-8.
Art 2070-5- Where the Fiducie' s assets constitute a business concern, such
reduction does not need to target the business itself and can take effect by
payment of a sum of money.
Art 2070-10- The Fiducie ends when its purpose has been fulfilled.
Alternatively, it can be terminated by judicial decision where all the
beneficiaries renounce their rights, or the fiduciaire dies, or the fiduciaire is
declared bankrupt, or where the fiduciaire is a legal entity and is absorbed or
liquidated.
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However, the courts, at the settlor's or the beneficiary's request, may take the
necessary steps to ensure the survival of the contract.
The above articles constitute Part I of the Bill which reflects the
drafters' concern to avoid envisaging all the possible practical applications of
the Fiducie. This institution was intended to flourish organically according to
the specific needs of the economy and the courts would have had the role of
adapting the device.
Part II of the Bill deals with accounting duties. Section 2 provides that
thefiduciaire must draw up two types of accounts. One is to describe the
assets and liabilities of the fund, the other the income and outgoings and the
dates of their payment into or out of the fund. According to Section 3, these
accounts should be communicated to the beneficiaries upon demand. Section 4
requires that the fiduciaire registers the accounts as prescribed in the Code de
Commerce. Sections 6, 7, 9 provide that the beneficiaries must appear as
creditors ofthefiduciaire, in the legally required statement of accounts.
According to Section 10, a statutory instrument will specify the proper
methods of drawing up such accounts.
Part illcontains the fiscal regulation of the Fiducie and is by far the
lengthiest and most complex part of the Bill. The principle of neutrality of the
Fiducie is applied: according to this principle, for the purposes of taxation a
Fiducie should not have any impact on the liability of the beneficiary or the
settlor. The fiscal administration wants to avoid any situation of opacity as
regards the ownership of assets. It has also taken this opportunity to make sure
that international trust transactions involving French assets are covered by
these anti-evasion/avoidance mechanisms.t''
40 "Fiducia at Fiscalite" J CP (E), 1991, n 13, 150.
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In Section 11, a distinction is established between the beneficiaries
entitled to the income and those entitled to the capital. The remaining
provisions are divided according to the specific form of taxation concerned.
Sections 12 to 22 deal with gift and registration duties and wealth Tax.
According to section 12, if the Fiducie gives effect to a gift to a third party,
payment of duty is required. Where the beneficiary is the settlor himself, no
duty is owed and the fund is included in the calculation of the wealth tax owed
by him. The rate of the gift duty depends on the proximity of kinship between
settlor and beneficiary (Section 13). Where the beneficiary has not been
designated before the death of the settlor the duty is owed and immediately
payable at the maximum rate of 60% (Section 17).
According to Section 18, the calculation of wealth tax payable by the
beneficiary of the income includes the assets in the Fiducie. Such beneficiary
is deemed to be the owner of the capital. When the beneficiary is not yet born
or designated, the fiduciaire must pay wealth tax at the highest rate. The
creation, modification or termination of a Fiducie must be notified to the tax
authorities. Such notification imports registration duties of FF. 5000 and FF.
1000 (Sections 20, 21, 22).
Sections 23 to 36 deal with direct taxation. The income from the
Fiducie is taxable in the hands of the beneficiaries, according to the tax regime
applicable to their activities. Where the beneficiaries entitled to the income
cannot be identified, the fiduciaire must, on their behalf, pay income tax at its
highest rate (Section 23). This provision is clearly intended to prevent tax
avoidance through the use of a Fiducie. The principle of transparency is
applied. It has been argued that such a provision would prevent accumulation-
discretionary Fiducies from emerging.
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Section 24 specifies that the income from the Fiducie is taxable in the
settlor's hands, where the contractual instrument:
-provides for the use by the settlor of the capital or the income, or the
return of the assets to him
-designates him as the beneficiary
The income of the Fiducie consists of the net proceeds of the management of
the assets AND the realised capital gains(Section 25). The settlors or
beneficiaries, except where the latter are corporations, are deemed to own the
assets in the Fiducie, for the purpose of the calculation of Income tax (Section
26).
The fiduciaire must inform the beneficiaries of the implications of the
Fiducie as regards their fiscal obligations. The fiduciaire must also provide to
the tax authorities a statement as to the name and activities of the
beneficiaries, the nature and value of the assets, the value and distribution of
the income (Section 33).
The management of assets in the context of a Fiducie is considered a
remunerated provision of services and the fiduciaire owes VAT as regards
each Fiducie. An occupational tax targets the fiduciaire by reason of his/her
activities, as a member of a professional body (Sections 40 to 42).The
remuneration oifiduciaire is thus acknowledged.
In the part dealing with additional common rules, it is specified that
the preceding fiscal provisions will apply to assets in trust (or other similar
institutions), following the usual rules of territorial jurisdiction laid down in
the Fiscal Code (Section 44). The tax authorities intended here to broaden its
control through its recognition of foreign trusts.
Part IV covers a number of miscellaneous provisions for the
modification of existing legislative texts. It addresses in particular the criminal
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liability of the fiduciaire. Section 59 provides that article 408 of the Code
Penal is to be modified as follows:
Art 408-1: Afiduciaire who has dealt with the fund in badfaith and in breach
of the beneficiaries' interests is liable to afine (between FF. 2000 and FF.
2,500,000) and to imprisonment for a term of 1to five years.
The onerous fiscal regulation of the Fiducie could be one of the major
causes for the Bill's failure. Indeed, it did not gain the expected support
amongst practitioners. The fiscal neutrality of the device had been widely
perceived as a precondition of the success of a French trust." The French
fiscal administration claimed that neutrality would be a basic principle, which
seemed to have been sacrificed where the risk of tax evasion/evasion needed
to be prevented.
However, the fiscal restrictiveness ofthe Bill does not alone explain
the failure of the Bill. It will be argued that one of the reasons for the 1992
Bill's failure is because the Fiducie would have been of little use in the
international business context without the division of ownership of the trust.
It is not the primary purpose of this thesis to provide a functional
account of the Fiducie and to explain its failure as stemming from its
deficiencies as a practical instrument. Indeed the contention of the thesis is
that the failure of the Bill does not stem solely or predominantly from such
deficiencies. Therefore, this thesis does not either provide a conventional
comparative study in order to evaluate the Fiducie as an instrument, or as an
illustration of the ontological qualities of French law.
The 1992 Bill on the Fiducie provides an empirical starting point, one
which has not yet been used in doctoral research; the first question posed is:
41 C Witz in his 1981 thesis recommended fiscal neutrality in his conclusion. Op. cit.
note 3.
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why did the attempt to introduce the trust into French law take the shape of the
Fiducie? Answering this question will in itself enable us to formulate
concluding hypotheses as to why the Bill failed. To provide an answer to this
question, it is the contention of the thesis that an understanding of the
processes of French legal knowledge and practice is necessary. The following
section provides the theoretical grounding for this chosen focus.
SECTION II· COGNITIVE CARTOGRAPHY
The analysis of the Fiducie proposed in this thesis is based on the
following two-fold hypothesis: first, the trust was translated into a distinct
institution named Fiducie because it could not be accepted or reproduced in its
common law form in the context of French legal culture; secondly, the Fiducie
illustrates a tension in French legal culture between the impossibility to
reproduce the trust and the necessity to introduce it. The basic premises of this
thesis is, therefore, that there is such a thing as "French legal culture" and that
it will be explored through this study of the Fiducie. This section seeks to
address, rather than resolve, the following theoretical question: "what is
(French) legal culture?".
The methodology chosen for this doctoral study is a Foucauldian
discursive approach, defined shortly. The application of the discursive or
archaeological method has necessary implications for the definition of the
object of study. This object is identified as French legal culture. However, an
exhaustive definition or account of this notion is not the aim of either this
section or this thesis. More modestly and specifically, the objective is to show
that the Fiducie can be interpreted as an epistemic event giving an insight into
the workings of French legal culture as knowledge and site of struggles.
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1. Archaeology as method
The following sub-section gives an account of the general theoretical
context of Foucauldian archaeology and its link with the central philosophical
question of the subject. This theoretical contextualisation will facilitate and
understanding of the Foucauldian notions of discourse and knowledge
deployed in the thesis. Further, the limits of Foucault's archaeology will be
explored and the usefulness of complementary insights stressed.
1.1 Decentering the Subject
Michel Foucault's archaeological method was set out in The
Archaeology of Knowledge .42 According to him, this method had been
informing his early important works without being clearly formulated until the
methodological statement of The Archaeology of Knowledge.43 It is based on
what Habermas has called "the linguistic tum" which "has placed
philosophisizing on a more secure methodological basis and has led it out of
the aporias of the theories of consciousness.f"
Indeed, in The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault asserts his aim "to
define a method of analysis purged of all anthropologism"." Foucault
nevertheless "wanted not to exclude the problem of the subject, but to define
the positions and functions that the subject could occupy in the diversity of
discourse" .46 Hence, discourse and its rules are placed at the centre of the
archaeological approach. The subject is not completely excluded but does not
constitute the starting point of the approach as s/he is an effect of discourse.
42Tavistock, London, 1972.
43 These books include Madness and Civilization (Tavistock, 1967), The Order of
Things (Tavistock, 1970).
44 Postmetaphysical Thinking, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992 at p 8.
45op. cit. note 8 at p 16.
46ibid.
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Language in its surface manifestation is the archaeological raw material,
without reference to the subject as the origin of meaning. Discourse is not the
outcome of subjective intentions, beliefs or personal psychology of
identifiable authors; thus, discursive analysis does not seek to uncover
meaning willed by the subject: "...discourse is not the majestically unfolding
manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary a
totality in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with
himself may be determined"."
It seems that Foucault's archaeological approach defies any
disciplinary classification. It rejects anthropology's focus on the human subject
but it cannot be described as textual or semiotic. It wants to go beyond
subjective consciousness but it does not embrace a psychoanalytical view of
the subject as shaped by the unconscious. It is concerned with social
phenomena but is not sociological. The archaeological method is more
interdisciplianry than multidisciplinary but it remains essentially
philosophical: it is located at the frontiers of many academic disciplines.
Rather than defining it with reference to these, it is better understood through
its central tool of analysis: discourse.
1.2 Discourse and discursive analysis: power and knowledge explored
An important element and source of confusion in Foucault's
understanding of discourse is this concept's fluctuating meaning. Foucault
accepts the "equivocal meaning of the term discourse, which I have used and
abused in many different senses: in the most general, and vaguest way, it
denoted a group of verbal performances; ...But I also meant a group of acts of
formulation, a series of sentences or propositions. Lastly - and it is this
47ibid. at p 55.
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meaning that was finally used ... - discourse is constituted by a group of
sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements, that is, in so far as they can
be assigned particular modalities of existence ...".48
Thus, Foucault uses the term discourse both in a conventional way, as
a surface manifestation of speech, and in a very specific way: discourse is
constituted of statements which do not exist at the surface level of speech acts,
that is, of what is being said. A statement "is not presented to the perception as
the manifest bearer of its limits and characteristics'C" it is "neither hidden nor
visible" and exists at the limits of language.i"
A discursive analysis is concerned with how and according to what
rules statements shape a discourse. Discursive rules or relations
"are, in a sense, at the limit of discourse ...they determine the group of relations
that discourse must establish in order to speak of this or that object. ...These
relations characterize not the language (langue) used by discourse, nor the
circumstances in which it is deployed, but discourse itself as a practice'V'
It is therefore important to stress that discursive analysis and discourse
are not only situated at the surface level of text or speech which constitute the
raw material of such analysis. A discursive approach is not a textual analysis.
Discourse, in the specific archaeological sense, operates
"at a kind of pre-conceptual level.. ..the 'pre-conceptual' thus described is ...{at
the level of discourse), the group of rules that in fact operate within it".52
Discourse is therefore a pre-conceptual set of rules and practices
governing the production of objects, concepts, subject positions. It shapes
these epistemological figures.
"[W]hat archaeology tries to describe is not the specific structure of science,
but the very different domain of knowledge'T''
48ibid. at p 107.
49ibid. at p 110-111.
50ibid. at p 112.
Slibid. at p 46.
s2ibid. at p 60 and 62.
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Hence, discourse is an essential aspect of the Foucault's archaeological
understanding of knowledge.
Discourse is to be understood as a deep-level epistemic phenomenon.
Foucault has stressed that archaeology does not describe disciplines: discourse
is not co-extensive with discipline. In fact, disciplines are the surface
manifestation of discourser" Discourse shapes deep-knowledge structures or
savoir. "A discursive formation provides the pre-knowledge (savoir) necessary
for the knowledge (connaissancey.f
Connaissances form surface-level units of knowledge such as disciplines and
are the product of savoirldiscourse which operates across disciplines.
In the proposed analysis of the Fiducie, we are examining the deep-
level structures of French legal knowledge which form its cultural basis. We
are going beyond a conceptual analysis of principles such as absolute
ownership, to explore the underlying rules which determine its significance
and role in French legal knowledge. This study is concerned with the various
discourses at the cross-roads of which French law as a recognisable unit
(constituted of legal knowledge-connaissances and rules) has emerged.
Archaeology explores discourse/savoir but also its relationship with
non-discursive expressions of power.
"Archaeology also reveals relations between discursive formations and non-
discursive domains (institutions, political events, economic practices and
processes) ...it tries to determine how the rules of formation that govern
it ...may be linked to non-discursive systems: it seeks to define specific forms
of articulation"."
The relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive is complex,
non-linear and cannot be reduced to a causal analysis.
Deleuze described this relation as follows:
S3ibid.at p 195.
S4see ibid. pp 106-107.
sSG Gutting.Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, CUP, 1984, at p 251.
S60p. cit. note 10 at p 162.
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"discursive relations become associated with non-discursive milieux, which
are not in themselves situated either inside or outside the group of statements
but form ...the specific horizon without which these objects would neither
appear nor be assigned a place in statement itself,.57
These non-discursive horizons are broad, perhaps vague; they are
"that whole domain of institutions, economic processes, and social relations
on which a discursive formation can be articulated".58
Establishing this link is fundamental to the archaeology as
"the autonomy of discourse and its specificity nevertheless do not give it the
status of pure ideality and total historical independence" .59
Foucault is at pains to stress that the archaeology
"makes it possible to articulate ...the analysis of social formations and
epistemological descriptions't'"
This is the aim embraced in the proposed study of the Fiducie.
1.3 The limits of archaeology
Foucault's careful methodological statement leaves a number of
questions open. The first relates to Foucault's statement of the articulation
between discourse and non-discursive social formations. How can this
articulation be defined? Secondly, what is this 'pre-conceptual' level of
discursive analysis?
The limits of Foucault's archaeology are indicated by its replacement
with a genealogical approach which focused more explicitly on a historical
account of the role of power in the constitution of subjectivities. A simplified
understanding of discourse seems to allow for a greater focus on power and
struggles, at the expense of abstract rules of discursive formation. Foucault's
57Foucault, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996, at p 20
s8Foucault, op. cit. note 10 at p 164.
s9ibid. at p164-165.
6Oibid. at p 228.
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archaeological aim seemed too dominated by a desire to find a methodology
which would enable a description of the abstract rules of truth production.
This overshadowed the possibility of a social critique of discursive practices.
However, it is only the overly abstract and systemic aspects of
discursive analysis which will be discarded here. Foucault's complex
understanding of discourse and his powerful statement of the interdependence
between the operation of power and the workings of knowledge have been
echoed in the work of many important contemporary thinkers. Bourdieu
provides a complementary sociological insight through his work on
knowledge as practices enmeshed in the constitution of powerful ruling elites
within given societal fields.61 The Fiducie will not be understood as solely
resulting from the abstract structures of French legal knowledge, as it is also
the product of agents' strategies and their conditioning in the context of field
struggles.
Another problem, rather than limit, of Foucault's discursive approach
is connected to the shifting meaning of discourse and the ensuing difficulty in
defining the level and nature of discursive analysis. In particular, Foucault
asserts that it is "pre-conceptual". This has lead Deleuze to state that a
discursive analysis explores the unconscious of knowledge. However,
Foucault's analysis is not based on psychoanalytical theories. Nor is it an
anthropological search for the pre-linguistic.
Discursive analysis is interpreted here as both an analysis of "surface-
level" phenomena of discourse such as legal logic and underlying and
unformulated (or rather, no longer formulated) myths and symbols. This
61SeeL Wacquant (ed), An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, Polity Press, Cambridge,
1992; P Bourdieu, La Noblesse d'Etat, La distinction, "La Force du Droit: elements
pour pour une sociologie du champ juridique", Actes de la Recherche en Sciences
Sociales, n 64, p 3. It is Dezalays application of Bourdieu's theoretical framework to
and understanding of the French legal profession which will be relied upon in the
following discussion and in chapter VI.
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mythology is "neither hidden nor visible". Its symbols and imagery are the
sedimented remains of pre-modem tradition and tales and constitute the pre-
conceptual grounding of modem legal concepts, ideas and language.
2. French legal culture as object
2.1 Legal culture as an epistemic entity
Method and object are mutually constitutive. The election of Foucault's
archaeology and Bourdieu's reflexive sociology - as applied by Dezalay - will
entail a particular understanding of legal culture as object of study. Foucault
and Bourdieu's work grant a privileged place to knowledge. The chosen
approach privileges an analysis of the epistemic characteristics of French legal
culture.
The Fiducie is the empirical starting point on the basis of which this
analysis is constructed. It is understood as an epistemic event around which
will be sketched "a 'polygon' or rather a 'polyhedron' of intelligibility, the
number of whose faces is not given in advance and can never properly be
taken as finite".62 This polyhedron is French legal culture. There is no
ambition to give an exhaustive description or anatomical picture of French
legal culture. Hence, three faces of this polyhedron have been identified, and
the following chapters are organised around these three aspects: the juridical
discourse of sovereignty, govemmentality and professional field struggles.
These three aspect are interconnected but they do not form a coherent whole
or system. The way these three elements relate to each other will be explored.
It will be argued that the Fiducie is at the cross-roads of discursive practices
62Foucault in an interview quoted in Burchell, Gordon, Miller (eds), The Foucault
Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Harvester Weatsheaf, England, 1991, at p77.
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and epistemic changes embedded in power struggles between agents who
construct and are constructed by their own legal culture.
2.2 The juridical discourse of sovereignty and epistemic tradition
The doctrinal rejection of the trust and the formulation of the Fiducie
are governed by the rules of the juridical discourse of sovereignty. This
discourse underlies the legal logic which structures doctrinal knowledge and
which is taught and conveyed by Professors within French universities. This
knowledge and type of logic dominate the French epistemic tradition. It
constitutes the knowledge of the "Keepers of the Temple" of law.63 In other
words, it is a knowledge attached to the function of legitimisation of law
destined to secure obedience to juridical authority. However, it does not
belong to a pre-defined set of agents; one can become a "Keeper of the
Temple" by fulfilling a number of discursive conditions and respecting the
discipline of the discourse. Hence, the "Keepers of the Temple" are not pre-
defined agents but subject "position[s] that may be filled in certain conditions
by various individuals'V" Discourse itself determines who can be a "Keeper of
the Temple" although they have traditionally been academics.
The legal logic with stems from the juridical discourse of sovereignty
is powerful because it combines reason with myth. This is the notion of
"mytho-Iogic" proposed by Lenoble & Ost and examined in chapter n. The
myth to which legal logic is subsumed is that of the unity, transparency and
gapless of law, echoing the characteristics of the power of its mystical
Originator - once God, or the King. The mytho-Iogic conveys a certain
63 This expression is borrowed and translated from Dezalay's own in Marchands de
Droit, Fayard, Paris, 1992.64
M Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Tavistock, London, 1972 at p 115.
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codified representation of power: juridical power.65 This symbolic code is
rooted in history and in monotheistic Christian society.
Hence, the weight of absolute ownership as a principle of French law
will be explained on the basis of its part in the ritualistic representation of
power - the power of Man, in this case - as unitary and all-mighty. The
juridical discourse of sovereignty is "pre-conceptual" because it provides a
structure of representation of power which underlies and precedes legal and
political concepts and ideas such as political, national, legislative or popular
sovereignty. This pre-conceptual framework is nothing more than the pre-
modem mythology of power which was once spectacularly displayed. Modem
law unsuccessfully tried to cut itself free from the hold of traditional myths
and symbols which have not been eradicated but repressed and pushed into the
background. Paradoxically, they have become more powerful as the invisible
epistemic core of French legal knowledge.
To summarise, the juridical is understood here as a discursive
formation which is not coterminous with law as a discipline. It operates
transversally and can shape other disciplines such as the political sciences. It is
not a discourse about sovereignty as a concept or object. It constitutes the
epistemic preconditions (savoir) of traditional legal knowledge-
connaissances. This juridical savoir is nothing more than a codified
representation of pre-modem power. This epistemic representation of power
constitutes the mythological bases upon which the legitimacy of law lies.
Obedience is the main stake in the juridical and is assumed to derive from a
ritualised representation of power, perpetuated by law. Rationality and logic
are employed to enhance the effect of mythology.
65See VTadros, "Between Governance and Discipline: The Law and Michel
Foucault", (1998),18, O.J.L.S. , 75.
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The modem role of law in techniques of government, peacefully and
purposelessly, co-exists with the juridical ritual of legitimisation to form the
epistemic entity identified as French legal culture.
2.3 French legal culture and Govemmentality
The trust, because it can be used as a screen to conceal ownership,
conflicts with the vision of governable society and the individual as
transparent entities, subsumed under the gaze of the state. This conception of
the conditions in which government can be exercised and its proper objects is
the product of Governmentality.
Governmentality is a combination of rationalities and techniques
concerned with the understanding, construction and exercise of government as
a form of power. Foucault's understanding of government is broad and is not
limited to the exercise of the legislative power. Law is only one of the possible
instruments of government, which can also involve power relations between
individuals.
Governmentality's discursive and epistemological dimension is the
following: it underlies the construction of the object, instrument, goals of
government. French legal culture will reflect such Governmentality as the
result of the modem inclusion of law in the more general technical and
epistemological apparatus of governmental control.
But Governmentality does not reflect a coherent programme or
conception of government. Indeed, there can be conflicting tensions within
Governmentality as it results from a haphazard combination of techniques,
procedures and rationalities. The Governmentality which seems to underlie
French legal culture is characterised by a tension between an impulse to police
and constrain freedom, through surveillance of ownership, particularly visible
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in the fiscal provisions of the 1992 Bill, and a more liberal approach of
enframing liberty.
Governmentality's penetration of law is evidenced by the notion of
Ordre Public - which could be translated as Public Policy. This concept is a
juridified expression of Governmentality. This "juridification" of
Governmentality has two aspects. First, it entails a particular historical
moment when the dominant rationality of rule, with all its inconsistencies,
becomes fossilised into a juridical entity. This historical moment the weight of
which is still being borne is that of the Napoleonic codification. Napoleonic
Governmentality has been enshrined in legal knowledge and culture.
However, and this is the second aspect of juridification, the substantive roots
and content of Ordre Public are ignored and the notion is regarded as
atemporal and adaptable to all epochal changes. This is part of the juridical
mytho-logic, which interacts with the discursive aspects of Governmentality.
This is why it will be argued in this thesis that the rejection of the trust
and even the lack of any comparable device in French law can be understood
in terms of the integration and survival through law of the imperatives of
surveillance and visibility in Napoleonic Governmentality.f
If the rejection of the trust can be explained in terms of
Governmentality, so can the formulation of the Fiducie in its legislative form.
The use of a statutory tool for the introduction of the Fiducie in the Civil Code
entails that the proposed institution is shaped by governmental rationalities
deployed in the context of the legislative definition of a new type of
transactional freedom. A particularly interesting aspect of the new Fiducie is
its apparent political neutrality. The Bill is what one could term a technical
66 See Chapter III.
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piece of legislation. However, the Bill reflects a deep-seated, cultural
Governmentality.
The Fiducie has also entailed a reactivation of epistemological issues
relating to the proper role and limits of government. 67 The Fiducie offers an
insight into the workings of rationalities of government of the economy which
operate at the deep epistemic level. 68
2.4 French legal culture andfield struggles
The non-discursive "horizon" without which the Fiducie could not
have appeared or be assigned a place within French legal culture is constituted
by what Bourdieu calls "social fields". Changes and tensions at the epistemic
level are linked to changes and tensions in the power dynamics of the legal
field. The epistemic (dis)order reflected by the Fiducie echoes the variable
space of social struggles.
A field is a dynamic structure defined at any specific moment in time
by a particular configuration of relations of power or distribution of capital:
"In analytic terms, a field may be defined as a network ... of objective relations
between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence
and in the determination they impose upon their occupants, agents or
institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of
the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands
access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their
objective relation to other positions ..". 69
The dynamics of a field are conflictual and the conflict is located both within
and at the margins of the field; "Each field is the site of struggles. That is,
there are struggles within given fields, and there are struggles over the power
67 See the Preamble of the Bill.
68 See Chapter IV.
69 Bourdieu , interview with L Wacquant in An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, Polity
Press, Cambridge, 1992, at p 97, original emphasis.
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to define a field".70 The aim of these struggles for the agents within a field is
to improve their position, the value of the capital they are able to use, or to
gain access to the type of capital that carries the most weight within the field."
Agents' actions and perceptions as regards a particular field are
determined and mediated by their habitus, which is defined as "the durable
and transposable systems of schemata of perception, appreciation and action
that result from the institution of the social in the body ".72 Like, knowledge-
savoir, habitus operates on an unconscious plane. It is the basis of
unformulated collective strategies of self-promotion of defined groups within
a field. These strategies are not consciously formulated and expressed
objectives, but find their expression in a logic of practice and the "relation of
practical knowledge" of the agent to the field.73 The plurality of habitus of
lawyers and jurists and savoir interact to constitute legal culture.
Bourdieu identifies two fields relevant to a "field study" of law.74The
champ juridique, which can be translated as the legal field or the juridical
field, is the field within which different types of lawyers (mainly academic
jurists and judges) struggle to obtain a monopoly over the symbolic power and
authority of law, which Bourdieu also calls "legitimate symbolic violence".
According to Bourdieu, to understand the dynamics of the legal/juridical field,
it is also important to understand its relation to the field of power. This notion
is ill-defined and seems to refer to state power. In our analysis, the field of
70Bourdieu quoted in C Calhoun,LiPuma, Postone (eds), Bourdieu, Critical
Perspectives, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, at p 6.
71 Bourdieu identifies three species of capital;
"...capital presents itself under three fundamental species ...namely, economic capital,
cultural capital, and social capitaL.To these we must add symbolic capital, which is
the form that one or another of these species takes when it is grasped through
categories of perception that recognize its specific logic", ibid. at p 119. He defines
~uridical capital as essentially symbolic.
2 ibid. at p126-127.
73 dixit Bourdieu op. cit. note 52 at p 128.
74P Bourdieu, "La force du droit. Elements pour une sociologie du champ juridique",
Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, n 64, 3.
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power will be interpreted more broadly as the field of Governmentality, in
other words the field concerned with the particular form of power that is
government, understood in the broad Foucauldian sense. Thus, the juridical
field constitutes the non-discursive horizon of the juridical discourse of
sovereignty, whereas the field of Governmentality is the material dimension of
Governmentality.
The work of Dezalay is used to refine our understanding of the
legal/juridical field and of its relation to the field of Governmentality."
Dezalay's work focuses on practitioners as major players in the legal/juridical
field, and on their relationship with the French state technocracy. His analysis
broadens Bourdieu's understanding of the legal/juridical field as involving
mainly legal academics and judicial interpreters. Thus, legal rules and
institutions are also the product of struggles and professional stakes within the
field of legal expertise and knowledge. In particular, Dezalay has analysed the
impact of the development of international legal elite on the power dynamics
within the French legal field. The model of legal knowledge constituted by
international business has an impact on the structure of the national
legal/juridical field and on the process of creation of legal norms.
In the context of a "field analysis", the stakes involved in the legal
definition and legislative consecration of the Fiducie are part of a broader
professional strategy of self-promotion of an emerging elite of international
legal experts. This elite seeks a prominent position in both the field of
7S Y Dezalay, Marchands de Droit, Fayard, Paris, 1992; "Between the State, Law,
and the Market: The Social and Professional Stakes in the Construction and
Definition of a Regulatory Arena" in MacCahery, Bratton, Picciotto, Scott (eds),
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governmental and economic power and within their own national legal field.
Such strategies are not consciously formulated objectives but the result of
professional pragmatism based on an emerging habitus. The workings of legal
knowledge can be situated in terms of the social stakes of field struggles.
Intemational Regulatory Competition and Coordination, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1996.
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CHAPTER II
THE EPISTEMIC PROCESSING OF THE TRUST IN FRENCH
DOCTRINE: FROM MYTHO-LOGICAL REJECTION OF
THE TRUST TO THE FIDUCIE'S GENEALOGICAL
RESURRECTION
The question posed in the next two chapters of the thesis is: how was the
trust received and processed into its acceptable counterpart, that is, the Fiducie ?
The main hypothesis is that the Fiducie's version of the trust has been shaped by
epistemic contingencies and requirements. This new legal device's legal form and
meaning are the result of how French legal knowledge operated to render the trust
in terms which are understandable and acceptable to it. The consensus amongst
French legal academics and practitioners was, and still is, that there is no
equivalent of the trust's structure of ownership in French law. The trust as a
property institution, that is an institution legally characterised by the proprietary
rights it entails, has no equivalent in French law and needs to be processed and
transformed in order to be received in the French legal system. This chapter will
set out and describe the elements of the general workings of French law qua legal
knowledge relevant to our study of the Fiducie. Chapter illwill focus on the role
and importance of absolute ownership as regards the French epistemic tradition on
the one hand, and the processing of the trust in doctrinal writings and the resulting
definition of the Fiducie, which avoids all reference to the split ownership of the
trust.
The level of analysis of these two first chapters needs to be identified. We
will focus on with the workings of the knowledge of the "Professors" or, as
48
Dezalay would have it, the "Keepers of the Temple". We are concerned here with
the savoir, rather than the connaissances perpetuated by French legal academics.
This distinction, introduced by Foucault, allows us to analyse deep-knowledge
structures or law's savoir, which underlie and are necessary for the formation of
law as a body of knowledge-connaissances, that is, as a discipline with its own
objects, characteristics and content.' To understand the Fiducie in its
epistemological context, we must focus our analysis on the discourses that
constitute French law's savoir, and ultimately the legal rules which form the
object of French law as a discipline.
The epistemic stratum which we are seeking to unearth relies on symbolic
mechanisms primarily connected with the basic social stake and value of
obedience to the law. Even if not all law has as its main function the indi vidual's
compliance to the authority embodied in law, all law is submitted to a political,
and it is argued, epistemic requirement that it must be represented as legitimate to
be obeyed. The Fiducie illustrates this point: the Bill could be described as an
example of facilitative law designed to allow greater transactional freedom, rather
than to secure obedience to a set of legal rules. However, the discursive way in
which the Fiducie was framed in doctrinal, policy and legislative terms, reflects
an underlying epistemic requirement of compliance with a certain model of
legitimacy. This is perceptible in the fact that the Fiducie was carefully
formulated and analysed in both doctrinal writings and policy terms, to avoid any
reference to the split ownership of the trust, which would have threatened its
legitimacy. The first section of the present chapter explores this model of
legitimacy. encompassed in the epistemic workings of French law. It is thus
1 See Chapter I for a more detailed account of Foucault's distinction between sa voir and
connaissances.
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argued that it is this epistemic level, identified as the juridical discourse of
sovereignty, which determined legal arguments regarding the Fiducie.
Doctrinal knowledge is shaped by the epistemic dynamics and logic
identified above, and the analysis in this chapter is based on a study of doctrinal
writings about the Fiducie. However, this logic can also be found in other types
of legal discourse, and indeed the drafters of the Bill as policy makers, and
practitioners commenting on the Bill, have endorsed doctrinal reasoning. They
have thus become "Keepers of the Temple". This demonstrates that what Dezalay
calls "Keepers of the Temple" are subjective positions, rather than embodied
subjects or defined agents such as doctrinal academics. Anyone who has
uncritically absorbed French law's powerful epistemic mythology can undertake
the position of Keeper of the Sacred Temple of Law. Hence, these positions as
subject of discourse can be adopted by policy makers, practitioners or anyone who
becomes epistemologically captured in the type of legal discourse described in the
following chapter.
To summarise, this discourse is defined here as the juridical discourse of
sovereignty and constitutes the epistemic soil of French legal knowledge-savoir .
Hence, this discourse operates at a deep epistemic level and follows a
combination of rules of logic and a mythology of power. According to this
analysis, French legal culture is shaped by a certain mythology perpetuated
through legal logic. This mythology originates in the French history of the
conceptualisation of power as unitary, eternal and sovereign. Section I lays the
theoretical bases of this analysis of French legal culture as shaped by a juridical
mythology of power perpetuated by logic. Section II applies this framework for a
discursive analysis of the doctrinal assertions about the Trust and the Fiducie.
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SECTION I - FRENCH DOCTRINAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE MYTHO-
LOGICAL DISCOURSE OF SOVEREIGNTY
This section draws on the work of Michel Foucault on the idea of "the
juridical" as well as on his archaeological method and understanding of
knowledge as savoir. It seeks to reinterpret and combine Foucault's concepts with
the notion of mytho-Iogic. The proposed hypothesis here is that the juridical
discourse of sovereignty constitutes the basis of French law's epistemic tradition.
This discourse mixes logical structures with mythological images of power and is
enshrined at the institutional heart of the French law school.
Foucault's understanding of the juridical will be re-interpreted on the basis
of the Foucauldian notion of discourse. What Foucault describes as a juridical
theory of sovereignty will be understood as a juridical discourse of sovereignty.
Once this discourse has been defined, its workings will be explained with
reference to the idea of mytho-Iogic, developed by Ost and Lenoble.
1. The Juridical Discourse of Sovereignty as Mytho-logic
1.1 Foucault and the Juridical Discourse of Sovereignty
Recent writings, as well as the publication of a series of lectures given in
1976 at the College de France are the starting point of a re-interpretation of
51
Foucault's understanding of the juridical. 2 Foucault's project and thinking on
power has been marked by an endeavour to move away from the dominant
"juridical and liberal conception of political power"," According to this
"classical juridical theory of power, power is considered as a right owned like
property which can be transferred and disposed of ... ,,4
Juridical sovereignty epitomises this vision of power and constitutes the main
focus of traditional political and legal theory. Foucault's project is to avoid such a
focus and the correlated issue of power's legitimacy. His aim was to formulate an
analytics of power reflecting the plurality and fluidity of power relations, as
opposed to the unity and unidirectionality of power as sovereignty. Indeed,
Foucault understands power as exercised
"in a network within which individuals circulate and are always in a position of
exercising and undergoing power. They never are passive and consenting targets
of power, but always its vehicle. In other words, power transits through
individuals without being applied to them".5
Thus, an alternative to the juridical analysis of power
"will, rather than asking how the sovereign behaves at the top, seek to discover
how, slowly and progressively, in real and material terms, subjects have been
constituted" .6
In the series of lecture referred to above, the main process of constitution
of subjects is discipline. Foucault describes the relationship between discipline
and the juridical vision of power as follows:
2 See M Foucault, /I taut detendre fa societe, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris 1997; Tadros
"Between Governance and Discipline: The Law and Michel Foucault", (1998), 18,
O.J.L.S,75.
3Foucault, "taut detenare fa societe, at p 14, my translation
4ibid., my translation
5 Ibid. at p 26, my translation.
6Ibid., my translation.
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"This theory [of sovereignty] ...has enabled the superimposition of a system of law
over disciplinary mechanisms, thereby concealing the latter's processes and the
fact and technique of domination linked to discipline ... ,7
This has lead some legal scholars to argue that Foucault views law as mere
ideology masking the real functioning of disciplinary power, and seems to
"expels" law from the scope of his studies." However, Foucault has not expelled
law from his various fields of study but he has chosen to avoid the focus, dictated
by traditional legal and political theory, on the issue of juridical sovereignty,
because of the traditional assumption that power is located in one main possessor,
be it the State, Parliament or the Nation.
Foucault's focus is power rather than law but he does not ignore the
importance of law in power struggles and clearly states:
"law generally is the instrument of ...domination ...law (including ...institutions
applying the law) conveys and implements relations which are not relations of
sovereignty but relations of domination ....the legal and juridical systems are
permanent vehicles for relations of domination and polymorphous techniques of
subjection ...the question for me is to ...avoid this central focus in the law on
sovereignty and individual obedience of those subjected to this sovereignty, in
order to reveal in the place of sovereignty and obedience, the problem of
domination and subjection","
It is quite clear that Foucault does not assert that law is an appropriate object for a
study on power. He merely dismisses the "juridical" approach to the question of
power. Moreover, Foucault does not equate law and legal discourse to the
"juridical". According to Tadros,
"The term juridicaL.refers to the conception of power relations which one might
call Austinian. It is neither the case that all law is necessarily 'juridical' in
'Ibid. at p 33, my translation
8 See Hunt, "Foucault's Expulsion of law ...", (1992), 17, 1, Law and Social Enquiry, 1 but
also a rediscovery of Foucault in Foucault and Law, Pluto Press, London, 1994. See
Habermas The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Polity-Blackwell, Cambridge, 1987.9" faut aetendte /a societe, at p 24-25, my translation.
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Foucault's understanding of the term nor that the only way in which juridical
power manifests itself is legal" .10
What does Foucault actually understand by this notion of a "juridical
theory of power"? This idea seems to have a number of synonymous expressions
such as "law's discourse" or "the juridical and political theory of sovereignty". It
can be argued that Foucault did not state very clearly in his writing what he meant
by such expressions. At times, he seems to indicate, disappointingly, that the
juridical theory of sovereignty is law's ideology. He states:
"Why has the theory of sovereignty persisted as the ideology and the main
organising principle of the great legal codes?"ll
However, he also offers a more convincing analysis of the juridical theory of
sovereignty:
"this theory from which one must free oneself in order to analyse power dates
back to the Middle Ages, it dates back to the revival of Roman law; it constituted
itself around the problem of the monarchy and the monarch ...historically, [it] has
had four functions.
First, it described the real mechanics of power under feudal rule. Secondly, it was
used as an instrument and as a mode of legitimation for the constitution of
administrative monarchies. Then, from the sixteenth century and mainly during
the seventeenth century ...the theory of sovereignty was a weapon circulating
between sides and used for one aim or its opposite, either to limit or on the
contrary to reinforce royal power ...Finally, in the eighteenth century, it is this very
theory of sovereignty reactivated through Roman law, which you will find in
Rousseau and his contemporaries, with a different fourth function: at the time, the
stake was the construction, as against administrative, authoritarian or absolute
monarchies, of an alternative model, that of parliamentary democracies". 12
I propose to develop beyond Foucault's understanding of the "juridical
theory of sovereignty", arguing that in some ways Foucault himself hinted that the
"juridical" is more complex than ideology or false consciousness and more
10 Tadros, op. cit. note 10 at p 76.
11/1faut detendre la societe, at p 33, my translation.
12lbid.at p 31, my translation.
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powerful. Indeed, what he describes as a theory has the attributes of a discourse: it
is indistinguishable from the construction and exercise of power; it is strategically
adaptable to different and even contradictory political projects. Foucault's analysis
of historical discourse could be applied to his vision of "the juridical", better
understood as a discourse comparable to historical discourse. Hence,
"[historical] discourse should not be understood as ideology ...we are dealing with
something else, which I am trying to identify, and which would be, if you will, a
discursive tactic, an apparatus of knowledge and power which, precisely because
it is tactical, can be transferred and become the law of formation of a knowledge
and at the same time, the common form of political battles".13
Because Foucault did not analyse the juridical theory of sovereignty as a
discourse, his observations must be re-interpreted and more specifically defined.
This is done with the help of his own conceptual tools. What are the
characteristics of the juridical discourse of sovereignty? It has been argued that it
is a code or a description of an actual form of power. Indeed, Foucault "seems to
use the term both to describe a discursive understanding of power ...and to
describe a particular network of power". 14 The juridical code, is a discursive
formation which once was articulated to a juridical network and organisation of
power; ''The juridical, for Ewald, is a 'code that enabled monarchical power to
constitute itself"'.15 This juridical code has greatly influenced the traditional
vision of law. If we understand this code as a discourse, this entails that it operates
not as a series of coherent propositions concerning the concept of sovereignty, but
as an underlying and powerful murmur, shaping our surface conceptual
understanding of certain forms of power, sometimes embodied in law. However,
13lbid.at p 169. my translation.
14Tadros, op. cit. note at p 81.
IS loldI I .
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this code is inadequate to understand two important and modem forms of power
with which law is now articulated: government and discipline.
The juridical code is still the code which shapes the imaginary of modem
republican law. Law may not function any more on the juridical, Austinian model
of rules and sanctions, but it is still legitimised according to this juridical code,
which, I argue, constitutes law's epistemic imaginary.
"Law's symbolic representation was as a monopoly of the right to violence,
primarily exercised by a Sovereign. Power was symbolically represented as a
possession which is ultimately given to the Sovereign by God ...".16
The juridical discourse of sovereignty is based on this way of representing power
which remains relevant to modem law because of its enduring symbolic and
epistemic function.
The juridico-political theory of sovereignty formulates the legitimisation
of power, centred around the unitary figure of the King. It is underlied by the
separate, deep-level phenomenon of the juridical discourse of sovereignty, with
which it should not be confused. The concepts of legislative sovereignty, state
sovereignty are the surface effects, the tangible illustrations of a deep-level
epistemic phenomenon based on a representation of monarchical power: this
phenomenon has been called the juridical discourse of sovereignty and generates
what Deleuze and Guattari have called arborescent or State form of thought. 17 The
underlying structure of such thought is unitary and hierarchical. This form of
thought has enabled the interiorisation by the subject of the form of the State.
16 ibid. at p 87, original emphases.
17 See P Patton, referring to Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia, Athlone Press, London 1984, in "Michel Foucault: The Ethics of an
lnteuectuar, in B Smart, Michel Foucault: Critical Assessments, vol, 2, Routledge,
London, 1995, at p 107.
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The juridical discourse of sovereignty is not reducible to the discourse of
law; it is a wider phenomenon, cutting across disciplines. However, it does not
encompass all the statements resulting from or made about law. Furthermore, it
constitutes only one aspect of the multiple discourses of law.
The juridical discourse of sovereignty is a deep-level, epistemic
phenomenon which operates to produce, amongst other effects, concepts such as
sovereignty (political, legislative ...) which together perpetuate a conception of
power as unitary, unidirectional and possessed by one sovereign figure- the
individual, the state or Parliament. This discourse precedes legal conceptual
formulations and determines them. It is "pre-conceptual" in the sense that it
constitutes the pre-existing mythology which governs the validity of legal
utterances. This does not mean that it is pre-linguistic or pre-discursive. 18 Rather,
it is informed by an unspoken, or rather no-longer formulated, mythology of
power. The work of Foucault does not provide a satisfactory description of these
pre-conceptual elements." His analysis will therefore be complemented by the
notions of mytho-Iogic as developed by Ost and Lenoble.
1.2 The notion of my tho-logic
The notion of mytho-Iogic is proposed by J Lenoble and F Ost in their
book, Droit, My the et Raison - Essai sur la Derive mytho-logique de fa rationalite
juridiquet' Their argument constitutes a challenge to the view that myth functions
independently of logic or rationality. On the contrary, their argument is that reason
"see chapter I at p
"see chapter I at p
20 Publication des Facultes Universitaires Saint-louis, Bruxelles, 1980. For a summary of
the book, see the article by the same authors: "Founding Myths in Legal Rationality",
(1986), 49, Modern Law Review, 530.
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is subordinated to myth; the legitimacy and truth of law depends on a myth of
rationality as an absolute guarantor of intelligibility and validity; such an absolute
operates as a fantasy and necessitates an over investment of the imaginary. The
legitimisation of law creates and relies upon a foundational myth of the unity,
transparency, coherence and gaplessness of law and the legal system. With
modem law, obedience to law appears as a necessary and logical outcome of law's
rationality. However, it is still the product of the belief in law's mythology, a
mythology which has its roots in pre-modem symbolics of sovereign power.
Whose belief and obedience?
In their book, Ost and Lenoble explore the mytho-Iogical characteristic of
law at three levels of legal discourse: judicial reasoning, legal logic primarily
expressed in the doctrinal writings of legal academics, and the philosophy of law.
Iwill focus on the arguments concerning legal logic. This chapter focuses on
French doctrinal accounts of the Fiducie, as illustrative of French epistemic
tradition which will be theorised to understand the particular conceptual apparatus
used in the analysis of the trust and the Fiducie . Legal logic, taught and learned
during university studies, is implemented by French legal academics but also by
legal practitioners and policy makers, whose juridical reasoning has been
determined by their many years as law students. Hence, legal logic is a typical
manifestation and product of French epistemic tradition, which produces "Keepers
of the Temple" whose main function is to ensure obedience to the law through
belief in what can be argued to be a mythical ideal.
Ost and Lenoble argue that belief in the effectivity of legal logic depends
on belief in a foundational ideal, that is the unity, transparency, coherence and
gaplessness of the legal system. This analysis of legal logic can be summarised in
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the following manner: legal logic operates "as if' law were transparent, coherent
and unitary, and this assumption encourages the reconstruction and consolidation
of general principles. The process of legal logic is one of systematisation and is
characterised by its a priori reluctance to include novel principles. Although
legislation is introduced to answer to specific and current problems, these
problems have to be processed through a conceptual grid which is marked by the
requirement of systematism. Thus, Ost and Lenoble's view support the idea that
legal logic has to say and think the social in its own legal terms, eliminating
heterogeneous and alien aspects and fitting the rest within acceptable
classifications. For instance, Green and White Papers are the site of such
transformation of the social into acceptable logical categories. Legal logic can be
implemented by anyone who has been legally trained but legal academics and
their doctrinal writings have a central part in the production and perpetuation of
legal logic.
Ost and Lenoble refer to the work of P Legendre to suggest that
institutionalised legal discourse is based on a symbolic structure the purpose of
which is to communicate the existence of an idealised creator, a substitute of the
Father or God. This symbolic structure is inherited from canon law's confusion of
human law - Roman law - and the Divine order. The power of logic lies in its
association with this mythological heritage.
The mytho-logical structure of legal knowledge is, according to Ost and
Lenoble, historically determined and the authors include a historical account,
echoing Legendre's own work, to support their views. The mediaeval legal
scholars' rediscovery of the Corpus [uris Civilis entailed a perception of Roman
law as technically superior to custom and embryonic legislation. The belief was
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that the Corpus [uris Civilis contained the answers to any issue likely to arise. To
deal with this Supreme text, the jurists developed their own scholastic method.
Hence, before the rise of modem legal rationality, all the elements of the
institutional apparatus propagating belief were in place: a sacred Text, an
infallible method and the interpreters/Keepers of the Temple. The centrality of the
Text remained throughout the Ancien Regime and through to the twentieth
century.
Again according to Lenoble and Ost, the same intellectual approach was
adopted by the post-glossators - the scholars who were the interpreters of the
Justinian codification - in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. However, the
increase in regal power meant an increase in legislation, the interpretation of
which was the prerogative of the Prince. The jurists were to be allowed to share
this prerogative and become the servants of the Prince. The Roman and Canon
law tradition was thus connected with the legislative activity of the Prince.
This change is significant as it entails the combination of a national and
secular legal discourse with the mythical aspects of the glossators' method. Gaps
in the law were to be filled by referring to Roman and Canon law, and not to local
customs. The symbolism of Sovereign power, despite its support in a secular
national law, was derived from the romano-canon heritage. Ost and Lenoble see in
Hobbes' Leviathan a perfect illustration of the mytho-Iogical dimensions of the
notion of sovereign power.
"As a brilliant visionary of power, Hobbes hints at the intimate link between
spiritual and temporal authority and the embeddedness of relations of force ...in the
symbolism of power, founded on the myth of the all-mighty Figure and
implemented by the equally powerful weapons of logic and canons"."
21 Droit, Mythe et Raison, op. cit. note 2, at p 258 (my translation).
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Hence, Ost and Lenoble's interpretation of Hobbes indicates that although
the foundations of power are mythical, its consolidation and preservation relies on
the proper use of logic. This is the task assigned to the jurists, as members and
servants of the great Leviathan and Keepers of the Great Temple of Law. They
have to "sustain the Republic" by constantly re-enacting the Text's rationality
through legal logic, which chases away any contradiction and borrows the
authority of the Sovereign.
In pre-revolutionary France, the opposition to Absolute monarchy was
expressed by a questioning of both the King and the basis of his authority, that is,
the legitimacy of his divine right. Revolutionaries had to find an alternative basis
for the exercise of power. Hence, power was described as founded on the consent
of each individual, the sole source of hislher subjection. This "subterfuge" was
designed to generate faith and submission. It relied on law as a means of gaining
the acceptance of rules perceived as an unbearable burden insofar and so long as
they represented the domination of the Church and the Clergy. Law prompted a
desire for submission to a new theology.
In order to be internalised by the subject, the revolutionary mechanisms
renewing obedience to the rule needed a mythicising celebration power,
incorporating the old mantra: the law must be obeyed because the law is just and
its author is fair. The function of the guarantor of law's perfection was once God
or the King. With modem power, this role is undertaken by Reason. Law was
idealised as the expression of eternal Reason, freed from particular and conflicting
interests.
A fundamental aspect of the revolutionary grounding of authority in law is
the quasi-religious faith in the purity of the legal rule. Law, understood mainly as
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legislation, may result from political struggles and debates, but it remains
exclusively juridical. "Like those creatures of legend able to walk through fire
without being burnt, law passes through the political melting pot unscathed.,,22
This political immunity of law is a necessary corollary of the belief in eternal and
immutable law. Article 1 of the draft Civil Code did invoke law as universal and
immutable. The drafters have referred to the Code as "a sacred trust", a "holy
ark". The post-revolutionary investment in law was accompanied by a mytho-
logical invocation of quasi-religious concepts.
Ost and Lenoble aim to show how the structure of legitimisation of
modem law depends on the connection established in the Mediaeval period
between myth and logic. The intermingling of the sacred and the secular endured
as a way of ensuring the authority of revolutionary institutions. However, the
desire to establish a break from the past has led to a denial of the mythical
dimension of legal thought.23
Michel Foucault too has stressed the importance of the mythological
representation of power in the construction of the juridical authority of the
sovereign. According to him, the symbolic structure of legitirnisation of modem
law is rooted in the medieval revival of Roman law:
"The development of royal power was achieved on the basis of the model of
Roman law's imperium and by reactivating the imperial laws codified in the era of
Justinianv.i"
22 cited in Droit, Mythe et Raison, ibid., at p 267 (my translation).
23 "Enlightened thinking has been understood as an opposition and counterforce to myth",
Habermas cited in P Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modem Law, Routledge, London,
1992. at p 44.
24/1 taut detenare la societe op. cit. note at p 102. my translation.
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Modem republican legal discourse has not rid itself of the monarchical structure
of legitimisation of power and its symbolic reference to the unitary sovereignty of
the Roman imperium.
According to Foucault, this symbolic structure of representation of power
which in his view dominates historical discourse and, it is submitted juridical
discourse, has two interconnected aspects:
"On the one hand, the juridical aspect: power binds through obligation and oath,
through law, on the other hand, power has a function, a role, an efficacy which is
magical: power dazzles and hypnotises".25
Moreover, this representation of power "is not only its image but also its
procedure of re-invigoration". 26This structure of representation which combines
mythical and magical dimensions with the rigour of logic is the juridical discourse
of sovereignty. As a result, modem law emphasises the predominance of rules of
legal logic but is still silently informed by the non-longer spectacular symbolics of
power inherited from the process of construction and canonisation of the
monarchical state. Thus, the juridical discourse of sovereignty governs the French
epistemic tradition at the level of surface rules of logic and through pre-
conceptual symbols of power.
This is reflected in Ost and Lenoble's analysis which suggests that the
logic operating at the surface level of knowledge-connaissances, is rooted in deep
mythological phenomena. It is the juridical discourse of sovereignty which
establishes this connection between a certain mythology of power and legal logic.
2 Legal Knowledge and Visions of Power: the Juridical Discourse of
Sovereignty as French Doctrine's Epistemic Imaginary
25lbid. at p 59.
26lbid. at p 60.
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The combination of the concepts of mytho-logic and juridical discourse of
sovereignty allows us to recognise the importance of myth and its function in
French legal tradition; it is connected to the legitimisation of law. Legitimisation
is a performance, involving a ritualised representation of power.
2.1 The Juridical Discourse of Sovereignty as symbolic representation of power
The modern or post-revolutionary structure of representation rests on old
mythological sediments. It still relies on a confusion between the sacred and
temporal law which is inherited from the Mediaeval revival of Roman law and the
work of the canonist. Such confusion did exist in ancient Roman law itself. It is
interesting to note that collections of imperial laws published prior to Justinian's
code, took the name "codex", which also referred to "a bound volume, such as the
Christians used for their scriptures, rather than a roll of papyrus".27
The form of power that is being represented is that of the sovereign but the
power of the sovereign was not stable and continuous throughout the ages. It
seems that the image of sovereign authority which has endured is that of the
absolute monarch, despite the fact that divine absolutism was a fairly recent
phenomenon before the French Revolution. It has been argued that "the (French)
modern state is nothing other than the king of the last few centuries, triumphantly
27T Honore, "Justinian's Codification:Some Reflections", (1993), 25, Bracton Law
Journal, at p29.
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continuing his unrelenting project of smothering local freedom, unifying and
evening out disparities'V"
The myth of the unity of law is a representation of sovereign power in its
embodiment in the unitary figure of the king. The symbolic constitution of the
unity of power in the person of the sovereign was undertaken through the project
of unification of law. In 1454, a royal decree ordered the official compiling of all
existing customary law. The writing down of customs was intended to freeze them
into a static body of rules, easier to harmonise in order to constitute a coherent
body of state law. By the end of the sixteenth century, several projects of
codification of local customs had been implemented." The revolutionary
endeavour to codify takes its roots in earlier visions of power, but drew on the
mythical inheritance of Rome.
The cult of Rom.e and Antiquity is characteristic of the revolutionary
theatrical staging of a democratic break with the recent past. However, the
rediscovery of Roman law dates back to the Middle Ages. As Foucault has
argued, monarchical power has used references to Rome to legitimise its power
through its direct lineage from the Great Emperors.Y This imagery of power as
both eternal and genealogically legitimate was preserved by the modem juridical
matrix. There is a degree of continuity in the symbolics of power. However, the
28 P Viollet, cited in op. cit. note 16, at p 167.
29 See A Watson, The Making of the Civil law, Harvard Uni. Press, 1981.
30 See his lecture of the 28.01.1976 where this point is made as regards historical
discourse. "This discourse had justificatory, liturgical functions: it was the State telling its
own past ...establishing its legitimacy" /I faut defendre la societe, op. cit. note at p200.
See also V Azimi's account of "mythistory" according to which monarchical law used
history as a justificatory basis for the King's power. He cites one of Louis XVI's advisors:
"History is one of the sciences in which our Kings, as far back as Francois I, have found
great interest for the purposes of governmenL." cited in, Azimi, "La Revolution
francaise:deni de memoirs ou denl de droit", Revue d'Histoire du Droit, 68 (2), avril-juin
1990, at p 162.
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Revolution was to bring certain changes in the imagery, but despite its claims, it
would not totally break with the myths of the past.
The revolutionary effort to secularise power and ground it in law was of
strategic and symbolic significance. It is partly to be understood as reflecting the
importance of the Church as a competing public authority. Establishing a clear
break from Clerical authority did not entail renouncing the symbolic and magical
function of the sacred. Indeed, as a result of revolutionary partial iconoclasm,
secular deities were created. They took the plural forms of Reason, the State, the
Legislator. "During legislative debates preceding the enactment of the Civil Code,
for example, Napoleon asked 'Who has the place of God on earth?' and answered,
'[t]he legislator,,,.31
In order better to destroy what was to symbolise the past, the Revolution
also constituted symbols of the past representing feudalism and the Ancien
Regime.
" 'Our history is not our code': the phrase was coined by Rabaut Saint-Etienne
and reflected the belief of the men of 1789. The passion expressed in the denial of
a juridici sed and legitimating past grows stronger with the invention of the Ancien
Regime; the history of the kings argues against Reason".32
Law, as the expression of Reason, had to be ahistorical. It could not be supported
by the past practice of mythistory. Law could not be grounded on myth as this
would have been reminiscent of the king's divine power. However, power is
inseparable from its mythical base.
The main features of the symbolics of power conveyed through the
juridical discourse leads therefore to a conception of law in traditional legal terms,
31S Herman, "From Philosophers to Legislators to Gods: The French Civil Code as
Secular Scripture", (1984),3, Uni. of Illinois law Rev., 597 at P 597.
32VA·· itzirru, 0p.CI note 22, at p159.
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as ahistorical but genealogically legitimised, and as unitary. The sacred and the
mythical in legal discourse linger as an absent presence. Indeed, the Revolution
did not destroy the existing mythology of power. It pushed it into the background,
causing it to lose part of its visibility. This in tum has strengthened the power of
myth which seems all the more able to shape legal logic's rituals of truth.
2.2 The Epistemic character and effects of the My tho-logical Discourse of
Sovereignty
The juridical discourse of sovereignty and its mythological structure form
what could be recognised as the pre-conceptual discursive parameters for the
formation of doctrinal legal connaissances. It is the underpinning of the French
doctrinal tradition." The juridical discourse assigns to legal logic a specific
function: the celebration of the mythical through ritualised repetition of the
founding myth. The underlying vision of power generates discursive closure,
through the ordering of text to simulate the order and unity of power.
Indeed, in Deleuze and Guattari's interpretation:
"the essence ...of sovereignty in general is to constitute, by means of specific
apparatuses of capture, a milieu of interiority. In these terms, the [arborescent]
mode of theorising ..may also be regarded as reproducing in thought the form of
the State. The injunction to totalise, the insistence upon theoretical homogeneity
across a given domain may be seen as apparatuses of theoretical capture". 34
Hence, the juridical discourse of sovereignty orders doctrinal knowledge to the
effect that the latter not only reflects, but also mimics State or sovereign power.
The interiorisation of the authority of such power by the knowing subject is
expressed by a belief in and obedience to the sovereign unity of law.
33 See Chapter I at pp 30-31.
34 P Patton, op. cit. note 16, at p107.
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A further epistemic function of the mytho-logic of sovereignty is the
anchoring of the knowing or speaking agent to a subject position within discourse.
The juridical discourse of sovereignty is particularly relevant to the issue of the
attachment of the jurist to the legal text.3S What will be retained is the idea that
the identification of the agent to the subject position of the jurist requires the play
of imagination and belief in the emblems of power carried by the juridical
discourse of sovereignty.
The juridical discourse of sovereignty grounds legal logic in myth, through
its epistemic function anchoring the subject to its position as "Keeper of the
Temple" of Law. As argued earlier, it is characterised by its closure, its ability to
exclude unacceptable knowledge or types of arguments. However, it does co-exist
with other epistemic configurations and is able to adapt in order to ensure its own
survival.
The rejection of the trust as incompatible with French law is an illustration
of the epistemic closure entailed by the juridical discourse of sovereignty. French
law will reject anything that conflicts or challenges its mythological and symbolic
figures. Notably, the trust's structure of ownership had to be discarded because of
its challenge to the coherence of the symbolism of absolute ownership. The
transposition of the trust as the Fiducie is an illustration of a discursive ability to
adapt, albeit within the confines of its own ritualised processes. The mythology
perpetuated by the juridical discourse of sovereignty has provided a legitimisation
of the Fiducie through, for instance, its constructed Roman origins.
3S Legendre offers a psychoanalytical understanding, discussed by Lenoble and Ost, but
beyond the scope of this discussion.
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SECTION II FRENCH LEGAL DOCTRINE AND THE TRUST: FROM
EPISTEMIC CLOSURE TO GENEALOGICAL REDISCOVERY
The purpose of this section is to examine the specifics of the doctrinal
discourse on the trust and its reinvention under the guise of the Fiducie, in the
light of the general theoretical arguments described in Section I. The rejection of
the trust can be understood as an epistemic manifestation. Doctrinal discussions of
the trust are governed by the epistemic necessity to reenact the Text as unitary and
gapless. Hence, the absence in French law of an institution recognisable as the
trust is not understood as an accidental gap, linked to historical factors. Instead, it
is presented as resulting from an essential incompatibility between concepts of
ownership. The absence of the trust in French law cannot point to any
incompleteness in the body of the law, but must result from its unitary and logical
ordering. Doctrinal discourse on the trust is thus conditioned by the epistemic
process of representation of the unitary power of the Pontiff, the Legislator, or
other imaginary figure. This entails a discursive closure, manifested in the
rejection of the trust.
The first part of this section will explore the argument that the trust is
incompatible with fundamental principles, which are viewed here as a ritualised
representation of the "Sacred Unity" of French law, or in other words, the
symbolism of law as a coherent and gapless whole. But French doctrinal epistemic
closure is not total. As more recent writings show, the trust cannot be accepted in
its original form as a structure of ownership. Itwill have to be modified and
naturalised. The second part of this section therefore focuses on this process of
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naturalisation. The equivalent of the trust in Roman law had to be constructed
before French law could legitimately accept a new addition to its institutions. The
conditional reception of the trust is governed by the same epistemic phenomenon
which lead to its initial rejection. Hence, this acceptance must be rooted in the
unitary and eternal characters of French law. These are expressed in the imagined
genealogical roots in Roman law. Hence, the acceptance of the trust entailed the
invention of a genealogically legitimate equivalent: the Fiducie.
1. The Trust's Incompatibility with Sacred Principles
The ritualistic reference to the sacred principles in French legal doctrine
allows the jurist, that is, the legal academic, to maintain the mytho-Iogical and
foundational "as if'. The latter has three inter-connected aspects. First, doctrinal
discourse must proceed as if law was unitary and coherent. Hence, law must be
governed by consistent principles. This does not necessarily entail that there is a
consensus in legal doctrine about what these principles are. When internal
conflict arises between principles, it has to be resolved by deciding which
principle prevails.
Secondly, the reference to sacred concepts also allows the jurist to proceed
as if law embodied eternal and incontestable values. Although it is acknowledged
that these principles are the expression of public policy - Ordre Public -, a
distance is created between the substantive and historically contingent content of
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the policy goals of the Napoleonian codification. The Ordre Public is an abstract,
unitary and atemporal notion which refers to the new order established by post-
revolutionary legislation, but also to the current order.'" Discussion of the
substantive values embodied in this notion is superficial. Indeed, the survival of
the new order of law resulting from revolutionary change and Napoleonic rule
seems to depend on ignoring its temporal contingencies and context. Sacred
principles operate a canonisation of the public policies behind the Napoleonic
Code. These are elevated from their mortal bodies to form, with the aid of legal
logic, the fundamental principles of French law.
Thirdly, this process is aided by the genealogical link made between
Napoleonic legislation and Justinian's Corpus iuris civilis. As argued in section I,
reference to Roman law does not stem from a historical approach, but from a
quest for the genealogic~llegitimacy of power. Reference to Roman law allows us
to think as if the Napoleonic new order was the embodiment of eternal rationality.
The orthodox doctrinal approach, displaying the epistemic closure
described above, is illustrated in H Motulsky's influential article: "Of the legal
impossibility of constituting a trust under French Law".37 The starting point of the
article is a critique of a Belgian court decision which accepted the validity of a
trust constituted by an Englishman living in Belgium. The law applicable to his
succession was Belgian law, which does not know the trust. Nevertheless, the
court decided, relying on French authorities, that a trust could validly be created
under Belgian law. Motulsky argues that the decision was wrong as the principles
and customs of English law cannot be transposed into French law or any other
36 See Chapter IV, at pp 106-110 for a full discussion of Ordre Public.
37"De l'impossibllite juridique de creer un trust anglo-saxon sous I'empire de la loi
francalse", 1948, Revue Critique de Droit International Prive, p 451. My translation.
71
system based on the Roman law tradition. The trust is incompatible with French
Ordre Public. His argument revolves around three legal principles.
First, he discusses the interpretation of the trust as patrimony by
appropriation." A patrimony by appropriation is a notion used to describe the
formation of an autonomous fund for the fulfillment of a purpose. According to
Motulsky, this notion is of Germanic origin and used to explain the theory of legal
personality. A patrimony by appropriation can only be created with the concurrent
constitution of a legal person as owner of the fund. The numerus clausus of real
rights entails that there cannot be property without a personified owner.
Although Motulsky does not expressly refer to it, the impossibility of creating an
ownerless fund is also based on the principle of the unity of patrimony. According
to this principle, each legal subject - be it an artificial or natural person - has only
one patrimony, and every patrimony has to have a recognisable owner. Hence, a
fund cannot be constituted to fulfil a purpose unless it has an identified owner.
English law does not refer to the notion of patrimony by appropriation to
explain the trust. Indeed, according to Maitland, "the trust has given us a liberal
substitute for a law about personified instinuions"." Motulsky argues that the
concept of trust relies totally on the notion of split ownership. Neither the
beneficiary nor the trustee can be said to be absolute owners, on the basis of
article 544's definition of ownership. The structure of ownership on which the
trust relies is therefore incompatible with the principle of absolute ownership
enshrined in the code. French institutions comparable to the trust do not operate a
similar splitting of ownership between legal and equitable owners. The Roman
38 A patrimony is the totality of a person's assets and liabilities, a sort of virtual balance
sheet.
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Col/ected Papers, Vol III, CAP, 1911, at p 279.
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fiducia, which was the basis of some institutions of the Ancien Regime, is a
contract by virtue of which the transferee is obliged to restitute or retransfer to a
third party the property received. The transferee becomes the sole owner and is
entitled both beneficially and legally. The liberalite avec charge is a gift which
includes a collateral duty to retransfer the property. The donee obtains full
ownership rights, limited by a personal obligation. Neither institutions operate on
a structure of dual ownership and cannot be assimilated to the trust.
Although the code has enshrined the principle of absolute ownership, it
also envisages a number of demembremenis, or dismembered property rights.4o
However, the Code does not provide for the splitting of ownership between legal
and equitable owners. This dismembering of ownership does not correspond to
any of the dismembered real rights listed in the Code. Moreover, according to the
principle of the numerus clausus of real rights, Article 543 exhaustively lists all
possible property rights. The list is closed and no new and unknown real rights
can be created by agreement between the parties. The creation of new real rights
necessitates the intervention of Parliament as the numerus clausus principle
prohibits the contractual creation of hybrid rights such as those entailed by a trust.
As already indicated, Motulsky's argumentation is constructed around the
ritual repetition of three sacred principles: the principle of absolute ownership, the
numerus clausus of real rights, and the unity of patrimony. These will now be
examined in greater detail.
1.1 Absolute ownership
40 "dismembered" property rights are real rights which do not comprise all three
prerogatives of ownership, ie the usus (right to enjoy), the fructus (right to collect revenue
or benefits in kind from the property), the abusus (the right to dispose).
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The principle of absolute ownership is clearly stated in article 544 of the
Civil Code, and is also enshrined in the French Constitution. Article 544 of the
Civil Code declares: "Ownership (Ia propriete) is the right to enjoy and dispose of
things in the most absolute manner, insofar as it is not used in a way prohibited by
the law."
French legal doctrine, in its reverent treatment of this fundamental
principle, portrays the principle as a symbol of the unity of the post-revolutionary
new order, opposed to the multiplicity and fragmentation of the Ancien Regime.
On the basis of a study of important treatises on French Civil law, a
comparatist observes: "In their respective codifications, Justinian and Napoleon
both sought to simplify an intricate network of customs, precedents, and local
ordinances .... the Code Napoleon sought to consolidate the objectives of the
Revolution, including notably the abolition of the feudal burdens of the ancien
regime" .41
The structure of ownership of the Ancien Regime is constructed as
characterised by a multiplicity of estates and rights over land. It is also described
as centred around the distinction between dominium utile and dominium directum,
"which manifestly resembles the legal and equitable ownership of the common
law".42 The dominium utile was a form of ownership granting solely enjoyment of
the land and was ultimately derived from dominium directum of the sovereign.
Thus, in pre-revolutionary customary law,
"ownership was divided into two rights over two separate aspects of the property.
These rights could, then, be called ownership rights as customary law did not
understand ownership as the totality of prerogatives over a thing, including the
41V Boigar, 'Why no trusts in the Civil Law?", (1953), 2, American Journal of
Comparative law, 204 at p210.
42 ibid, at p 207.
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abusus. Indeed, in customary land law, the right to the enjoyment of the property
is the essential element of ownership as....the land belongs to God who only grants
man the use of the soil through the King".43
Hence, absolute ownership is a sacred symbol of the unity of the new
order, opposed to the fragmented or dual Ancien Regime. It symbolises a break
with the past, but it does more than that. It also symbolises the mythical unity of
power which permeates the epistemic imaginary of French law.It echoes the
mythical unity of the Text and of its author, identified by Legendre in the mythical
figure of the Pontiff. The concept of absolute ownership is the product of the
imaginary picture of unitary power which underlies French law's knowledge
processes. Such processes also rely on legitimacy through the discovery of
genealogical linkages with Roman law. Absolute ownership also provides a
genealogical link with Roman Law, as the Corpus iuris civilis is said to contain a
similar notion of absolute and indivisible ownership.
Yet absolute ownership as a principle operates as a fiction, a relic in which
one must place faith with the awareness that it is a mere representation of an entity
beyond questioning.The artificiality of this principle is quite evident to the jurist
who, nonetheless, cannot challenge the principle on this basis. The notion of
absolute ownership remains an unquestioned principle despite the fact that the
code also contains the recognition of a number of property rights which do not
confer the full array of ownership prerogatives and which therefore entail the
dismembering of ownership over a thing." This contradiction within the Code
does not seem to pose a problem for the jurist's mind.
43P Croq, Ptopttet« et Garantie, Thesis, Paris II,1992, at p 266 (my translation).
44 For instance, the usufruct only provides a right to use and enjoy the property and any
fruit or revenue thereof.
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Absolute ownership remains above all an abstract and sacred principle, the
substantive implications and bases of which have never been clearly established in
French legal doctrine. Indeed, it might seem self-evidently clear that
"the Code Napoleon ...filled the vacuum created by the abolition of the complex
and servile feudal law of property, with the simple concept of individual liberty,
expressed as an absolute power of enjoyment and disposition vested in the
owner.,,45
The implications of this principle are, however, disputed. According to Motulsky,
absolute ownership prevents contractual parties from creating property interests
which do not fit into the categories of rights listed in the Civil Code. Another
doctrinal point of view is that absolute ownership entails the prerogative of
disposition, allowing any possible dismembering of the owner's right." However,
the latter interpretation conflicts with the principle of the numerus clausus of real
rights.
1.2 The Numerus Clausus
According to this principle, possible types of property interests are
exhaustively listed in the Civil Code and it is impossible for parties to create new
and unknown types of property rights. The origins of this principle are unclear.
Motulsky, amongst others, grounds the numerus clausus in article 543 of the civil
code. The article states that "A right over a thing can either be ownership, a mere
right to the enjoyment of the thing, or a rentcharge" and seems to constitute a
closed list of types of property interests.
45 Bolqar, op.cit. note 33 at p219.
46 See P Croq's discussion of this doctrinal opinion, op.cit note 35, at p 272.
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The numerus clausus principle has been stated by some of the most
prominent doctrinal writers such as Aubry and Rau, and Planio1.47 However, the
principle has not always been followed by the courts, as in the Caquelard
decision.f" Itwas stated in this case that article 543 did not set out all possible
property rights, as the law does not prohibit the fragmentation of ownership. The
principle has also been contested in more recent doctrinal writings.
The link between the text of the Code and the principle is tenuous but this
does not prevent the upholders of the principle from investing their faith in it. This
is so even though the bases of the principle remain unclear. Motulsky cryptically
declares that
"the listing [of real rights] ...is restrictive ... because the property regime of the
civil code was intended by its authors to be a war machine against the
fragmentations of feudalism and the Ancien Regime. and the will of the legislator
cannot be changed ...but also because ownership is an absolute right ...".49
According to Motulsky, the numerus clausus principle is a logical
consequence of the principle of absolute ownership. Hence, to preserve absolute
rights, the numerus clausus prohibits the concurrent existence of two rights of
ownership over a same thing.
In French law, the only possible form of co-ownership takes the form of a
shared single title, opposed to two simultaneously coexisting titles. The feudal
system of ownership is said to be typified by the simultaneity of rights of
ownership. The numerus clausus prohibits the constitution of rights reminiscent of
the feudal tenures, such as those entailed by the trust.so The numerus clausus can
47 See Motulsky op. cit. note 29, treatises referred to in footnote 1 at p 463.
48 Case cited in P Croq's thesis, op. cit., note 35 at p 271. Case reference: Cass.Req., 13
Fevrier 1834, D.P, 1834, 1, 118.
49 op. cit., note 29, at pp 462-463.
50 See P Croq's discussion, op.cit, note 35, p 265-278.
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thus be said to be grounded in the epistemic imaginary underlying legal doctrine.
Indeed, it expresses the sovereignty and unity of the new order, fetishised through
the notion of absolute ownership. It embodies the sacred will of the legislator who
has envisaged all possible property relations.
Another way of justifying the principle of the numerus clausus is the
argument according to which ownership needs to be protected by limiting the
possibility of its fragmentation and therefore of its being weakened.I' More
specifically, it is argued that the abusus, or right to dispose, is the main
prerogative of ownership and ultimately the main object of protection through the
prohibition of fragmentation of ownership. Article 537 of the Civil Code
enshrines the principle of freedom of alienation by asserting that "Individuals
have the freedom to dispose of their property in accordance with the changes
introduced by the law". The preparatory reports leading to the enactment of the
Civil Code seem to indicate the intention to implement a policy of free trade. 52
The numerus clausus would therefore fit into the general policy orientation of the
Code, encouraging trade in land through the legal protection of property rights.
The theme of free trade is also present in the interconnected argument,
according to which the protection of property transactions requires that no
unknown and unforeseeable rights can be freely created over the object of the
transaction. The general policy of the security of property transactions lies behind
the scheme of registration of real rights, which was introduced in 1855, over fifty
years after the promulgation of the Civil Code. Indeed, what does not clearly
appear in the doctrinal discussions of the numerus clausus is its Germanic origin
51 See P Croq's discussion of B Foex, Le Numerus Clausus des droits reels en matiere
mooiuer», op .cit., note 35, at p 267.
52 ibid, at p 266 footnote 4.
78
and its connection with the policy of comprehensive registration implemented in
Germany.
According to V Bolgar, the abstract principle of the numerus clausus was
deduced from the rules of registration and first formulated by the German author
of a treatise in 1888 and justified on the basis of:
"the allegedly strict division between iura in rem and iura in personam, which
isolates the law of things (Sachenrecht) from the law of obligations ....While party
autonomy is largely allowed in the field of obligations, it is excluded in the field
of property.,,53
The numerus clausus perpetuates the tension between the idea of the sovereignty
of the individual in contractual matters, where party autonomy is encouraged, and
the sovereignty of the law in property relations, where the law implements free
trade at the expense of individual freedom.
Despite these various interpretations, the numerus clausus seems to be
more easily understood as originating from the practical necessities of registration.
It has been formulated as follows: "(a) all transactions creating iura in rem must
be entered in the official register; (b) the types of in rem transactions are stated in
the Code; ergo (c) transactions not contained in the Code cannot be entered, and
(d) the number of in rem transactions is necessarily c1osed".54
The arguments explaining and justifying the numerus clausus are diverse
and sometimes overlapping. The principle can be seen as a derivative of the
notion of absolute ownership or of the property/contract dichotomy. It has also
been associated with the policy behind the Code: free trade in land, the certainty
of land transactions secured through registration. A dubious textual basis has even
53op.cit., note 33, at p 213.
54V Boigar, ibid, at p 213.
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been found for this doctrinal creation. The inconsistencies and uncertainties
surrounding this principle reinforce its status and strength as an abstract principle,
unaffected by the vagueness of its origin and the inconsistencies of its grounding.
Indeed, it operates as a sacred principle, floating above the multiplicity and
materiality of social policy considerations. The link with the Code, however
tenuous, is necessary; the Text is the central guarantor of the unity and
consistency of the principles. The sacred character of the numerus clausus is
derived from its grounding in the Text and its Latin denomination. The
genealogical connection with Roman law, although superficial, is thus established.
1.3 The Unity of Patrimonl5
In her presentation of the 1992 BiII, J de GuiIIenchmidt declared:
''The principle of unity of patrimony ...does not seem today as inviolable as it was.
This 'sacred dogma' .... (quoting) 'fascinates jurists because we belong to
...civilisations in which what is one is considered necessarily better than what is
dual".56
The principle of unity of patrimony has been stated in several different ways but at
its most basic formulation is the following: as patrimony is an emanation of
personality, every person has one and only one patrimony, and every patrimony
has one owner. In his treatise, referred to by Motulsky, Lepaulle argues that the
trust constitutes a patrimony by appropriation.V The patrimony by appropriation
would conflict with the unity of patrimony as it defines a patrimony without an
55See Chapter IV, Section 2 for a more detailed account of this principle. The following
discussion explains the historical emergence and current functioning of the principle qua
"sacred dogma", whereas later developments will relate the principle to policy objectives
and logic.
56"La Fiducie, pourquoi faire?", Revue de Droit Bancaire, n 19, 1990, p105.
57 Lepaulle, Traite Tbeotique et Pratique des Trusts, 1932, Cited in Motulsky, op. cit. note
29.
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owner. The new Fiducie contravenes the principle as it entails the constitution of a
separate fund within the patrimony of the fiduciaire, who is therefore the owner of
at least two patrimonial funds - his and the one(s) s/he manages.
The principle of unity of patrimony was formulated by Aubry and Rau .
"It is agreed on all sides that not the Code Napoleon but its commentators Aubry
and Rau are responsible for the grand development of patrimonial theory, if not its
origin, in the French civilian group. The climate is dependent upon the new code.
They follow it in spirit: 'ils ont voulu, avant tout, faire ressortir l'idee maitresse du
Code civil, opposant l'unite ala diversite".58
The existence and perpetuation of the principle is dependent upon the
academic process. The principle is interiorised during the first two years of legal
studies, as a basic principle the practical basis of which remains unclear in the
jurist's mind. An empirical study has indeed revealed that there is an automatic
consensus amongst practitioners, as to the necessity of respecting this principle.i"
The dogma is established as self-sufficient and is transmitted through the oral
tradition of university lectures, which construct the shared values and perceptions
constituting French lawyers' habitus'" Professors and practitioners, as former
students, remain wedded to the principle despite - or perhaps thanks to - its
imprecise content.
The textual basis attributed to this principle is article 2092 of the Civil
Code which reads: "Whoever contracts a personal debt commits his present and
future movables and immovable belongings to the repayment of his debt". A
corollary rule is found in article 2094 which consecrates the equality of unsecured
S8 See C.B Gray, "Patrimony", Cahiers de Droit, 1981, n 22, at p 101.
S9 See the study "Ia Sociologie Juridique du Patrimoine", commissioned as part of the
preparatory works on the Fiducie and conducted by M.A Frison-Roche, Paris II, 1992.
60 The notion of habitus was elaborated by Bourdieu and refers to a shared schemata of
perception which allows agent to understand and shape the social field in which they
interact. For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter I, at pp 36-37.
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creditors. The principle of unity of patrimony seemed to be linked to a policy of
security of transactions, whereby each personal debt is legally secured against the
whole of of the debtor's property and becomes part of his patrimony. A secured
debt will guarantee the priority of the secured creditor over unsecured creditors.
The substantive/policy dimension of the principle is not stressed as the principle is
by definition abstract.
The principle has been described as a "dogma, which is the subject of
Franco-French religious wars amongst legal scholars'V" It is described as an
obstacle to the incorporation and the constitution of personified institutions. It has
therefore been asserted that "our law is a weapon against companies'Y'
The principle of the unity of patrimony has the hallmarks of a sacred
principle of French law; it has a textual basis and its formulation as an abstract
principle removes it from its material policy basis. The latter is unclear and this is
unproblematic to the legal mind, which proceed "as if' this principle was
coherent. Indeed, is the unity of patrimony about the protection of creditors or is it
an expression of Napoleonic anti-corporatism? Are these linked? The principle
also in its very formulation embodies the theme of unity, which dominates the
legal epistemic imaginary.
The trust's proclaimed incompatibility with sacred principles of French
law has stimulated and given a direction to research into comparable institutions
known to French law, leading to the legislative proposal on the Fiducie. If the
common law trust does not exist in French law, there must be some similar
institution which can be constructed as an equivalent. Interest in the trust, coupled
61 C Champaud, "La Fiducie, ou I'histoire d'une belle juridique au bois dormant du droit
franl(ais", Revue de Droit des Affaires Internationales, 1991, 689, at p 693, my translation.
62 lbld I .I I ,my trans ation.
82
with respect for doctrinal orthodoxy, has led to the genealogical rediscovery of the
Fiducie.
2 The Genealogical Rediscovery of the Fiducie
Claude Witz's acclaimed doctoral thesis played an important part in this
rediscovery.f His work has been referred to by the drafters of the Bill and
inspired the denomination of the proposed new institution as Fiducie. The aim of
C Witz's doctoral work is to provide a definition of a new institution called
Fiducie and explore its possible regulation and applications. To construct this new
Fiducie, C Witz refers to institutions existing in other jurisdictions. The trust is
his starting point. 64 In his introduction, he concludes
" Several dangers threaten the development of the Fiducie ...To be truthful, the
enlightenment resulting from a positive law approach does not suffice. Any
institution is more or less the product of its past. ..To allow the studied institution
to be called Fiducie, it is important to demonstrate that French private law's
Fiducie indeed is the descendant of the fiducia of the Antiquiry''."
Hence the developments concerning the possible applications of the proposed
Fiducie, and the rules governing it, are preceded by a preliminary part entitled:
"The Fiducie throughout History".
It is argued that Witz's account is shaped by the double imperative of
genealogical legitimacy: to uncover a paternity link between the new institution
and Roman law, and to clearly distinguish this rooted institution from other
institutions of the Ancien Regime.
63 La Fiducie en Droit Pttve fran9ais, Economica, Paris, 1981, my translation.
64 see ibid, pp 2-6.
65 ibid, pp 17-18, my translation.
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Witz defines his Fiducie as arising where an instrument transferring a
patrimonial right to a fiduciary, limits the exercise of this right by imposing a
series of obligations on the fiduciary. Amongst these obligations will usually be
included an obligation to retransfer, after a period of time, the property right to
either the settlor or a third party-beneficiary." He identifies two similar
institutions in Roman law: the fiducia and the fideicommissum.
The Romanfiducia was a pact which was appended to a solemn transfer of
property. Unlike the trust, bothfiducia and Fiducie are contracts. Thefiducia's
pact contained a promise made to the transferor by the transferee to retransfer the
property at the time and in the manner described in the agreement. At first, the
fiducia was not enforceable and its execution depended solely on the good faith
and word of the transferee. The fiducia was based on the fides which constituted a
moral and religious basis for the parties' relationship. As this basis was proving
more and more shaky, and less and lessfiduciae were being complied with, new
rights of actions were introduced. They enabled remedies to be obtained against
the fiduciary or specific performance of the pact.
Gaius proposed a two-category classification of the fiducia. The fiducia
cum amico operated as a bailment, where a friend would be chosen as the bailee.
The fiducia cum creditore was a transfer of property for the purpose of providing
a security for a creditor. The transferee would promise to retransfer the ownership
rights once the debt had been redeemed. The development of both institutions was
hampered by the excessive degree of formalism attached to the solemn transfer of
property. Thefiducia cum amico was replaced by bailment and thefiducia cum
66 ibid, P 15.
84
creditore was the basis for the later development of mortgages. The Justinian
codification confirmed the demise of the fiducia and does not refer to it at all.
Despite the fact that thefiducia is alien to post-classical Roman law, and is
therefore not historically connected to French law, it is viewed by Witz as the
genealogical basis and model for a contemporary Fiducie. This is so despite the
fact that, in other analyses, thefiducia has been more adequately described as the
ancestor of the mortgage or the bailment. 67 The feature of the fiducia which is of
most importance to Witz is the fact that it realises a full transfer of ownership and
does not entail the split ownership of the trust. It is also rooted in contract. It can
therefore be argued that the Witz study has two interconnected priorities in mind:
distinguishing the contemporary Fiducie from the trust, and establishing its
genealogical legitimacy and link with Roman law. These priorities are not
articulated and are epistemologically determined The mythical dimension of
Witz's approach is betrayed by the fact that he does not establish an accurate
historical account of the development of the fiducia into an institution of French
law similar to the trust. But this does not matter, as the search is epistemologically
directed towards genealogical legitimacy rather than historical accuracy. Witz's
starting point is his own model of a fictional Fiducie and he has to go back in time
to establish a mythical link between his construct and an institution which, it is
argued, has little to do with the functionings of the trust or with the historical
roots of French law. This does not seem to matter; thefiducia as, in our view,
Witz's epistemologically determined endeavour is to endow the trust-like Fiducie
with genealogical and etymological legitimacy.
67 International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol VI, 1973, pp 84-108.
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The other Roman law institution investigated by Witz bares a striking
resemblance to the trust. However, it is also the ancestor of the substitutions
fideicommissaires which were amongst the institutions of the Ancien Regime
targeted by the Revolutionaries. The fideicommissum is defined as "a mere request
by which the testator asks the legatee ...to give something to or do something for a
third party".68 Similarly to the trust's ancestors, it was used to make testamentary
gifts to persons who could not legally benefit from them, or hold property. Like
the trust, the fideicommissum could not be enforced and its execution depended on
the good faith of the entrusted transferee. The necessity to provide for the judicial
enforcement of fideicommissa was gradually recognised and the Emperor
Claudius instituted two Praetors whose task was to secure such enforcement. The
fideicommissa were also eventually regulated and could no longer be used to ...
avoid statutory prohibitions. The Justinian codification incorporated the institution
which found its way into French law.
The fideicommissary substitution is described by Witz as the most
prominent institution of family law during the Ancien Regime. Its primary
function was to preserve wealth within the family. The first beneficiary of a
testamentary gift operating through a substitution would have the obligation to
manage and preserve the property and eventually transfer it to subsequent
beneficiaries. Like the strict settlement, the substitutions ensured the conservation
of family wealth across several generations. The use of substitutions was
prohibited in article 896 of the Civil Code, which implements the revolutionary
decree of 14-15 November 1792.
68Witz, op.cit. note 55 at p51, my translation.
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C Witz also describes the Fiducie of the Ancien Regime. This
institution has to be distinguished from the Romanjiducia as, unlike the latter
and like the substitution, it is a type ofjideicommissum. It arises where the
transferee is not intended to benefit from the property and has a mere role in
the management of the property, intended to benefit a third party. Unlike the
Romanjiducia, it was used in the context of testamentary gifts. The fiduciary
was a fictitious legatee and the intended beneficiary was the real owner. The
fiduciary was not considered as an owner but as a bailee.
Unlike the substitution, the Fiducie survived the Ancien Regime as it was
not expressly prohibited. French legal doctrine and the courts established a
distinction between the substitution and the Fiducie, arguing that the prohibition
did not include the latter. However, the Fiducie fell rapidly into disuse. The
reasons given by C Witz are as follows: as a surviving Ancien Regime institution,
its legal grounding was shaky. Moreover, it could be attacked on the basis of the
theory of simulation which condemns the use of legal devices as shams to disguise
the real state of affairs. The legatee could be seen as a fictitious beneficiary acting
as a screen for the real owner. Moreover, the transfer of ownership to the real
beneficiary did not include the right to manage the property granted to the
fiduciary. This could be perceived as a sui generis fragmentation of the
prerogative of ownership, never envisaged in the Civil Code.
This discussion of the Fiducie of the Ancien Regime allowed C Witz to
highlight the differences in his definition of a contemporary Fiducie and to
reinforce the genealogical link. The old Fiducie was based on simulated
ownership. The contemporary Fiducie should, like the Romanjiducia, operate a
full transfer of ownership for the benefit of the fiduciary. Although the
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contemporary Fiducie is inspired by the trust, it cannot rely on split or simulated
ownership. This is the condition required by the epistemic necessities of
genealogical legitimacy and the respect of the sacred principle of absolute
ownership.
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CHAPTER III
THE SOVEREIGN UNITY OF ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP
"limit and infinity, unity and multiplicity, masculine andfeminine,
light and dark, good and evil" (list of Pythagorean oppositions given in
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol J).
According to French doctrinal orthodoxy, absolute ownership explains
the incompatibility of the trust with French law. The observance of absolute
ownership as a sacred principle has also functioned as a condition of the
acceptability of the new Fiducie; the latter's most important distinguishing
feature being that, like the Roman fiducia, it performs a full transfer of
ownership in the hands of the fiduciary: The proposed Fiducie would not have
reproduced the split ownership or division of property rights that characterises
the trust. I
The proposed Fiducie was not the only possible approach. An
alternative approach could have been to base a new trust -like institution on
existing fragmented forms of ownership such as the usufruct.' However, it is
argued that upholding absolute ownership as a working and fundamental
principle was essential to the mytho-logical resurrection of the fiducia, The
IThe drafters of the Bill have expressly stressed the importance of avoiding the
trust's fragmentation of title. They have followed the lead of the drafters of The Hague
Convention 1985, who realised the weight of absolute ownership in most non-trust
countries and provided a definition of the trust avoiding any reference to the equitable
and legal ownership. For a detailed discussion of the Convention, see Chapter VI, pp
166-174.
2 The usufruct is a form of fragmented and incomplete ownership recognised as valid
by the Civil Code. Absolute ownership comprises three types of prerogatives: the
usus, the fructus and the abusus. The usufruct combines the right to use the property
with the right to the revenues from the property but excludes the abusus, the right to
dispose of the property. The usufruct has been compared to the common law life
interest; "A can grant the usufruct in immovables or movables to B, retaining the
naked title, which establishes property interests in B and A, respectively, virtually
identical in all respects with the COMMON LAW life estate and reversion".
International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol VI, 1973, at p87.
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importance of absolute ownership is also reflected in its role as foundation for
other principles such as the numerus clausus.
, It will be seen that absolute ownership is often described as the main
conceptual difference in the field of property between the common law and the
civil law.' This conceptual divergence would account for the absence of the
trust in civil law jurisdictions. The emphasis by civil law jurists on split
ownership as the trust's main characteristic reflects the prominence of
absolute ownership in the civilian mind. However, can it be said that the
notion of absolute ownership does not inform in any way the common law
vision of property? Is absolute ownership as totally unintelligible to the
common law lawyer, as the trust is meant to be to civil law jurists? How can
the enduring conceptual role and power of absolute ownership be explained?
The following analysis is based on a distinction between the
conceptual dimension of absolute ownership, that is, its existence and
manifestation at the surface-level of legal knowledge, and the epistemic
function of absolute ownership, rooted in the deep-level structures of the
juridical discourse of sovereignty. If the concept of absolute ownership is not
the exclusive property of French civilian legal culture, its epistemic function
and importance are not echoed in the English common law.
Absolute ownership conceptually characterises French law's
construction of property rights. Section I explores the conceptual differences,
highlighted by comparative law scholars, between the common law conceptual
basis of property rights and the civil law notion of absolute ownership.
However, such a conceptual approach does not explain why absolute
ownership should have such a powerful impact on civil, and more specifically
3
It could be argued that the common law yers would define their specific conceptual
system in opposition, and therefore in connection with, the civil law.
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French, doctrinal discourse. The second section of this chapter addresses this
issue and argues that absolute ownership functions at a deeper level than that
of conceptual knowledge-connaissances.4 Absolute ownership is more than an
abstract, organising concept. It operates as an epistemic icon, rooted in the
discursive soil of the juridical discourse of sovereignty. This does not preclude
its conceptual role at the surface of knowledge, nor the relativity of property
rights. The epistemic function of absolute ownership does not contradict the
existence and legal recognition of a multitude of rights, such as creditors' or
inheritance rights, which compromise the absolute exercise of ownership. Is
absolute ownership therefore a mere legal fiction?
Absolute ownership cannot be so easily dismissed. It is a central
structuring legal concept and, furthermore, has an important functional role
connected to the epistemic workings of French law. This deep epistemic
function, explored in the second section of this chapter, explains the enduring
surface relevance of absolute ownership as a concept.
SECTION I - ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP AS A CONCEPTUAL
PARTICULARITY
First will be set out the ways in which the conceptual differences
between the civil law and the common law notion of ownership are perceived
in comparative literature. There will then be an attempt to go beyond the
orthodox acceptance of absolute ownership as characterising the civilian
tradition, by highlighting convergences between absolute ownership and the
common law notion of radical title, the sovereign rights over land of the
4 See Foucault's distinction between "savolr' and "connaissances", referred to in
Chapter I, at pp 30-31.
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Crown. These two concepts can be linked to a common juridical
understanding of sovereignty.
I.Conceptual divergences in the notion of ownership and their rationales
''The civil law of property is based on a broad concept of 'ownership'
as the 'fullest right a person can have over a thing' ".5 One of the main
characteristic of the civilian, and therefore French, notion of ownership, is its
conceptualisation as a relationship between man and object. This
characteristic is said to be inherited from the Roman law of things which "was
...originally contemplated as regulating the relations between human beings
and material objects.t" Ownership, a relation between man and thing, is
absolute in that it entails "a right that can be invoked by the owner against any
third party"," The meaning and implications of this absolute character will be
examined next: the absolute nature of ownership is enshrined in the Civil
Code and reflects an abstract ideal which defeats a precise definition of the
prerogatives of an owner. But it has nonetheless the concrete implication of
preventing fragmentation of property rights.
The absolute character of ownership was intended to be abstractly
reflected in the unity of the powers it confers. Ownership is one and
indivisible. Consequently, the owner cannot fragment his right into various
limited interests, unless these are limited real rights recognised by the Code.
''The above mentioned principle of unity constitutes one of the essential
differences between the CIVIL LAW systems and the ANGLO-AMERICAN
law, in which ownership as a unitary concept plays a much less important role
in consequence of a fragmentation of ownership'Y
5 A Dyer H van Loon, Report on trusts and analogous institutions, drafted for The
Hague Conference on private international law and presented in May 1982, at p 15.
6 J H Beekhuis,in International Encyclopaedia of Comparative law, vol 6, 1973, at p 3.
7 ibid, at p 8.
8 ibid at p 10.
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Absolute ownership confers prerogatives which are claimed to be of
unlimited duration. Indeed, the eternal nature and permanence of absolute
ownership is one of its most symbolic and essential characteristics. This is so
even though the rights of an owner are limited by the concurrent rights after
his/her death of his/her spouse and descendants!
The concept of absolute ownership is an abstraction. It has no
predetermined substantive content such as specific rights of action. It is an
abstract form of power - dominium - over things. It entails:
"the attribution of all conceivable powers relating to the object ...Seeing that
it is impossible to enumerate all the powers inherent in ownership, one must,
if one tries to define ownership, be content with this formal description'Y
But although absolute ownership does not have a preestablished
content, it is a right defined by statute. This has its own consequences.
Codification of property rights "tends to freeze legal institutions and devices
in the precise form in which they happen to be at the date of codification". 10
Thus, the concept of absolute ownership tends to be immutable and inflexible.
This crystallisation of absolute ownership was performed in France not only
through article 544 of the Civil Code, but also through constitutional
enactments enshrining private absolute ownership. Absolute ownership as a
sacred constitutional principle has been reaffirmed in successive constitutional
reforms arid is still enshrined in the Preamble of the current 1958
Constitution. 1 1
To sum up therefore, from a civilian perspective, ownership is an
absolute prerogative over things the integrity of which cannot be threatened by
fragmentation over time or between individuals. The abstract nature of this
9 ibid, at p 12.
10 "The trust and its counterparts outside the common law", in ibid, p 84.
11 J Morange, "La Declaration et Ie droit de propriete", Droits, vol 8, 1988, P 101. The
Preambule incorporates the 1789 Declaration of Human Rights which, in its articles 2
and 17, refers to ownership as a fundamental human right.
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character requires that ownership cannot be broken down into a list of defined
attributes. Ownership is enshrined in the Civil Code and in the Constitution
and as such, is a consecrated eternal principle. On the basis of such a
description of civilian ownership, it has been argued that "[a]t common law,
as opposed to the civil law, there is no right or concept of ownership" .12
However, it can be argued that the common law conceptual bases of property,
and in particular land law, is no less abstract than civillFrench law's absolute
ownership.
"From its earliest origins land law has comprised a highly artificial field of
concepts, defined with meticulous precision, with the result that the
interrelation of these concepts is not unlike a form of mathematical
caIculus ....The law of land is logical and highly ordered, consisting almost
wholly of systematic abstractions ...".13
The conceptual framework of land law is inherited from the mediaeval
doctrines relating to estates and tenures. It also forms the basis of broader
notions of property. Property or ownership in the common law sense is still
connected to the historically and politically most important form of
ownership: land tenure. This link has been severed in civillFrench law through
a more abstract and general notion of ownership.
To the extent that the concept can be said to exist in the common law,
absolute ownership is a prerogative which can only belong to the Crown in
the form of radical title to all land. The concept of radical title is the
concomitant of sovereignty and is vested in the Crown, as the only true owner
of land. Radical title results from the act of conquest and subjugation of a
territory by the King, and originates in the Norman conquest. The feudal
theory of tenure is founded on this act of conquest, consecrated in the concept
of radical title as the source of all other limited rights.
12 J R Cortina, "The Jus Emphyteuticarium and the Trust: a Byzantine Solution to an
Acadian problem", (1981),8, 1, Southern University Law Review, 95 at p 102.
13K Gray, Elements of Land Law, second edition, Butterworth, London 1993, at p 51.
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Whereas in the common law, absolute ownership could describe the
relationship of the sovereign to territory, tenures form the basis of property
relations between lord and tenant. Property rights are therefore conceptualised
as a relation between grantor and grantee, defined by the conditions of grant:
"In addition, those with land rights were not preoccupied with the right of
ownership, which belonged to the sovereign" .14
If the Crown is the only owner of land in the civilian sense, what do
tenants own? According to the doctrine of estates, the tenant owns not the land
itself but an abstract entity, the estate in land. The estate owned confers
specific rights attached to the nature of the estate itself. These rights
"represented a temporal 'slice' of the bundle of rights and powers exercisable
in respect of land".lS According to the doctrine of estates, property rights are
temporally delimited and defined according to their temporal dimension. The
element of eternity ofabsolute ownership does not inform the
conceptualisation of property rights.
The concept of seisin, which informs the common law idea of
relativity of title, explains the absence of ownership as an abstract and
absolute title. ''The notion of 'seisin' is part ofthe common law tradition that
proprietary rights in land are based in physical possession rather than abstract
title".16 Factual possession, irrespective of right, evidenced a relationship
between man and land amounting to ownership.
"[T]he preeminent position accorded to de facto possession in English law
ensures that there is no such thing as 'absolute title' to land. All title is
ultimately relative. The title of the present possessor will customarily be
upheld unless and until a better claim is advanced on behalf of someone
else".17
14op. cit. note 12 at p 114.
IS Gray, op. cit. note 13, at p 56.
16ibid, at p 61.
17ibid, at p 62.
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To summarise, the common law conceptualises absolute ownership
only insofar as this notion can be equated to the Crown's radical title. Property
rights are conceived as relative relationships between persons, mediated
through the concept of estates or limited interests. A property holder is not
perceived as owning the land itself but an interest or estate. These abstract
objects of ownership are flexible and can be divided into lesser interests.
According to doctrinal theorisation, the conceptual framework of common law
property has allowed the fragmentation and manipulation of ownership rights.
"The flexibility of the Anglo-American concept of estates in land has made
much easier the development of the trust, as it was theoretically sound for a
holder of a fee simple to divest himself of some of his interests".18
The fragmentation of ownership for the functional purpose of separating the
management of land from its enjoyment was facilitated through the
recognition of the beneficiary'S right as an equitable estate.l" It is therefore
arguable that another conceptual difference between French law and the
common law, it the ability of the latter to consider ownership functionally,
rather than as an abstract prerogative.
The rationales explaining these conceptual divergences are of three
main types. First, the differences are explained in terms of the different
historical evolution of systems of property. The feudal system of ownership
was violeritly uprooted in France during the Revolution. The radical changes
were then consolidated by the nineteenth century codification. English law did
not experience such a radical break and is still influenced by its feudal past. A
second argument is that, in France more than in common law countries, the
political dimension of the liberal notion of private property permeates the legal
18 op.cit., note 12, at p 114. The statement suggests that fragmentation of title was
the result of a flexible doctrine of estates, whereas it is probably the case that the
latter was itself the result of an ex post facto rationalisation of pragmatical divisions of
ownership in the interest of the beares of rights: see Gray, op. cit. note 13.
19 see op.cit, note 5, at pp 16-17.
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notion of ownership. A third argument is based on the epistemological and
methodological differences identified between the civil law and the common
law. Each of these arguments will be considered in tum.
First as regards the French system of property rights, feudalism' as a
political system was in ruins at the eve of the Revolution; the latter only
confirmed the decline of the powers of feudal landlords. However, the
structure of ownership was still based on the tenure system.20 The prevailing
position is well described by Herman:
"According to feudal tradition every manor owner enjoyed rights of 'eminent
property' (dominium directum) upon all land in the manorial village. These
rights permitted the manor owner to withdraw revenues and fruits from the
land as a kind of homage or tribute. The lesser landowner also 'owned' the
land in the sense that he could transfer or devise it, but his ownership was
conditional. If the lesser landowner transferred the land with the lord's
consent, the lesser landowner owed the lord certain rents as well as property
transfer fees in recognition of the lord's eminent rights. To use the language of
article 544, the lesser landowner's ownership was not absolute; the lesser
landowner enjoyed only the useful (or profitable) estate (dominium utile)".21
By the time of the Revolution, the services owed by the tenants to the Lords
had been considerably reduced but divided ownership remained. After the
Revolution, this system of property holding was abolished and Article 544
established the basis of a new system.
"[T]he Code ...replace[d] the old system with a system in which everyone
subject to state imposed regulation could bargain freely regarding land
ownership because each citizen owns property unqualified by the dominium
directum ....The property-holding system of the Civil Code stripped away the
last vestiges of seigneurial privilege and united in the same hands both the
control of assets and the benefits those assets yielded. A highly stylized,
streamlined system of property ownership resulted".22
20see A Leca, "Essai de synthase sur l'etat du droit feodal a la veille de la
reVOlution", Revue de la Recherche Juridique, n 1, 1988, P 63.
21 S Herman, "From Philosophers to Legislators, and Legislators to Gods: The French
Civil Code as Secular Scripture", (1984), 3, University of Illinois Law Review, 597, at
~607.
2 ibid, at pp 607-60B.
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The feudal system of property holding, characterised by a multiplicity of
relations and ties, was replaced by a system based on a unitary and
unconditional relation to the object of ownership.
As part of this reform of the system of ownership, other feudal
institutions were targeted. The fideicommissary substitutions - the French
equivalent of the entail - were abolished. The substitution had enabled the
preservation of land within the family.
"[B]y the time of the French Revolution, almost the entire country was tied up
by these substitutions. The first donee was owner only in name and
appearance; ...Thus the institution was despised because creditors were
deprived of recourse against collateral and property was tied up indefinitely
and kept out of commerce".23
The elimination of this institution has been identified as one of the reasons for
the conceptual problems encountered by civilians as regards the trust:
''To this day, the concept of the trust is still virtually incomprehensible to the
typical French jurist, thus indicating the measure of the Civil Code's uprooting
of this feudal device"."
The second line of argument is based on the impact of political history
on law. For instance, in the eyes of many, the replacement of the feudal system
of ownership, characterised by a multiplicity of personal relations, by a system
organised around the Roman law inspired concept of absolute ownership,
illustrates ~hepolitical and philosophical importance of ownership in the
constitution of modern French law. In the common law, on the other hand,
"[m]etalegal considerations ...such as justification of the right to own land or
preoccupations with the nature and essence of the right of ownership, were
never the subject of theoretical scrutiny. This was not so at civil law,
particularly after the natural law theories became popular. At civil law the
theoreticians were and still are concerned with questions about the relationship
23DSinger Jacobs, "Prohibited Substitutions", (1981), 56, Tulane law Review, at
~359.
4 op. cit., note 21, at p 609.
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between man and his right to the ownership of land and ultimately, about man,
property, and God". 25
The French post-revolutionary codification has been described as
performing the positivisation of natural law, thus inscribing philosophical
thought into positive law. Natural law views ownership as the natural right of
man, stemming from his occupation of and work on the land.26 Article 544
implements the idea that man, by virtue of his human essence, has a natural
right to appropriate and use for his sole benefit, the natural resources
surrounding him.
Another interpretation, still based on the impact of modem political
history on law, proposes that the legal notion of absolute ownership is a
consecration of liberal individualism. Absolute ownership is nothing else than
the glorification of individual property as an incentive for entrepreneurial
initiative and creativity." Absolute ownership secures individual freedom.
The third type of argument stresses that, although the common law has
also been influenced by similar political and philosophical ideas, these have
not become part of the law through codification. The concept of property in
the common law remains more concerned with functional or pragmatic
considerations. Hence, another reason given for the conceptual divergences
between the common law and the civillFrench law refers to epistemological or
methodological differences.
"[T]he obsession for classification and definition, without any practical goal,
irritates the common law jurists ...the civil law is a sort of professional system,
whereas the common law is essentially a practitioners' system; one developed
not by professors and scholars, but by judges and by lawyers who give the
judges the material for their decisions".28
25op. cit., note 12, at p114.
26See J Morange's discussion of Turgot and Locke, op.cit., note 11, at p103-1 05.
27 'b'dI I .
28op. cit. note 12, at p 114.
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These epistemological differences would explain why there is no unitary,
abstract and regulative concept of ownership in the common law, which is
instead more reactive to practical requirements.
"Common law chooses flexibility both in the creation of interests of property
and in their manipulation; its way has been 'experiment' ...it is fair to say that
the system as a whole is not preoccupied with logic. As Maitland wrote, 'On
juristic elegance we do not pride ourselves, but we know how to keep the roof
weather-tight' ...civillaw proceeds in a fashion diametrically opposed to the
common law. Instead of permitting individuals and their attorneys to discover
what kinds of ownership and what objects of ownershi~ are in their best
interests, the civil law maps out the rules in advance".2
Different historical and political evolutions of the law and diverging
legal methods are invoked to explain the conceptual differences between the
common law's pragmatic vision of property and French law's principle of
absolute ownership. This has lead some scholars to assert that "[a[t common
law ..there is no right or concept of ownership'V" Moreover, the notion of
title, preferred by the common law, should not be confused with ownership as
the former is to be understood as relative and qualitatively on a par with the
aggregated interests it represents.
The diverging conceptual approaches observed do not, however, allow
us to assert that the concept of absolute ownership is unintelligible and non-
existent in common law systems. Nor is it true that French law's notion of
absolute ownership excludes the conceptual possibility of fragmented and
lesser property interests.
"The CIVIL LAW systems recognize many types of split ownership, including
those incident to co-ownership, joint ownership, servitudes, usufruct, usus,
habitation, pledge, mortgage, antichresis, lease and emphyteusis, and modem
FRENCH law permits the substantial equivalent of almost every type of future
interest known to the COMMON LAW".31
29 D W Gruning, "Reception of the trust in Louisiana: The case of Reynolds v
Reynolds", (1982), 57, Tulane Law Review, 89 at p 100.
30 op. cit. note 12, at p 102.
31 lbldI I ..
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Focus on the diverging conceptual bases of property law does not
provide a space for the explanation of these convergences between the
common law and French law. The emphasis on differences may be a key to the
constitution of an identity for the common law, but there may be something to
be learned from neglected conceptual convergences.
The proposed approach is to demonstrate that in English law, the
concept of absolute ownership does exist but it is linked to the
conceptualisation of the right of the sovereign over his land. In French law,
ownership is a sovereign right, the right of the sovereign individual over
things. The model for individual ownership is borrowed from a conception of
sovereign power. In both English and French law, sovereignty and absolute
ownership converge. Underlining this conceptual convergence allows us to go
beyond the comparative focus on private rights.
Indeed, the co~~ept of absolute ownership is connected to the concept
of sovereignty in both French law and the common law. This illustrates the
connection between sovereignty and absolute ownership. The purpose of
establishing such a conceptual connection between ownership and sovereignty
is to lay the foundation for the argument according to which these concepts
belong to the same underlying discursive phenomenon: the juridical discourse
of sovereignty. A second point to be made is the difference between the
common law and the French civilian understanding of ownership does not lie
at the conceptual level, as an equivalent of absolute ownership is found in the
notion of radical title. The concept exists in the common law but was not
given a place in the legal and political formulation of individual ownership.
Why? We will argue in section 2, that the reasons are to be found in the
deeper epistemic workings of legal culture.
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2. Conceptual Convergences: Absolute Ownership, Radical Title and the
Concept of Sovereignty
Radical title, the basis of the doctrine of tenure, is said to be the
concept closest to the civilian notion of absolute ownership. In the common
law, the Crown is the only entity capable of exercising absolute and
unmediated power over land. The radical title grounds and symbolises the
sovereignty of the ruler over its territory.
The notion of radical title illustrates the existence of an overlap in
common law between property rights and political sovereignty. This overlap
or conceptual connection is strikingly revealed in the Australian case law
concerning the possibility of indigenous property rights. The Australian case
Mabo v. Queensland is a potent illustration of the implications of the
colonialist linking in the common law of the Crown's sovereignty and its
absolute title to land.32
In 1879, the Meriam's people traditional land, the Murray Islands, were
annexed as a settled colony to Queensland. The Meriam people brought an
action against the state of Queensland for declarations that they were entitled
to the Islands on the basis of their native title, as owners, possessors, occupiers
or beneficiaries of usufructuary rights.
According to Brennan J, who delivered the majority judgement, "the
chief question in this case is whether ...[annexation] had the effect on 1 August
1879 of vesting in the Crown absolute ownership of, legal possession of and
exclusive power to confer title to all land in the Murray Islands".33 In other
32 (1992) 175 CLR 1
33 ibid. at p 25.
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words, the main issue was whether the acquisition of sovereignty and of the
radical title meant that absolute beneficial ownership of the land had vested in
the Crown to the exclusion of any pre-existing native rights. The court
(Dawson J dissenting) held that the Crown did acquire radical title to the land
but that native title survived the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty which did
not amount to absolute ownership and exclusive power to confer title.
The application of the English doctrine of tenures and of the concept of
radical title to this relationship between the Australian state and Aboriginals
stems from the theory established in Australian case law according to which
Australia as a settled colony was "terra nullius". It was regarded as
uninhabited and submitted to no human laws. Hence, English property law, in
the absence of any other, became the law of the colony. According to the
English doctrine of radical title, the Crown enjoys absolute beneficial
ownership of the land and no other right of interest in this land can exist
unless specifically granted. The judicially established consequence of the
application of this doctrine to Australia was that any indigenous interest did
not survive British settlement. The recognition of a native title entails the
drawing of a clear distinction between the notion of radical title, expression of
the Crown's sovereignty and absolute beneficial ownership. Radical title
cannot be questioned by the courts as this would entail a questioning of the
Crown's sovereignty, but it could be interpreted so as to allow a sharing of the
beneficial ownership between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples.
Hence, Brennan J did assert that radical title and the doctrine of tenure "could
not be overturned without fracturing the skeleton which gives our land law its
shape and consistency". 34 However, " it is not a corollary of the Crown's
acquisition of a radical title to land in an occupied territory that the Crown
34ibid. at p 45.
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acquired absolute beneficial ownership of that land to the exclusion of the
indigenous inhabitantsv.f
This position was supported by Sir John Salmond J :, cited by Brennan
"Territory is the subject-matter of the right of sovereignty or imperium while
property is the subject matter of the right of ownership or
dominium".36Brennan J concluded that radical title can be the basis of the
exercise of sovereign power without it necessarily meaning that the Crown
enjoys absolute beneficial title to the land. However, radical title is the
expression of colonial sovereignty and therefore entails the power to
extinguish native title.
The Australian case law regarding the issue of native title explicitly
illustrates the conceptual connection between sovereignty and ownership in
the common law; the political sovereignty of both coloniser and Aboriginal
peoples entails the assertion of control over land. The Mabo case distinguishes
ownership from sovereignty, and radical title from property rights, to reaffirm
the sovereignty of the coloniser by maintaining the notion of radical title as
entailing a prerogative of control over land through the granting and
extinguishing of title.
The common law radical title was traditionally connected through the
concept of absolute beneficial ownership to the supreme exercise of
sovereignty of the Crown or the colonial ruler. In French law, the sovereignty
of the juridical subject is expressed through the legal recognition of his/her
property rights as absolute. Absolute ownership expresses the sovereign power
of the individual over his property. Both radical title and absolute ownership
encompass a species of power that can be identified as that of the sovereign
over his territory. This species of power was already conceptualised in the
35ibid. at p 48.
36ibid. at p 44.
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natural law tradition and stems from the theological tradition. It is man's
dominium, modelled on God's potestas absoluta , the expression of His divine
sovereignty." As will be argued in the next section, the conceptual structure
and roots of the modem concept of
absolute ownership are to be found in the medieval legal formulation of God's
right and its later confusion between imperium and dominium. We have thus
demonstrated the conceptual confusion between imperium and dominium,
between radical title and beneficial ownership, between sovereignty and
individual property rights illustrate that the same coded representation of
power underlies these concepts. The power of the coloniser over his colony or
of Man over things is sacred, unidirectional and sovereign. The symbolic
importance and sacredness of the notion of radical title, and of the power of
the colonial sovereign, can be gathered in Dawson J's dissenting judgement in
Mabo, which altogether refuses any questioning of the notion of radical
title.the conceptual links between absolute ownership and sovereignty; in both
French and common law traditions, absolute rights over land/things reflect a
certain juridical representation of power. However, in French law, as opposed
to the common law, this representation is central to the conceptualisation of
individual ownership. A key question remains: why has absolute ownership
such a pivotal role in the French law's conceptual landscape?
SECTION II ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP AND SACRED SYMBOLS
The differences in property laws, understood as systems of rules or
disciplines, can be suitably explained in terms of conceptual divergences
stemming from the historical, political and epistemological aspects
37 see M-F Renoux-Zagame, "Ou droit de Oieu au droit de I'homme: sur les origines
tMologiques du concept moderne de proprlete", Oroits, I, 1985,17.
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characterising the legal cultures or systems compared. However, the enduring
importance of absolute ownership in French legal doctrine remains
unexplained. Why should absolute ownership be treated still today, despite
. political changes, as a sacred principle which shall not be compromised at the
risk of fracturing the body of the law? The conceptual differences between
French law and the common law may well explain why the trust has no exact
and spontaneous equivalent in French law. They do not explain the doctrinal
resistance, reflected in the proposed legislation, to introduce the trust's
structure of ownership into the French Civil Code, and indeed, as will be seen,
in those of Quebec and Louisiana.
It cannot be argued that absolute ownership has remained a bedrock
principle on the basis that individual property is a supreme and unquestioned
value. The importance of Welfare reforms in the second part of the twentieth
century and the constitutional recognition of collective rights demonstrate that
individual ownership has been compromised. But this does not lead us to the
conclusion that role of absolute ownership is simply ideological, masking the
reality of fragmented rights and the magnitude of state regulation of
ownership. The further dimension, one that my argument focuses on, is the
role of absolute ownership in the imaginary of French law. Itmust be
emphasised here that concepts of "imaginary" and "ideology" are not
synonymous." It is argued that the persistent significance of absolute
ownership in French law is mainly epistemic and symbolic. It is specific to the
imaginary of French - and other jurisdictions' based on the Code Napoleon -
38 Ost and Lenoble 's concept of imaginary is distinct from the Marxist notion of
ideology. "These notes on the imaginary allow us to begin a debate with the concept
of ideology. This confrontation is necessary if we are clearly to distinguish our own
hypotheses from those analyses. from now on classical, of legal discourse that are
proposed in terms of critique of ideologies". For further details see "Founding Myths in
Legal Rationality",(1986), 47, M.L.R, at pp 537-538.
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legal knowledge; absolute ownership's discursive role is quite independent
from the non-discursive significance of individual property.
The enduring relevance of absolute ownership in French law is
connected to its epistemic and symbolic function. As a symbol, absolute
ownership participates in the ritualistic representation of power. The species
of power represented has been identified as sovereign power. This function is
not merely incidental or accessory, it is epistemic and therefore an essential
part of the fabric and workings of doctrinal discourse qua legal knowledge. As
regards the trust and the Fiducie, these workings are revealed by the
arguments invoking the impossibility of importing the trust because of its
structure of ownership.
Absolute ownership does not symbolise a specific power-holder - the
King, God, the coloniser - but of a form of power. The representation reflects
the characteristics of sovereign power rather than a character exercising
power. The characteristics of sovereign power - unity, unidirectionality - have
a regulative role in the production of legal knowledge. They define concepts
and determine their central role. They also regulate the general form of legal
thought."
The convergences between sovereignty and absolute ownership in
French law, highlighted by a comparison with the notion of radical title in the
common law, stem from the grounding of both concepts in the same epistemic
symbolism," Absolute ownership and sovereignty are both effects of the
juridical discourse of sovereignty. They both represent the juridical
prerogative as a sovereign, unitary, unfragmentable and unidirectional power.
The sovereignty of the property owning subject, as that of the Crown or the
39 See Chapter II.
40 It could be argued that both the common law and French civil law traditions have
been influenced, albeit in different ways, by the juridical discourse of sovereignty.
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State, echoes God's potestas absoluta. It is in this resonance that lies the
legitimacy of juridical power.
M-F Renoux-Zagame has demonstrated the episternic link between the
modem concept of absolute ownership and mediaeval theological thought.t'
''The idea that man, by his very essence, has a natural right to appropriate all
things for his own use and enjoyment, implemented by the definition in
article 544, owes its existence and part of its meaning to the efforts of the
scholars of the Church to understand the legitimacy ...of human property over
a world of which the Scriptures say that God, its creator, is the only master,
the solus dominus". 42
The author shows how the modem juridical notion of absolute ownership
stems from natural law theories; however, the latter are rooted in an older
intellectual tradition, arching back to the theological and juridical reflections
of scholars on the Christian Scriptures and Roman law. She describes
mediaeval scholasticism as "the theological prehistory of the so-called modem
vision of ownership't.f
The theological vision of human dominium which founds Man's right
to property is organised around two key ideas: dominium over things can only
belong to God and God has allowed humans to participate in his dominium.
God is both the origin and model of human dominium. The term dominium
refers both to God's power over His Creation and to the human exercise of
property prerogatives. The term is borrowed from Roman law's vocabulary as
a result of the mediaeval cross-fertilisation of juridical theories and Christian
thought. "The progress of the term dominium therefore translates a slow
evolution leading the theologians to perceive divine dominium as a type of
41 Doctoral study summarised in the article "Du droit de Dieu au Droit de I'Homme:
sur les origines theoloqiques du concept modeme de proprlete", op. cit., note 39.
42 ibid., at p 17-18, my translation.
43 ibid., at p19, "proprlete" is translated as ownership and "domaine" as property or
dominium.
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right, and then to confuse dominium, law and the divine ...this evolution is
cruciaL.as it could be that the notion of subjective right is rooted therein".44
Divine dominium, the model and basis of human dominium, is
interpreted as the site of divine sovereignty and expression of God's unlimited
power of creation and ordering. Man's submission to God allows human
participation in the divine dominium. The dominium of Man over things was
thus interpreted as a way by which God allows humans to participate in His
action, to share part of his power for the purposes He has assigned. According
to the theologians, human dominium is confused with God's power and
mission. In natural law theories, the role of God has been confined to the
explanation of the origins of human dominium; the latter was no longer
confused with God's own dominium. Accordingly, Man, in his worldly
endeavours, was no longer constrained by God's will. Dominium was
inscribed in human nature and man was born free. However, Man's natural
right to property, expressed in absolute ownership, had the same content as its
theological ancestor. "Freed from its ties with God ...the moving divine
dominium of theological thought became in a way a human right".4s
The author concludes by noting that the theological human dominium
resembles the absolute power of the King; in both cases, submission to God is
the basis and the limit of these two types of power. Moreover, absolute
ownership, grounded in the human/divine dominium, "could have been better
named right of God, as it was modelled on the divine for Man conceived as
the agent of God on earth"." The contradictions appearing in human rights
theory are inherent in the idea that a multiplicity of beings could all be equal
44ibid., P 20.
4S ibid., P 30.
46 ibid., p31.
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and yet exercise rights which were originally constructed for the sole and
supreme God of Christianity.
M.F Renoux-Zagame's study reveals that the modem concept of
absolute ownership originates in theological reflections about God's power. It
seems that, to express the omnipotence of Man, absolute ownership had to
crystallise the attributes of divine and monotheistic power: unity, sovereignty,
unidirectionality. Absolute ownership is part of the enduring epistemic and
symbolic structure rooted in theological reflections on power and producing
legal conceptualisations focused on sovereign power.
The role of absolute ownership as epistemic icon is further argued by a
focusing on in its enduring importance in jurisdictions which have based their
private law system on Napoleonic codification, but which also have been
considerably influenced by the common law. Quebec and Louisiana both
consecrated absolute ownership in their nineteenth century codification. They
both have adopted their own equivalent of the trust through statutory reform.
In both jurisdictions, absolute ownership has been the focus of doctrinal and
judicial debates and analyses on the legal definition of the imported
institution. Absolute ownership is also an epistemic symbol of identity in these
jurisdictions. Unlike French doctrine, legal knowledge in these jurisdictions
has been considerably influenced, or at least exposed to, common law
concepts. However, the epistemic unity and uniqueness of Quebec's and
Louisiana's legal identity seems to depend on reverence to the sacred
epistemic symbols consecrated by Napoleonic codification. Absolute
ownership in Quebec and Louisiana does not merely translate the conceptual
particularity of a system of property law based on Roman law. It subsists, in
the face of adversity, as a symbol of the law's identity. In Quebec and
Louisiana, unlike in French legal doctrine, the issue of legal identity is at the
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forefront of legal discourse and is formulated as a clash between legal
traditions. In all three cases, legal discourse maintains its sense of identity and
unity through the sacred symbols.
1. The Trust in Louisiana
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 is based on the French Civil Code
and contains a similar prohibition on fideicommissary substitutions. As a
result, the nineteenth century courts would not admit the validity of trusts
created in Louisiana and governed by the codified rules. However, in 1882
charitable trusts for educational purposes were statutorily exempted from the
Code's prohibition, in order to allow gifts made by Paul Tulane to Tulane
University. Between 1882 and 1938, legislation was introduced to overcome
the judicial and doctrinal hostility towards trusts. The first trust code, the Trust
Estates Act, was enacted in 1938 and reformed in 1952. The current law is
contained in the Louisiana Trust Code 1964. The purpose of this legislation
was to ensure that the trust concept accords, as much as it is practically
possible, with the civil law framework. Section 1781 of the Trust Code
defines the trustee as "a person to whom title to the trust property is
transferred to be administered by him as a fiduciary".
It has been argued that the 1938 and 1964 codifications amount to a
capitulation of Louisiana to the common law.47 The successive codifications
constituted "an outright adoption of the Anglo-American Trust in its own
common law and equity concepts by means of a comprehensive code".48
However, "there remained the possibility that trusts in Louisiana would still
47JM Wisdom, "A Trust Code in the Civil Law", (1938),13, Tulane Law Review, 70.
48op. cit. , note 12, at p106.
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suffer in the courts because they embodied 'tenures alien to the civillaw'''.49
Despite the importation of the notion of legal title, abbreviated to "title" in the
1964 Trust Code, the judicial and doctrinal analyses have remained faithful to
the notion of absolute ownership and unable to construe the nature of the
interests of the beneficiary and trustee. The search for an absolute owner
remains the source and structure of debates about the trust.
The case of Reynolds v Reynolds 50, decided in 1980, has been
interpreted by legal doctrine in Louisiana as raising the unsolvable question of
whether "title" amounts to absolute and indivisible ownership.l' Mrs
Reynold's grandmother created in her will a spendthrift trust in which she
bequeathed her farm. This will stipulated that the trustee was to hold the
property in trust for her grandchildren until her youngest grandchild attained
the age of 21. Then the trust corpus and the accumulated income would be
distributed equally to all. before such time, the trustee used his discretionary
power to distribute some of the income to the beneficiaries. Mrs Reynolds
received payments from the trustee and applied them to household expenses.
Mr and Mrs Reynolds divorced. At the time of the divorce Mrs Reynolds still
held a balance of £ 555.18 of the distributed income and there remained £
11,434.80 in the account of the trustee, representing undistributed income of
the trust estate in which Mrs Reynolds had a proportionate share. Mr Reynolds
argued that he was entitled to a half of the distributed income and of Mrs
Reynolds proportionate share in the undistributed income. The basis of his
claim was article 2386 of the Civil Code, according to which the fruits of a
wife's separate property become community property, i.e. both spouses'
property in equal shares, unless the wife executes and records a declaration
49op. cit., note 29, at p102.
50 388 So. 2d 1135 (La. 1980)
51 K Venturatos Lorio, "Le trust en Louisiane: I'experience du trust par une juridiction
civiliste", Revue Juridique et Politique, 1990,240.
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that she reserves all of such fruits for her own separate use and benefit. Mrs
Reynolds did not make such a declaration. The main issue was whether the
trust corpus could be considered as Mrs Reynolds' separate property and the
trust income as the fruits of her property. The case offered an opportunity to
settle the issue of the precise nature of a beneficiary's right and of the trustee's
title. However, the case only revealed the great diversity of opinions and
approaches amongst Louisiana judges.
"On a theoretical level, Reynolds shows that the Trust Code has not
'crystallized' the concepts of legal and equitable title. The court was at pains
to discover what the beneficiary had' ..The majority found that the beneficiary
possessed some interest in the trust. ..".52
The Supreme Court held that whilst the undistributed trust income was not the
fruit of Mrs Reynolds separate property and did not fall into the community,
the trust income already distributed was. The judges were at pains to reconcile
the idea of absolute ownership enshrined in article 489 of the Louisiana Civil
Code with the rights of a beneficiary. Hence, for Summers CJ:
"When ownership is vested in the trustee with full powers as such it cannot be
said that the beneficiary of the trust then has rights in the property which
entitle her to its fruit...No statute in Louisiana confers upon a trust beneficiary
the ownership of the corpus of the trust". 53
Mrs Reynolds did not own the trust corpus as the trustee had full title. Hence,
the undistributed income could not be regarded as the fruit of her property.
Indeed, as a beneficiary "she had no right to administer the trust property ...she
was without even the slightest indicia of ownership"."
However, on rehearing, a more nuanced definition of the beneficial
interest was sought, to reconcile opposing views as to "whether that beneficial
52 0 W Gruning, "Reception of the trust in Louisiana: the case of Reynolds v
Reynolds" (1982), 57, Tulane Law Review, at p 118.
53seecase reference note 95, at p 1138
54ibid.at p 1139.
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interest can be characterized as ownership of the trust corpus'v" Dixon CJ
concluded that:
"Mrs Reynolds' interest in the corpus of the trust did not constitute 'ownership'
of separate property which could produce either income payments or
undistributed income as 'fruits' .... [as] Mrs Reynolds future and indefinite right
is devoid of the indispensable element of ownership: immediacy, dominion,
and authority ".56
However, the distributed trust income "was the materialization of the gift of a
future interest in property'v"
However diverse, the reasonings adopted granted a central role to the
civilian notion of absolute ownership.
"The fundamental problem remains that the trust is essentially a device in
which a search for an owner is inappropriate ...The French Revolution fought
to reintegrate ownership in order that land would remain in commerce, and
this ideological origin may in part explain the supreme court's insistence that
an owner in civilian terms be found notwithstanding the existence of a trust.
But it is not merely ideology or even habit that compels this. Ownership is an
essential, working part of the Louisiana civil law system, and numerous
occasions ...require that an owner be found to answer concrete questions ...To
this extent, then, the reception of the trust in Louisiana remains incomplete. In
many cases, the kind of uncertainty caused by Reynolds will discourage
settlors and their attorneys from employing the trust device ...".58
The search for an absolute owner may well be "inappropriate" but it
seems to be the unavoidable consequence of the epistemic importance of
absolute ownership in Louisiana civil law. Although the Louisiana courts have
the conceptual apparatus to understand the trust, they are compelled to apply
the civilian notion of absolute ownership. Absolute ownership is, as asserted
by Gruning, a "working part of the Louisiana civil law system". How can its
function be described? The proposed analysis is that absolute ownership is
epistemic icon, guaranteeing the mytho-logical identity and unity of the Code.
The reception of the trust and its own conceptual apparatus will have to
SSibid.per Dixon CJ at p 1144.
s6ibid. at p 1148 and 1147.
sf-er Dixon, ibid. at p 1150.
5 ibid.,atpp120-121.
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remain incomplete as absolute ownership cannot be compromised. In Quebec,
absolute ownership is also at the centre of judicial and doctrinal discussions.
2. Quebec's Fiducie
Quebec's Civil Code of 1866 (Civil Code of Lower Canada) adopted
aspects of the coutumes de Paris, one of the French pre-revolutionary systems
of customary law. The coutumes had remained in force until Quebec's cession
to Great Britain in 1763. Following the coutumes, the Code adopted a liberal
view as to fideicommissary substitutions and allowed freedom of testation and
inter vivos donations. It also included the notion of absolute ownership in its
article 406, echoing the French article 544. It has been argued that Quebec's
Fiducie has its roots in the provisions of the 1866 Code based on the
coutumes. Article 869 allows a form of Fiducie for charitable testamentary
gifts and article 964, unlike the French Code, preserves the testamentary
substitution."
In 1879, in order to respond to the practices of lawyers and their
wealthy clients in the Anglophone community of Quebec, the "Act respecting
Trusts" was enacted.t'' The provisions of this Act were introduced in the 1888
Civil Code as articles 981a to 981n. Article 981a allows "all persons capable
of disposing freely of their property ...[to] convey property, movable or
immovable, to trustees by gift or will, for the benefit of any persons in whose
favour they can validly make gifts or legacies". The scope of the Fiducie was
therefore limited to the making of inter vivos or testamentary gifts. The 1879
59See J Brierley, "De la Fiducie", in La Betorme du Code Civil:Textes Reunis,Tome I,
Presse Uni. de Laval, 1991. 0 Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada, Carswell Co.Ltd.,
Toronto, 1984.
60 See B Stapelton, "Codification of Trust law: Who needs it?", Conferences sur Ie
nouveau Code Civil du Quebec: Actes des Joumees Louisianaises de I'Institut
Canadien d'Etudes Juridiques Superieures, Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, 1991.
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rules focus on issues of administration, accounting and procedures. They are
similar to common law rules. "However they are few in number and fall far
short of constituting what could properly be described as a codification of trust
law".61 The 1879 Fiducie has been characterised by uncertainty as to its
nature and application. These uncertainties are highlighted in the judicial
interpretations of the 1879 rules.
A 1932 case, Curran v. Davies, sought to widen the scope of the
Fiducie.62It had to be decided whether a settlor could unilaterally revoke a
Fiducie set up for the benefit of his adopted son. This hinged upon the issue
whether the gift had to be accepted by the donee in order to become
irrevocable. This, in tum, depended on whether the codified rules governing
gifts were applicable to a Fiducie. These rules required the acceptance of the
donee for the gift to become perfect and irrevocable. The court concluded that
the Fiducie was not merely the means of making a gift, but a contract for the
transfer of property. However, the issue regarding the definition of the
trustee's rights was left open.
Rinfret J attempted to define the nature of the Fiducie contact:
"This conveyance ...is in the words of the deed itself declared to be
'irrevocable' by the donor himself...The trustees will however not be owners in
the absolute sense. Although they are sole apparent owners with regard to
third parties, the trustees will not have the usus, nor the fructus or the abusus
of the trust property. [The beneficiary] has no right of ownership over the
thing given. At the same time the trust was created, he simply acquired a claim
against the trust".63
The trustee has all the rights of an owner but cannot be described as an
absolute owner." His rights and those of the beneficiary cannot be defined
solely on the basis of Civil law notions of ownership. Indeed,
61ibid. at p77.
62[1933] 1 S.C.A. 283.
63ibid.at p 293, translated in Royal Trust Co. v Tucker [1982] 1 S.C.R 250.
64 Y Rossier, "Etude comparee de certains aspects patrimoniaux de la fiducie",
(1989),34,4 McGill law Journal, 817 at p854-856.
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"it is hard not to conclude that the Code's section on the Fiducie has been
inspired by the common law. It is certain that Roman law or French law did
not transmit anything similar ...It is therefore consistent with ordinary
principles of interpretation ...to seek a solution in the case law from which our
own legislation originates. In English trust law, the beneficiary's acceptance is
not necessary to the validity of the trust contract". 65
On the basis of common law property concept, the case introduced the hybrid
construct of fiduciary ownership, as a right without the advantages of
enjoyment of the trust property. The idea of fiduciary ownership as a sui
generis form of ownership was consolidated in the 1982 Supreme Court case
Royal Trust Co. v. Tucker.66
In this 1982 case, Beetz J interpreted the significance of Curran v Davies as
follows:
"the trustees were ...recognized to have a limited right of ownership in the
property conveyed to them in trust. It accordingly becomes possible to give the
Quebec law on trusts a more liberal interpretation, one which is more in
keeping with its English sources"."
Confirming the position taken in Curran v Davies and contradicting the Court
of Appeal, the Supreme Court decided that the trustee is a sui generis owner,
but this ownership could not be described as the legal ownership of the
common law trust.
"The trust was known in the old French law, but. ..is of English inspiration, as
appears from the English terminology of article 981 a..[however] the
enactment of articles 981 a et seq. did not have the effect of introducing in
Quebec the English distinction between legal title and beneficial ownership, a
sort of dual ownership, and a foreign to Quebec law under which ownership is
indivisible and vested in a single individual".68
The English law of trusts, bar the equitable-legal title division, had thus been
incorporated into Quebec law by implicit reference/" The Supreme Court tied
650p.cit. note 107 at p 302, my translation.
66[198211 S.C.R 250.
67ibid. at p 255.
68ibid. at p 256
69 See M McAuley, J Talpis, "The Quebec Trust in the Real World", in op.cit. note 59.
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to define the trustee's rights without reference to either the common law legal
title or civilian absolute ownership.
"...ownership cannot remain in suspense ...that leaves only the trustee in whom
ownership of the trust property can be vested. Clearly the right of ownership is
not the traditional one, since, for example, it is temporary and includes no
fructus. It is a sui generis right, which the legislation implicitly but necessarily
intended to create ..."_70
Doctrinal and judicial analyses and debates on the legal nature of the
Fiducie have been structured around absolute ownership as a yardstick of the
impact of the trust on the law's identity. The debates on the Fiducie have been
analysed as unravelling three different approaches." These are the pragmatic
approach, the protectionist approach and the innovatory approach.
The pragmatic approach is illustrated mainly in the judicial analysis of
the Fiducie, based on practitioners' views. It recognises the Fiducie as
inspired by the common law trust. However, it is admitted that the conceptual
backbone of the trust - the splitting of ownership in two titles - cannot be
incorporated, as the notion of absolute ownership is a key element of the civil
law of Quebec. The ownership of the trustee is of a specific and unique nature
and cannot be identified as absolute ownership. It is not, however, to be
analysed as the legal title of the English trust. As the trust property needs an
owner, the ownership has to be located in the trustee, who does not enjoy the
fructus, one of the three prerogatives of absolute ownership. The Fiducie is a
hybrid derived from and modelled on the English trust, but influenced by its
civil law epistemic environment. The pragmatic approach takes into account
the fact that practitioners have used trust practice as a blueprint in their use of
the Fiducie. The aim is to give effect to the intention of the parties, rather than
to construct a general theory regulating the Fiducie.
700p. cit. note at p 272.
71 S Normand, J Gosselin, "La Fiducie du Code civil: un sujet d'affrontement dans la
cornmunaute juridique quebecolse", Les Cahiers de Droit, vol 31, 1990, 681.
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The protectionist and innovatory approaches developed in reaction to
the pragmatic approach. The aim of the protectionists is to assert the
dominance of Quebec's civil law tradition. Accordingly, the Fiducie is said to
derive from pre-revolutionary French law. The trustee is a mere administrator
and the notion of fiduciary ownership is an aberration which presupposes the
importation of the common law property concepts.
The innovatory approach, adopted mainly by academics specialising in
commercial law, accepts that civil law concepts are inadequate to explain the
trust relationship. New concepts have to be introduced to construct a general
theory of the Fiducie. Two theories have been influential: Faribault's
institutional theory, which describes the Fiducie as a corporate body or
artificial person, and Lepaulle's theory of the patrimony by appropriation.f
According to Lepaulle, the Fiducie creates an autonomous fund over which no
one has any property rights. Lepaulle's solution has influenced the Civil Code
Reform Committee who sought to avoid reference to fundamental civilian
concepts, such as absolute ownership, in their new definition of the Fiducie.
The new Fiducie is included in the reformed Civil Code of Quebec, in
force since January 1994. The reformers sought to formulate a general and
unified framework for the Fiducie, thereby widening its potential application.
They elected to adopt Lepaulle's theory of patrimony by appropriation as a
suitable umbrella concept to define the Fiducie. The notion of patrimony by
appropriation avoids recourse to the civilian concept of ownership. The
property in Fiducie constitutes an ownerless fund or patrimony. The notion of
patrimony is typically civilian and thanks to it "the English trust is 'civilised'
as it is formulated within a conceptual framework familiar to us".73 Hence, the
72 See ibid. at pp 714-726.
73 J Brierley, who participated in the drafting of the new legal provisions on the
Fiducie, op. cit. note 58, at p 743.
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Fiducie is seen as derived from the trust but constructed with the use of the
civilian concept of patrimony. This allows us to assert the independence of the
Fiducie from a complementary regulation by English rules on trust. However,
although English or American law cannot constitute a formal source of law,
"there is nothing to prevent the Quebec's courts and scholars to draw their
inspiration from common law doctrinal writings and case law".74
Under the reformed code, the trustee does not acquire the ownership-
or any other real rights - of the trust property. S/he will be granted powers of
administration independently from any transfer of property. The beneficiary
does not acquire any real rights either. His/her interest is protected as a
personal right. There is no conceptual need for the notion of sui generis
fiduciary ownership.
''The creation of a Fiducie does not entail a fragmentation of the settlor's
ownership rights. This is simply to say that the Fiducie is not based on the
notion of real rights but ...is shaped according to a different conceptual mould,
that of the patrimony by appropriation" .75
It seems that, in order to remain untouched, the civilian notion of
ownership had to be altogether avoided." By avoiding a definition based on
real rights, the risk of introducing the notion of fragmented legal title, through
the existing notion of fiduciary ownership, is curtailed. The conceptual limits
of ownership will no longer be highlighted by this confrontation between the
conceptual apparatus of the trust implemented by practitioners, and doctrinal
and judicial analysis within a civilian epistemic framework. Absolute
ownership is confined to its epistemic heights. By the same token, and
somewhat paradoxically, it is hoped that the practioners' use of the Fiducie as
a trust will no longer be hampered by its civilian epistemic context,
74ibid., at p 744.
75ibid., at p748.
76 This was the strategy also adopted by the drafters of the 1984 The Hague
Convention on Trusts and their recognition. See Chapter V.
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crystallised in the notion of absolute ownership. The recent reform of the Civil
Code has strengthened the role of absolute ownership as an epistemic icon, by
eliminating the incoherence of fiduciary ownership, and by removing the
concept of ownership from the context of existing debates on and practices of
the Fiducie.
A tentative conclusion for chapters II and illcould be that the trust's
legal structure of ownership cannot be introduced into French law and into the
legal systems which share the same epistemic tradition. This is linked to the
workings of legal savoir and the particular epistemic importance of absolute
ownership and the juridical discourse of sovereignty in French legal tradition,
as well as in Louisiana and Quebec, which share the same epistemic tradition.
However, this does not entail that the trust cannot be introduced at all, or that
its functions cannot be fulfilled by a domesticated equivalent. This chapter has
not addressed the issue as to whether the civilian equivalents of the trust
cannot perform the same functions as the trust because they lack the
fragmented ownership structure. What a legal institution can or cannot
perform and the manner in which it can be applied does not depend on its
conceptual legal structure. It depends on the specific power-knowledge
configuration in which it is rooted. Two dimensions of French law's power-
knowledge structure will be examined in the remaining chapters of this thesis.
First, the Fiducie in the context of French Governmentality will be addressed.
Finally, the Fiducie in relation to the practice and knowledge of the French
legal profession will be examined.
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CHAPTER IV
THE TRUST'S INCOMPATIBILITY WITH FRENCH
ORDRE PUBLIC: MISTRUST AND THE IMPERATIVE OF
TRANSPARENCY IN NAPOLEONIC
GOVERNMENTALITY
"...The state does not have an essence; in itself the state is nothing more than
the 'mobile effect of a multiple regime of govemmentality"'l
The orthodoxy established by H Motulsky and according to which the
trust conflicts with French Ordre Public - which could be translated as
"public policy" - was partly explored in Chapter two.s Itwas seen that this
conflict takes the form of a challenge to abstract principles and theories
defined as fundamental to French law. The identification of the notion of
Ordre Public with a set of abstract principles entails that the historical and
substantive content of this juridical concept remains unexplored in French
doctrinal writings on the trust. Indeed, this reflects the tendency in French
juridical mytho-logic to proceed "as if' law was a unitary set of coherent
principles embodying a universal and eternal rationality.
The hypothesis here is that the Civil Code, and principles derived from
it, far from perpetuating the universal and abstract rationality of Roman law,
have enshrined aspects of governmental rationalities which influenced
Napoleonic rule. It is argued that abstract principles, referred to in legal
analyses of the trust and the Fiducie, are the juridified expression of
1C Gordon citing M Foucault in ''The Soul of the Citizen: Max Weber & Michel
Foucault on Rationality and Government", in B Smart (ed), Michel Foucault: Critical
Assessment, vol IV, (2), at p 437.
2 See Motulsky's article, "De I'impossibilite juridique de creer un trust anglo-saxon
sous I'empire de la loi trancalse", Revue Critique de Droit International Prive, 1948,
451, discussed in Chapter II, Section II.
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instrumental rationalities of rule. The latter have found a place in legal culture
through juridical concepts such as Ordre Public. The trust's incompatibility
with French law results from aspects of Napoleonic rationality of government
enshrined in French legal culture through codification. The problems posed by
the trust and the Fiducie are also recognisable as problems of government.'
It is suggested that French legal culture is shaped, not only by its
epistemic tradition explored in the previous chapters, but also by a certain
"mentality of rule" or Governmentality, as Foucault would put it. The focus of
the next two chapters will be on the particular aspects of French governmental
rationality which the legal analyses of the trust and the Fiducie have
"activated". Those aspects concern the panoptic imperative of visibility and
transparency in relations between individuals, and between the state and the
individual. We are particularly concerned here with the focus on the trust's
ability to create opacity, as regards an individual's actual wealth, in doctrinal
and fiscal debates about the trust and the Fiducie.
The first section of this chapter explores the possible interpretation of
Ordre Public as the juridical expression of Napoleonic Governmentality. It
will focus particularly on Foucault's theoretical constructs: Governmentality,
Panopticism, and his vision of the modem dynamics of power. The purpose of
this approach is to establish the relevance of Foucault's vision of government
to an analysis of the juridical concept of Ordre Public. Foucault's theoretical
analysis allows us to argue that the reliance on principles and techniques of
surveillance is part of modem French political culture, and has been
incorporated into the law through the notion of Ordre Public.
3 The term government is to be understood according to Foucault's own
interpretation. which will be explained in this chapter. It is not the equivalent of policy
as it proposes a wider and more complex idea of government as determined not
simply by intentional and political factors. but also technical and epistemological
elements which are not necessarily mastered by the policy-maker.
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The "panopticist" vision of governable society as a transparent
machine characterises Napoleonic mentality of government; it is reflected in
the legal application of Ordre Public which seems to exclude the creation of
screen-like intermediary bodies such as the Trust. Section ITexplores the
specific abstract principles with which the Trust stands in conflict, connecting
them with the notion of Governmentality discussed in Section I. These
principles reflect the role of surveillance and visibility as means of
government. Hence, some principles are the juridified expression of policy
aims regarding the protection of contractual transactions, creditors and credit,
through the law's guarantee of the conformity of reality to appearances of
solvency. The trust poses well known problems as regards the protection of
creditors, and this concern is reflected in the Bill and doctrinal analysis of the
Fiducie. Moreover, the authoritarian tendency in French legal culture towards
the state surveillance of individual ownership hampers the introduction of a
device which would allow the "dematerialisation" of ownership.The
importance of surveillance in French political and legal culture will be first
explained with reference to a few Foucauldian theoretical constructs.
SECTION I - ORDRE PUBLIC REVISITED: NAPOLEONIC
GOVERNMENTALITY AND PANOPTICISM
This first section explores Foucault's theoretical constructs:
Governmentality, Panopticism and his vision of the modem dynamics of
power. It seeks to establish the relevance of Foucault's understanding to
French legal discourse, by connecting the notion of Govemmentality to the
juridical concept of Ordre Public. These general and theoretical developments
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will then be set in the specific context of the discursive treatment of the trust
and the Fiducie.
1.0rdre Public, Governmentality and Panopticism
The concept of Ordre Public is wide-ranging and includes specific and
current policy aims, as well as abstract bedrock principles of law. Motulsky
argued that no trust can be created under and regulated by French law as this
institution is incompatible with the French Ordre Public. Hence, the trust
conflicts with French Ordre Public as it offends the numerus clausus
principle, the concept of absolute ownership and the theory of the unity of
patrimony+ C Witz, in his analysis of the possible regime of a rediscovered
Fiducie, explores the issue of the validity of the fiduciary operation as regards
Ordre Public.s
Arguing that his Fiducie cannot be declared void or unenforceable on
the basis of a conflict with principles of Ordre Public, C Witz argues that the
Fiducie does not fragment ownership, and is not contrary to the principle of
free alienability of property. He argues that full ownership is transferred to the
fiduciary whereas the settlor and the beneficiary only have personal rights
against the fiduciary. Witz refers to devices similar to the Fiducie which have
never been penalised on the basis that they fragment ownership.These devices
are ways of managing a deceased's estate which do not rely on split
ownership.s As regards the principle of free alienability, Witz stresses that the
Fiducie does not always require the fiduciary to keep the asset, which can be
disposed of. The primary fiduciary duty is to preserve the value of an asset,
4 See discussion in Chapter II, Section II.
5 La Fiducie en Droit Prive Frencsls, Economica, Paris, 1981, at pp 237-267.
6 ibid pp 242-243.
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not the asset itself which is therefore not rendered inalienable when it is
placed in a Fiducie. Moreover, the inalienability would be justifiable on two
grounds, if it is temporary and if it is destined to protect a legitimate interest.
Witz argues that these two conditions would almost always be automatically
fulfilled.7
Witz also assesses the principle according to which the security of
commercial transactions is based on the appearances of solvencyf The
immediate appearances should be preserved as the basis on which creditors
assess the risk of lending. Any device allowing the fictitious representation of
solvency would be contrary to Ordre Public. Witz focuses on the case law
concerning the issue as to whether reservation of title clauses should bind third
parties. These clauses are not binding on third parties but Witz argues that the
principle of apparent solvency is not the main legal basis for this result.
Apparent solvency is not an important guiding principle for the courts and
could not defeat the validity of the Fiducie.
Witz also addresses Ordre Public issues regarding the fraudulent
avoidance of rules forbidding the settlor from accomplishing certain acts, or
prohibiting gifts to certain persons. The Fiducie, like the trust, could enable
these persons to receive or act by hiding their identity behind that of the
fiduciary.vWitz stresses that the use of the Fiducie in such circumstances
would be automatically sanctioned as fraudulent. Existing rules would prevent
the abuse of this device.
Finally, the author considers the reserve hereditaire - which
entrenches inheritance rights for surviving descendants. 10 The Fiducie cannot
be used as an instrument of fraud to avoid this statutory limitation on
7 ibid at pp 243-246.
g ibid at pp 254-258.
9 ibid at pp 259-264.
10 See Section II at pp 129-130. Ibid pp 264-265.
126
successions. The Fiducie can only be constituted for those assets which will
not be legally automatically transferred to the settlor's protected heirs.
Thus, the elements of Ordre Public threatened by the trust are the
following: the abstract principles of absolute ownership and of the unity of
patrimony, free alienability of property, the protection of creditors and that of
heirs. The juridical concept of Ordre Public appears as a mixed bag of
principles and policy. The notion of Ordre Public is both an overarching
abstraction and a reflection of substantive policies. I I It has no predetermined
and invariable content - Witz's understanding of Ordre Public in the light of
the Fiducie is broader than Motulsky's. It is treated as series of fundamental
and abstract principles, yet doctrinal analyses of these principles seem to spill
over into consideration of Napoleonic and post-revolutionnary policies.P The
juridical notion of Ordre Public translates into the law the general objective of
Order, as an abstract notion which may vary in its manifestations. However, I
wish to suggest that Ordre Public in fact enshrines the Napoleonic vision of
Order and the means for achieving this broad objective. Legal analysis and
questioning of Ordre Public Principles perpetuate Napoleonic substantive
policy values, by treating these "as if' they did did not have a contingent and
historical meaning. The notion of Ordre Public is the juridified and
perpetuated expression of the Napoleonic rationality of rule.
The concept of Ordre Public can be found in Article 6 of the Civil
Code, which states that there can be no exception to the application of rules
which deal with Ordre Public and Morality. The concept of Ordre Public is a
II In some respects, Ordre Public can suitably be translated as Public Policy,
particularly as regards the concept used in conflict of laws rules. However, the notion
of order as an eternal, atemporal and apolitical state is lost in this translation. This is
why I have opted for a literal translation of Ordre Public as Public Order.
12 See Chapter II, Section II, where the doctrinal approach to fundamental principles
involves consideration of substantive policy issues, despite acting "as if" these
principles were eternal, atemporal and abstract in form and content.
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general juridical principle which is used in most branches of the law.
However, Motulsky's application of this notion was made in the context of a
conflict of laws discussion of the trust. We will therefore focus on the
meaning given toOrdre Public in this particular legal discipline.'?
The notion of Ordre Public is defined functionally as allowing the
judge to exclude the application of a foreign law which "stands in total
contradiction with our fundamental conception of what legal order is''.I4
Hence, the Ordre Public exception allows the judge to avoid the application of
foreign laws which would entail a solution contrary to natural law; it also
allows to "defend principles which constitute the 'political and social
foundations of French Civilisation"', and to safeguard various legislative
policies. 15 The content of the notion and its precise coverage cannot be
ascertained with precision. This has led certain scholars to assert that the
notion of Ordre Public is "the enfant terrible of Private International Law"
because it leads to uncertainties.l"
The notion of Ordre Public in Private International Law has both
national and international dimensions. It encompasses an idea of universality
of principles common to all civilised nations, as well as a conception of the
"moral, social and economic goals" inherent and particular to the French legal
order. Hence the concept has a temporal and contingent dimension which has
led the Cour de Cassation, the highest court, to assert in its decision of the 22
March 1944 that the definition of Ordre Public "depends to a large extent on
13 Conflict of laws scholars assert that the meaning of Ordre Public in their own
diSCipline is to be distinguished from that given in purely domestic law. See Y
Loussouarn, P Sourel, Droit International PrlvB, 4 e ed, Dalloz, Paris, 1993 at pp 265-
278. P Mayer, Droit International PrivB, 5 e ed, Monchrestien, Paris, 1994, pp 139-
149.
14 Loussouarn, Sourel ibid. at p 271 (my translation).
15 Mayer, op. cit. note 12 at p 140-141 (my translation).
16 ibid at p 141.
128
the opinion prevalent in France at any given time".'? On the other hand, the
notion of Ordre Public is also intended to encompass certain essential, durable
characteristics of the French legal order as its function is to enable "the
preservation of French public morality, social, political and economic trends
which characterise our civilisation't.P Hence the paradox of the juridical
notion of Ordre Public lies in the fact that it is a juridical concept, operating
on a certain abstract plane, but also conveying the reality of the dependency
of law on governmental rationality, or Governmentality. This concept's
abstract level realises the juridification of governmental goals, values and
techniques.
The various legal interpretations of and debates on the notion of Ordre
Public are not our primary focus. But this notion allows a more general and
theoretical reflection on legal discourse. The work of Foucault on
Governmentality provides a theoretical basis upon which it will be argued
that, as reflected in the legal notion of Ordre Public, legal discourse
incorporates governmental rationality.
The Foucaultian neologism Governmentality was invented to describe
and constitute the mentality of governmental rule as an object of theoretical
analysis. Foucault defines Governmentality as :
" The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and
reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very
specific albeit complex form of power [(government)], which has as its target
population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its
essential technical means apparatuses of security."19
Governmentality itself is the haphazard combination of techniques and
substantive rationalities, whether or not leading to political programming.
17 D.C., 1944, 145, cited in Loussouarn, Bourel, op. cit. note 13 at p 276.
18 ibid at p 275.
19"Govern mentality", lecture given in 1978 and published in The Foucault Effect:
Studies in Governmentality, Burchell, Gordon, Miller (eds), Harvester Weatsheaf,
England, 1991, at p 102.
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There can be conflicts. Governmentality is not a unitary programme, or
intentional cohesive scheme. It is an accidental, complex and contradictory set
of rationalities and technologies. N Rose has rightly pointed out that
Governmentality is both a body of rationality governed by an epistemology
and an assemblage of technical means of government, of which law is only
one instrument.
"As political rationality, governmentalities are to be analyzed as ...a kind of
intellectual machinery or apparatus for rendering reality thinkable in such a
way that it is amenable to political programming ...political rationalities have
an epistemological character, in that they embody particular conceptions of the
objects to be governed - nation, population, economy society, community -
and the subjects to be governed - citizens,subjects, individuals ......"2o
Governmentality also includes techniques of government, including law,
which combine with others and with a system of knowledge and
argumentation. Hence:
"As an array of technologies of government, governmentality is to be analysed
in terms of the strategies, techniques and procedures through which different
authorities seek to enact programmes of government in relation to the
materials and forces to hand and the resistances and oppositions anticipated or
encountered. Hence, this is not a matter of the implementation of idealized
schema in the real by an act of will, but of a complex assemblage of diverse
forces (legal, architectural, professional, administrative, financial,
judgmental), techniques (notation, computation, calculation, examination,
evaluation), devices (surveys and charts, systems of training, building forms)
that promise to regulate decisions and actions of individuals, groups,
organizations in relation to authoritative criteria'V'
With the notion of Govemmentality, Foucault refocusses his
investigation on power's large-scale mechanics. Within this perspective of
Governmentality , law is both an instrument amongst others and a discourse
set in and determined by Governmentality. Law regulates or conducts
behaviour and participates in the construction of society. Juridical concepts,
20 N Rose, "Governing Advanced Liberal Democracies", in Barry, Osborne, Rose
(eds), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of
Government, U C L Press, London, 1996, at p 42.
21 N Rose, ibid.
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such as Ordre Public, reflect a compound of rationalities of rule and their
epistemology. Hence, Ordre Public, interpreted as encompassing Napoleonic
Governmentality, enshrines in the law a mentality of rule and governmental
technologies. This does not mean that French law follows the specific logic of
the French State as established since the Revolution, or that, indeed, a specific
and unchanged logic was fixed when the new Republican State emerged. The
argument is simply that Napoleonic Governmentality forms part of French
legal culture and influences the way legal issues are formulated and resolved.
A particular aspect of Napoleonic Governmentality, reflected in the
values of Ordre Public, is Panopticism. Panopticism is a technology of
government which is particularly relevant to the regulation of the trust and the
Fiducie as both of these techniques can be used as screens, concealing the
identity of the "true" owner. Panopticism is the title of one of the Chapters of
Foucault's Discipline and Punish. 22
In this book, the developments on Panoptic techniques are discussed in
the context of a general historical and sociological analysis of the penal system
and of its methods of control of social deviance. However, as will be argued
further later, Panopticism is perceived by Foucault and many of his
interpreters as a technology or diagram of power, which can be applied for the
purposes of controlling behaviour, whether or not it is deviant or criminal.
In Discipline and Punish, the chapter on Panopticism offers a
description of the workings of a particular form of power based on visibility
and associated with disciplinary power. Bentham's Panopticon is the idealised
architectural schema organising power through the principle of visibility.
Bentham described his invention as "a new mode of obtaining power of mind
over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example't.Alts main advantages are
22 pp 195-228, Penguin Books, London, 1977.
23The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol IV, Thoemmes Press, London, 1995, at p 39.
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two-fold: first, its adaptability to most institutional contexts and secondly, its
efficiency as a mechanism of power.
As regards the first advantage, Bentham enthusiastically concluded:
"What would you say, if by the gradual adoption and diversified application of
this single principle you should see a new scene of things spread itself over the
face of civilized society? - morals reformed, health preserved, industry
invigorated, instruction diffused, public burthens lightened, economy seated as
it were upon a rock, the gordian knot of the poor-laws not cut but untied - all
by a simple idea of architecture".24
Relying on the surveillance by one inspector in a tower and invisible to
those being watched, Bentham insisted on the efficiency of the Panopticon:
"I flatter myself there can now be little doubt of the plan's possessing the
fundamental advantages I have been attributing to it: I mean, the apparent
omnipresence of the inspector (if devines will allow me the expression)
combined with the extreme facility of his real presence" .25
In his writings, Bentham proposed to apply the Panopticon to
"penitentiary-houses, houses of correction, manufactories, mad-houses,
hospitals, schools". He provided a lengthy description but the main features of
the Panopticon are the following:
"The building is circular. The apartments of the prisoners occupy the
circumference ...the prisoners ..[are] secluded from all communication with
each other ...The apartment of the inspector occupies the centre".26
According to Foucault, the Panopticon's major effect is
"to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that
assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the
surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if discontinuous in its action; that
the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise
24ibid. at p 66.
25ibid. at p 44.
26 ibid. at pp 40-41.
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unnecessary ...that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of
which they are themselves the bearers"_27
The Panopticon is a mechanism or "marvellous machine" of power,
rather than a specific architectural utopia dedicated to the construction of
prisons:
"..the Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: it is the
diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning,
abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a
pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of political
technology that may and must be detached from any specific use".28
Panopticism highlights the impersonal and mechanistic operation of power
through the Gaze, which constitutes a "relation in which individuals are
caught up" and implicated in their own subjection.t?
Panopticism is associated with the problematisation of efficient power,
be it disciplinary or governmental. It can interpreted as part of a general
strategy and reflection on the efficiency of power. ''The panoptic schema
makes any apparatus of power more intense: it assures its economy(in
material, in personnel, in time); it assures its efficacy by its preventative
character, its continuous functioning and its automatic mechanisms. It is a way
of obtaining from power 'in hitherto unexampled quantity', 'a great new
instrument of government' ...(Bentham, 66)".30 Panopticism is "a functional
mechanism that must improve the exercise of power by making it lighter,
more rapid, more effective ..."_31 The goal is to create useful and efficient
individuals. ''There is a particular rationaIity ...which goes along with the
Panoptic technology, one which is self-contained, non theoretical, efficient
27 op. cit. note 22 at p 201.
28ibid, P 205, my emphases.
29 ibid, P 202.
30 ibid, p 206.
31 ibid., P 209.
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and productive't.P Panopticism can therefore be connected to a mentality of
rule primarily concerned with the efficiency of government.
The role of law as a connector between rationalities of government and
governmental and disciplinary techniques is revealed by the juridical notion of
Ordre Public. Within the context of an analysis of the trust and the Fiducie,
Public Order values seem to reflect the role of panoptic techniques in
governmental control: Visibility needs to be preserved and there is a fear,
echoed in legal argumentation that the trust and the Fiducie might pervert
appearances as regards solvency and actual wealth. The legal arguments
regarding the compliance of the trust and the Fiducie with Ordre Public
values seem to obey to conceptualisations which rely on the panoptical thec;e
of control through visibility. The specificities of this legal argumentation r ;~--
be further explored in Section ITof the present chapter. However, the more
general impact of Panopticism on Napoleonic Governmentality should be
explored first.
2. Sketching Napoleonic Governmentality: A Panoptic Diagram
Foucault's concern in his studies in Governmentality was mainly
theoretical and conceptual.P He did not attempt to provide a detailed
empirical account of the French State after the Revolution. However, his work
provides an insight into Napoleonic Governmentality which, it is argued, has
left its mark on contemporary legal culture.
32 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault, Harvester, London 1983. at p 193.
33 See C Gordon. "The Soul of the Citizen: Max Weber and Michel Foucault on
Rationality and Government". in B Smart (ed). Michel Foucault: Critical Assessment.
vol IV (2). at p 437 ..
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Gordon argues that Napoleonic Governmentality can be characterised a
mixture of structures of police administration and liberal strategies.v The
Panoptic on exemplifies the connection between the disciplinary techniques of
the police State and the liberal art of government celebrated in post-
revolutionary France. Gordon argues that Foucault observed that the police
state took control of disciplinary mechanisms, "connecting the vigilance of the
sovereign to the minute regulation and supervision of individual conduct't."
This style of thinking and governing, which Foucault calls a "History of Detail
in the Eighteenth century" "climax[ed] in the regime of Napoleon, who
wished to arrange around him a mechanism of power that would enable him to
see the smallest event that occurred in the state he governed't.v
Foucault asserts:
"A fear haunted the latter half of the eighteenth century: the fear of darkened
spaces, of the pall of gloom which prevents the full visibility of things, men
and truths. [The French Revolution] sought to break up the patches of
darkness that blocked the light, eliminate the shadowy areas of society,
demolish the unlit chambers where arbitrary political acts, monarchical
caprice, religious superstitions, tyrannical and priestly plots, epidemics and the
illusions of ignorance were fomented't.t?
The Revolution dreamed up a new form of power "exercised by virtue of the
mere fact of things being known and people seen ... [the Panopticon] provided
...the formula for [this] 'power through transparency', subjection by
'illumination"'.38
This new form of power was linked to one of the ways in which
Enlightenment thinkers had thought of society itself.
" ...Bentham was the complement to Rousseau ...the Rousseauist dream ...was
the dream of a transparent society, visible and legible in each of its parts, the
34 Gordon's introduction in op.cit., note 19 at p25.
3S ibid.
36 ibid.
37 M Foucault, "The eye of power", Power/Knowledge, C Gordon (ed), Harvester
Press, England, 1980, at p153.
38ibid, p 154.
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dream of there no longer existing any zones of darkness, zones established by
the privileges of royal power or the prerogatives of some corporation, zones of
disorder. Itwas the dream that each individual, whatever position he occupied,
might be able to see the the whole of society.t'.t?
Panopticism is a technology deployed in the context of a rationality of
rule concerned with maximising the efficiency of government. It is therefore
not the only or predominant element in modem Governmentality.
" A Superb formula: power exercised continuously and ..for a minimal
cost...the gaze has had great importance among the techniques of power
developed in the modem era, but, as I have said, it is far from being the only
or even the principal system employed't.w
It is a system that presumes, relies on, and generates mistrust between
individuals. "In the Panopticon each person, depending on his place, is
watched by all or certain of the others. You have an apparatus of total and
circulating mistrust, because there is no absolute point"."
The Panopticon is based on a certain vision of society as an aggregate
of atomistic individuals who can be controlled through their arms length
relations. Panopticism has been linked to Liberalism. Bentham, the father of
the Panopticon, is also known for his utilitarian theories. Colin Gordon
asserts: "Bentham's Panopticon ...is a liberal theorem of political security".42
There are continuities in the history of governmental rationalities and
Liberalism, as the political rationality prevalent in the nineteenth century is
connected to previous practices, explored by Foucault through the lens of
discipline. Hence, "[l]liberalism indeed transforms the techniques of security
inherited, in a great part of Europe, from the police state".43 However, French
Liberalism as political rationality practised and preached in the nineteenth
century has to be defined further to understand the role of Panopticism.
39 ibid, P 152.
40 ibid, p155.
41 ibid, P 158.
42C Gordon, op. cit. note 19, at p 25.
43C Gordon, op. cit. note 30 at p 432.
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It is here that the work of J-F Niort, exploring the particularities of the
Napoleonic Code's Liberalism, is helpful.e+ Niort argues that there is a
dialectical tension between philosophical and juridical principles on the one
hand, and, on the other, the economic imperatives and those of the Raison
d'Etat or State rationality. This tension is apparent in the philosophy behind
certain of the Code's provisions. The author purports to focus on these
provisions, together with the preliminary debates leading up to the enactment
of the Napoleonic Codification. Through this documentary study, Niort argues
that the drafters were influenced by political economy, but adopted a
pragmatic approach, taking into account the political imperatives of the
Napoleonic regime. The liberalism reflected in the Civil Code is therefore
quite atypical and, in the author's words, "strange".
In his concluding section, Niort notes that, although there is no doubt
that the Code's drafters were influenced by Liberal political economy, there
cannot be a monolithic characterisation of the Civil Code.45 Hence, the
"autonomisation of economic activity from other social spheres and the state"
is mitigated by the Napoleonic State rationality; ... "like all other types of
freedom, asserts Bonaparte, free enterprise 'can only have the interest of the
State as its limitation'l'." Freedom is granted by the State in the interest of its
own continuity.
" ...economic liberalism and individual liberties are perceived, particularly by
Bonaparte, less as values than as techniques of govemment...the economy in
France is traditionally instrumentalised and subsumed by the State, whereas to
[Adam] Smith it represents civil society's means of emancipation'V?
44 "Droit, Economie et Liberalisme dans I'esprit du Code Napoleon", Archives de
Philosophie du Droit, Tome 37, Sirey 1992, pp 101-119.
45 The author, in his conclusion, states: "..it seems risky to definitively define as
liberal 'the strong yet liberal government' under which the Code was created for the
nation, given the wide variety of philosophies, ideologies and doctrinal theories which
it synthesises, revives, sublimates .." translated from Niort, ibid., at p 119.
46 ibid, P 116-117, (my translation).
47 ibid, p 117, (my translation).
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Emphasis is therefore laid on the composite nature of Napoleonic
Governmentality, mixing liberalism and authoritarianism. This mixed
influence could explain the enduring role of disciplinary panoptic techniques
in the nineteenth century Liberal context. The specificities of nineteenth
century Liberalism are explored by Niort through the legacy ofthe Code's key
economic institutions.
The first institution to be described is credit. Niort notes the "socio-
psychological dimension" of credit which, according to one of the Code's
drafters, is based on the opinion one has of someone else's morality and
wealth. One of the considerations in the Codification's preliminary debates
was to ensure the security of credit transactions. The Napoleonic codification
of regulations regarding credit and security are influenced by this key
governmental objective.
This same concern is reflected in the Code's provision regarding
ownership. As has been argued earlier, absolute ownership has a specific
symbolic function and meaning. However, individual property is also intended
to playa part in the codified economic government. The exercise of property
rights must be for the benefit of all. The prosperity of the nation is to be
fostered by a free market in land. However, absolute ownership could prove to
be an obstacle to the operation of the market, and therefore, to the nation's
prosperity. The freedom of the absolute owner was therefore intentionally
curtailed to fulfil the governmental objective regarding the public interest. One
of the main goals to be attained by a codified regulation of ownership was the
constitution of a large class of small property holders. A fragmented property-
owning class, unlike the proletarian class or the large hereditary estates of the
Ancien Regime, would constitute a stable and supportive basis for the State.
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These goals were implemented mainly through the codified regulation of
successions, which considerably compromised freedom of disposition.
Niort's study reveals the influence of Napoleonic Liberalism on the
Code and resulting legal culture. This Liberalism reflects a type of
Governmentality mixing authoritarian disciplinary techniques and liberal
aspirations. Panoptic techniques are particularly adapted to this dual
imperative of Governmentality, ensuring both discipline and efficiency. The
following section argues that the trust could not have developed as it did in the
common law as it stands against a particular aspect of the organisation of
power in French legal and political culture: the Panoptic schema.
SECTION II· OPACITY, THE TRUST AND THE FIDUCIE
The drafters of the Civil Code, echoing the dominant economic view
of their times, placed great emphasis on the "spontaneous" functioning of the
economy. Law's role was perceived as mainly concerned with ensuring the
automatic operation of economic transactions; in this context, panoptic
techniques would secure the visibility or conformity of appearances with
reality of the situation, on the basis of which transactions could be made. For
instance, it was thought that money lending would depend on the appearance
of solvency of the parties involved. The role of law would only be to ensure
the transparency and visibility of individual economic and legal situations.
The role of law would be facilitative, oiling economic mechanisms thanks to
panoptic techniques. In this context, trust techniques would hamper the proper
and spontaneous functioning of credit transactions, because of its possible use
as a screen to defeat creditors' claims.
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The trust can create opacity in another respect. It can defeat the state's
surveillance of individual assets, for fiscal purposes for instance. This concern
was central in the debates about the Fiducie, in particular as regards the
uncompromising fiscal regulation of this institution. The drafters were aware
that visibility would be hampered by this new device but were prepared to
compromise it, whilst on the surface respecting the letter rather than the spirit
of principles implementing the requirement of visibility.
I.Security in Visibility: third parties, credit and the importance of
appearances
Credit was one of the mechanisms thoroughly discussed by the Civil
Code's drafters.v It was understood by the drafters as having two
complementary meanings: first, as the loaning of money between economic
agents, and secondly, as the trustworthiness and reputation of the citizen;
"Credit results from the opinion one has of the morality and wealth of a
citizen".49 Economic transactions involving the loaning of money which were
perceived as the main basis of economic prosperity, were believed to depend
on the visible signs of the actors' probity and fortune. As for the role of law, it
is clearly envisaged by the drafters as an "instrument capable of reestablishing
trust and stability in economic relations, and, by increasing the security of
48 See ibid, pp 103-106.
49One of the drafters, Treilhard, cited in op, cit. note 41, at p 103 (my translation).
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transactions, of 'placing business within the confines of integrity"'.50 Credit
was therefore a key economic institution which relied on the display of
material and moral assets. The role of law was to provide a framework for the
spontaneous functioning of credit through mechanisms of security, ensuring
the reliability of appearances of prosperity and morality.
The abstract dogma of the unity of patrimony reflects the central
concern for the security of credit, despite its doctrinal formulation "as if' it
had no connection with the substantive policies behind the Code.
The theory of patrimony is central to the argument that the trust is
incompatible with French law. It is was also taken into account in the drafting
of the 1992 Bill; the drafters were concerned that the Fiducie should, as far as
practicable, respect the rule of unity.!' Hence, it was decided that the Fiducie
should be understood as constituting an autonomous patrimony, reserved for a
specific purpose, but included in the patrimony of thefiduciaire. This
inclusion of an autonomous fund within the trustee's patrimony has been
described as highly artificial and as a way of complying in appearance to the
idea of unity.52The meaning of the theory and its connection with Panopticism
will be discussed next.
The origins of Aubry and Rau's theory of the unity of patrimony are
not to be found in the substance of the Code, which only rarely refers to the
50ibid, at p 104, the author cites the drafters (my translation).
51 See the report on the rule of the unity of patrimony and the Fiducie, commissioned
by the Ministry of Justice and drafted by a research unit at the University Paris II:
..Sociologie juridique du Patrimoine; La Realite de la RegIe de I'Unicite du Patrimoine
(dans la perspective de /a Fiducie)", 1992.
52 See Grimaldi, "La Fiducie: Reflexions sur I'institution et sur I'avant-projet de loi qui
la consacre.", JCP,( N}, 1991, p 897. The fiduciaire only has one patrimony within
which one or more fiduciary funds operate. This aspect of the Bill differs from the
definition of the trust proposed in the 1985 international convention, according to
which the trust fund is totally autonomous and does not form part of the trustee's
patrimony. This is the solution adopted in the new Quebec Civil Code, which defines
the Fiducie as an ownerless patrimony reserved for a specific purpose.
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notion of patrimony.P The theory has three main propositions; first, only
persons (natural or legal) can have a patrimony. Secondly, every person has a
patrimony, whether or not he/she has any possessions. Patrimony is therefore
an empty shell of potential rights and obligations connected to one's estate.
Finally, a person can only have one patrimony. This is at the core of the idea
of unity and is most problematic as regards the reception of the Trust and the
formulation of the Fiducie. The trust is regarded as operating a division of
patrimony. The principle of unity is said to derive from the connection
between personality and patrimony. The patrimony is an emanation of
personality and, just as a person is unique and indivisible, hislher patrimony
must remain undlvided.s+
This grounding of the idea of unity in legal and philosophical rights
theory has been questioned. However, the majority view amongst academics
and practitioners remains that the unity of patrimony is an essential legal truth
grounded in the text of the law. 55 The two legal provisions referred to as a
basis of the theory are articles 732 and 2092 of the Civil Code.56 Article 2092
is the most significant but, as article 732, it does not even mention the word
"patrimony". It establishes a droit de gage general des creanciers, that is, the
general right of all creditors to claim against their debtor's goods. Hence, there
is
"here not an allusion to the institution of a cohesive patrimony, but only an
intention to exclude the arbitrary withdrawal of some types of goods. That is,
instead of pointing to the uniqueness of patrimony as a common pledge as
53 See C B Gray, "Patrimony", Cahiers de Droit, vol 22, 1981, p 81. See Chapter III.
54 See ibid., and "Patrimoine et Vie Privee" , one of the headings in the report op. cit.
note 48.
55 See the report, op. cit. note 48. where an empirical study reveals that most lawyers,
including practitioners, remain attached to this great principle which they have learned
during the first two years of their legal studies.
56 See op. cit. note 50.
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against the multiplicity of creditors, what is stressed is the additive character
of their pledge: every new item acquired feeds into them".57
The theory of unity of patrimony is, in the French lawyer's mind,
connected to the Code's general objective of protection of creditors.P This
goal would be achieved by ensuring that debtors cannot divide their
patrimony, thereby protecting some of their assets by the creation of secret
funds. The division of patrimony is equated with the creation of a situation of
opacity in which the assets of the debtor become invisible to the creditors. The
necessity to maintain the visibility of one's assets and the transparency of
every patrimony seems to conflict with another - antithetical - value promoted
in French law: privacy."
There is a conflict between the transparency of patrimony through its
unity, and the right to privacy as a right to protect one's fortune against the
gaze of others by, for instance, hiding assets in secret funds constituting
autonomous patrimonies. This conflict is characterised as
"a conflict of gazes: the gaze of the owner over the elements of his patrimony,
against the third party gaze over the patrimony of others .... Today, the
unprecedented development of means of knowledge and information
technology, the consequent demands for more information, and finally the
concern to increase controls over people in power, are at the root of a conflict
to be resolved by the law between secrecy as protecting the individual and
transparence which protects society".60
The Trust, as could have the Fiducie, allows the protection of assets in secret
funds. This stands against the imperative of transparency echoed in the
requirements of the unity of patrimony, and connected to Napoleonic liberal
57ibid, P 97.
58 op. cit. note 48.
59 "Patrimoine et Vie Privee" in ibid. Privacy seems to be the necessary dialectical
counterpart of transparency and visibility. Is it surprising that in a society in which
visibility is as a means of social control, privacy should be perceived as a fundamental
civil right deserving vigorous legal protection?
60ibid, at pp 3-4.
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Govemmentality. It is against this background, and the general perception that
the trust can be used in sham transfers of ownership, that the Bill was drafted.
According to C Witz, in pre-revolutionary law, the Fiducie was widely
perceived as a sham transfer of property; the full transfer of ownership to the
fiduciary was seen as contradicted by a separate secret agreement restricting
the rights of the fiduciary. The sham or simulation theory has been deduced
from article 1321 of the Civil Code and declares:
''There is a sham each time the parties hide their real intention behind false
appearances: having entered into a visible agreement, they cancel, change or
displace the effects of the former with another contemporaneous agreement
which is intended to remain secret. The visible ( or apparent or sham)
agreement is countered by the secret instrument.c''.s'
Witz's argument is that a new, modem Fiducie could be clearly distinguished
from any pretence or sham transfer of property, and the Fiducie would not
necessarily be in contradiction with Ordre Public.62
Witz identifies three categories of sham agreements. First, there is the
fictitious agreement, where no transfer of property occurs at all. Secondly,
there are agreements which do create a new legal relationship. However, the
real and intended legal relation is not visible to third parties, who are misled
by the apparent situation. The real legal situation is disguised by a fictitious
apparent agreement. The third type of simulated agreement interposes a party
to hide the real beneficiary of the transaction.P
Witz argues that the Fiducie cannot be regarded as a sham transaction
and that the fiduciary transfer of property is genuine, albeit limited. The
restriction on thejiduciaire's prerogatives has a purpose other than the
cancellation of the property transfer. Moreover, the Fiducie should not be
61cited by C Witz in op. cit. note 5 at p 211.
62 ibid. pp 211-228.
63This type of agreement is very pejoratively known as a pr~te-nom contract.
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perceived as having as its purpose the interposition of a fictitious
intermediary. A fictitious intermediary is intended to act as a screen protecting
the real owner. The fiduciaire is not simply the apparent owner of the property
but a genuine intermediary who has really acquired exercisable property
rights. However, Witz notes that many de facto situations, which would have
been recognised as trusteeships in Common law countries, have been
sanctioned by French courts as simulated.s+
Another legal argument that could have been deployed against the
Fiducie is that the device could create misleading appearances of solvency.
This notion of apparent solvency had been used to deny the validity of
reservation of title clauses.s! The argument is that the Fiducie, used to
secure a debt by a fiduciary transfer of title to the creditor without
dispossession of the settlor, contributes to maintaining the latter's apparent
solvency. Witz stresses that the principle of apparent solvency is not a general
principle on which the protection of creditors is based.
" It does not seem useful to insist on the antiquated character of the notion of
apparent solvency: it goes against basic common sense to believe that the
credit is granted on satisfactory inspection of the visible assets of the debtor ....
What used to be the case at the beginning of the nineteenth century, in a small
shopkeepers' economy, is obviously no longer valid ...".66
Witz suggests that it is now unrealistic to rely on appearances of
solvency when conducting business. Paradoxically, the 1992 Bill relied itself
on appearances as a mechanism of protection for third parties dealing with the
fiduciary. The proposed article 2068 reads:
64 See op. cit. note 5 pp 227-228. In the nineteenth century, it was common for a
member of a religious congregation to hold property for the benefit of the whole
community, as religious groups lacked the legal capacity to own property. The
enactment of the 1901 statute on associations entailed that these groups could not be
regarded as authorised and that their property holding could no longer be tolerated.
Hence, the courts applied the theory of simulation to prohibit such property holding
arrangements.
65 Ibid, pp 254-258.
66 ibid P 257.
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"In his relationships with third parties, the fiduciary is deemed to have the
widest powers over the trust property, except where it is demonstrated that the
third parties knew about the limits of his powers't.s?
This article was intended to ensure that third parties would not need to
investigate whether the fiduciary is dealing with hislber own assets or those
slbe is managing. Hence, third parties who trusted appearances would be
protected against the fiduciary's claims in bad faith that slbe did not actually
have the power to complete a given transaction.sf The security resulting from
protecting trust in appearances contrasts with another mechanism; the
transparency of a register.s? However, the drafters rejected the idea of setting
a specific system of registration of fiduciary instruments, as this would be too
formal and inflexible and would thus deter the use of the Fiducie.
The rejection of the trust and its reformulation as the Fiducie have thus
been understood here as determined by the underlying concern in French law
for truthful appearances, transparent situations and visible solvency. These
priorities are stressed in doctrinal writings but are attributed, in our analysis, to
the importance of panoptic principles in French Govemmentality. The
protection of creditors, translated in legal argumentation as the principle of
unity of patrimony, is illustrative of the role of Panopticism in French law.
The unity of patrimony principle was of importance in the discussion of the
Fiducie, which was therefore fashioned with regards to the imperative of
security in appearances, although the latter may have been ultimately
compromised.
2.Transparency and the State's Surveillance of Ownership
67 1992 Bill, Doc A.N 2583 p14, my translation.
68 See Jeantet, "Projet d'introduction du Trust en France sous Ie nom de Fiducie",
Revue Juridique et Politique, 1990, 280.
69 See ibid and practitioners' opinion in "La Fiducie: Contributions a I'avant-projet de
loi", Revue de Droit Bancaire, Sept-Oct 1990, 176.
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The relationship between individuals envisaged in Napoleonic
Govemmentality reflects an assumption that trust is based on appearances; on
the other hand, the relationship between State and individual has to be as
unmediated as possible. The individual must offer him/herself as a transparent
unit, controllable through a centralised gaze. Hence, Maitland refers to the
French attitude towards corporations as a
"pulverising, macadarnising tendency in all its glory, working from century to
century, reducing to impotence, and then to nullity, all that intervenes between
Man and State ...the work of the monarchy issues in the work of the
revolutionary assemblies. It issues in the famous declaration of August 18,
1792: 'A State that is truly free ought not to suffer within its bosom any
corporation ... ' That was one of the mottoes of modem absolutism: the
absolute State faced the absolute individual","?
The Trust and the Fiducie constitute such intermediary bodies whose screen-
like effect is problematic.
The suspicion of intermediary bodies is reflected, willingly or not, in
the theory of patrimony, or at least in its interpretation and application. The
corporation is a way of multiplying patrimonies, and a tolerated derogation to
the rule of unity. The rule of unity is understood as preventing the constitution
of intermediary bodies with their own patrimony, independent of their
members'. Legal personality is described as a legal fiction and instrument
destined to bypass the rigidity of this doctrinal dogma. Although the
constitution of a legal person fragments and multiplies the patrimonies of the
natural persons involved, the various patrimonies are fused into one, that of
the legal person, which itself is understood to have a unique patrimony. The
artificial rule of unity is maintained through the fiction of legal personality."
Hence, legal personality is the only way found in French law to accommodate
70 Collected Papers, Vol Ill, HAL Fisher (ed), Cambridge Uni. Press, 1911, at p 311.
71 op. cit. note 48.
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derogations to the unity of patrimony. The corporation is itself characterised
by its unitary and autonomous patrimony which forms both the creditors'
security and the basis of its governable character. Indeed, the attribution of a
patrimony to this artificial entity entails that it is a full legal and governable
subject.
Indeed, French law has had to accommodate the existence and
formation of intermediary groups.
"The end of the nineteenth century witnesses a radical recasting of
liberalism's politico-juridical heritage, a quiet legal revolution whose direction
and apparent technical neutrality is, arguably, a measure of its strategic
strength and influence ....mediating between the poles of state and individual,
law and sociology together strive to construct a governable legal status for the
'intermediary bodies' suppressed by the Revolution: this is the purpose of
Maurice Hauriou's theory of the institution't.t-
The latter is central to the conceptualisation of legal personality in French
Law. The institution is defined as "a group of individuals subjected to an
organisation the purpose of which is obtaining an end".73 The institution is
headed by an authority figure whose task is to ensure the consensual and
cohesive striving towards a common goal,14
In his discussion of the reality of legal personality, M Hauriou defines
patrimony as "the always open books of a single account't.P Like legal
personality, patrimony is a fiction. "These fictions' role is to ensure continuity
and identity to the 'organic individuality' of groups ...Legal fictions give unity
to this data by 'representing' it".76 In other words, patrimony and legal
72 Gordon, op. cit., note 30, at p 32, my emphasis.
73ibid.
74See Normand et Gosselin, "La Fiducie du Code Civil: un sujet d'affrontement...",
Les Cahiers de Droit, vol 31, n 3, Sep 1990, 681. The theory of the institution is key
to one of two main theorisations of the Fiducie in Quebec. The influential M Faribault,
a treatise writer and commercial lawyer, describes the Fiducie as a legal subject with
an independent personality, much like a corporation. This interpretation was not
retained in the new Quebec Civil Code.
75cited in op. cit. note 48, at p 156, (my translation).
76 ibid (my transalation).
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personality are used to give legal reality and a governable status to groups, by
constructing them as single juridical subjects. Moreover, through the notion of
patrimony, the subject is represented in examinable accounting terms as a
balance sheet, a statement of account.
The notion of patrimony is at the heart of the juridical
conceptualisation of the economic subject, be it individual or group.
"Patrimony is the emanation of personality in the economic domain"."?
" ...Patrimony - which was no more than a type of image - would be considered
as the attribute of the subject's personality ...As the emanation of personhood,
patrimony was in a circular relation to the person supporting it; it also
signified this very personhood: it materialised, actualised and designated
personhood, to the extent that an author wrote 'behind the mysteries of its
components and management, a way of being is to be discovered' ".78
Hence, patrimony is the legal representation of the economic subject.
This representation is given in the static and accounting terms of assets and
Iiabilities.I? The notion of patrimony contributes to the constitution of the
examinable economic subject. Hence, the imperative of unity, with its
correlated restrictions on the creation of autonomous and fragmented funds, is
connected to the objective of surveillance in Govemmentality. The Trust and
the Fiducie constitute a challenge to surveillance because they are
intermediary bodies which do not fit into the grid of visibility of legal
personality. They are not recognised as transparent and governable subjects.
Indeed, Maitland noted that the trust form was preferred to the corporate form
because it allowed more autonomy and freedom from the State.80 This echoes
my argument that the corporation is, in French law and may be even in
77 "Patrimoine et Vie Privee" in op. cit. note 48. (my translation).
78 ibid. P 14 (my translation).
79 In op. cit. note 48, the static notion of patrimony in civil law is contrasted with the
focus on movements of funds in the financial culture. This reflects the legal emphasis
on the localisation of assets and the financial understanding of patrimony as a
fluctuating entity for the purpose of investment.
80 op. cit. note 67, at p 388.
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English law, a legally subjected form of association, whereas the trust remains
a fluid entity.
The unity of patrimony limits de facto freedom of disposition, which
seems to give way to more pressing imperatives. The necessity to keep "a
close watch over individual ownership" was stressed by Napoleon during the
drafting of the Code." Succession laws were to be used as instruments of
government; their aim was to channel the freedom of absolute ownership
towards the common good. The goal of state intervention was to designate
those entitled to inherit and to provide a predetermined structure for the
distribution of succession assets. The reserve hereditaire was established to
this end. It is a statutory encumbrance on all estates, creating entrenched
inheritance rights for surviving descendants. It is in effect a statutory trust
restricting the powers of free disposition by testament or donation to a fraction
of the testator's fortune. This fraction is called the quotite disponible. The
original egalitarian laws of 1792 did not allow any freedom of disposition but
they were not included in the 1804 Code. The purpose of the quotite
disponible was to maintain paternal authority and to preserve the economic
integrity and efficiency of landholdings as cohesive production units. The
intention was indeed to dismantle large dynastic holdings but without reducing
these to a barely exploitable fragmented multitude.P
The freedom of disposition tied with absolute ownership is therefore
both carefully monitored and instrumentalised for the purpose of government.
The State is to exercise its oversight primarily through the regulation of
successions. However, the family is preserved as an autonomous unit of
government through the head of the family's limited freedom of disposition.
Napoleonic Governmentality included a concern for the distribution of wealth
81 see section I in fine, and op. cit. note 41.
82 op. cit. note 41 at p 109.
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in the State's and the population's best interest. This goal is tied to a vision of
the State as capable of overseeing and controlling the inter-generational
movement of assets. An institution like the trust, which, according to
Maitland, originated as a weapon against restrictions on freedom of testation,
would clearly conflict with an essential aspect of Napoleonic
Governmentality.
The only possible political grounds for the parliamentary opposition to
the Fiducie was identified by the drafters of the Bill as being the threat to the
reserve. Itwas therefore decided that a Fiducie can only transfer assets which
are part of the disposable fraction - quotite disponible. Where the transfer of
assets in Fiducie is of a value over and above that of the disposable share, the
court would order a reduction of the value of the assets, but not necessarily a
return to the bulk of the estate of specific assets.v Moreover, the Bill was
widely marketed as aiming to benefit small to medium family businesses by
ensuring the continuity of the business after the death of the head of the
family-business.w This echoes the importance of the family as a stronghold of
the economy and accomplice of the State in post-revolutionary
Governmentality.
The doctrinal argument according to which the trust conflicts with
French Ordre Public has been rendered as follows: the trust does not fit into
French Governmentality's Panoptic schema; the next chapter will further
demonstrate how, because of this and of the perceived applications of the trust
83 Articles 2070-3 to 2070-5. Where the assets in Fiducie form a business unit worth
more than the disposable share, the reduction to the value of the share will be in
value by payment of a sum of money, as opposed to the return of some of the
business assets.
84 See for instance the papers given at the 86th congress of Notaries P Decheix, "La
Fiducie, mode de transmisssion de I'entreprise?", Y Streiff, "Le Droit Civil au secours
de la transmission des entreprises" , both published in Les Petites Affiches, n 56, Mai
1990.
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as a screen, the Fiducie was constructed following the requirements of the
panoptic schema. Panopticism may not be the most prevalent technology of
power in French legal culture, but it seems to be particularly relevant to the
issue of reception of the trust in the shape of the Fiducie. Itmay be that the
trust poses similar problem to panoptic imperatives in common law culture,
which has also been concerned with the protection of creditors' rights and the
policing of such enigmatic creatures as the purpose trust. However, it would
seem that the panoptic imperatives in French law have been strong enough to
subsume practices and lawyers' devices proposing to foster opacity. Itwill be
seen in later developments that this is connected to the particular power-
knowledge configuration which has shaped the French legal field and which
places at the forefront the power of the Administration. Lawyers' practices,
such as the trust, which may conflict with imperatives of transparency required
for the efficient exercise of administrative power, were not allowed to
flourish. They may have found a more favourable climate in the international
arena. In Chapter Vi, it will be seen that the introduction of the Fiducie
reflects the growing power of practitioners and their practices, developed at
the interstices of the French legal order.
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CHAPTER V
ENFRAMING TRUST: THE FIDUCIE, THE
IMPERA TIVES OF GOVERNMENT IN FRENCH LAW
AND THE LIBERAL PROBLEM-SPACE
The present chapter investigates further the impact of what has been
defined as "Governmentality" in Chapter IV, on the statutory formulation of
the Fiducie. Thus, this chapter further develops the second line of argument of
the thesis, according to which Governmentality constitutes one of the facets of
French legal culture which has led to the doctrinal rejection of the trust and the
parameters for its reformulation as the Fiducie. However, the 1992 Bill on the
Fiducie is not simply the passive result of a certain epistemological
configuration in French law. It interacts with this Govemmentality's epistemic
domain, bringing to the fore certain constructs at the expense of others. The
vision of society, on which the Bill is based and which it perpetuates,
contributes to modify Governmentality. How this is made possible cannot be
solely explained through an analysis of epistemic and discursive phenomena.
Hence, the final chapter of this thesis will assert the importance of changes in
power configurations, and in particular, of the rise of commercial lawyers'
practices, knowledge and power, in the genesis and impact of the 1992 Bill on
the Fiducie.
The statutory formulation of a trust-like device is of significance to the
distinct legal profile of the 1992 Bill's Fiducie. The process of "enframing"
the trust, that is, of translating and formulating it as the Fiducie within a
legislative framework, entailed not only the deployment of French law's
governmental rationalities, but also a reactivation of the epistemological issues
relating to the proper role and limits of economic government. Hence, it is
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because the Fiducie was to be introduced via the legislative route that
governmental rationalities and epistemology were particularly active elements
in the shaping of the new device.The introduction of this trust-like device
necessitated the framing of a new institution in terms of its purpose for the
government of the economy, and the operation of knowledge-savoir regarding
the objects of government: society and the economy.
The drafters of the 1992 Bill insisted that the new legislation would be
characterised by its generality and flexibility; the dispositions would have
allowed for the multiplicity of uses for the new device, which could not all be
specifically provided for. The new statute would have been general and
abstract, thereby
"breaking with the current trend ...to draft increasingly specialised statutes,
which do indeed respond to pressing and specific needs but hardly fit into a
coherent normative whole, and thus create problems of interpretation".'
The proposed new law was intended to be widely and generally relevant to
practice. Its generality would have allowed it "to find its general place in the
Code Civil". 2
Although the claim that the new provisions would have fitted perfectly
into the Code may be regarded as artificial, the proposed new law did reflect
the purposive governmental rationalities shaping contemporary French legal
and political culture. The general codified framework for the Fiducie is better
understood in the light of French law's Governmentality (Section J). As
argued in the preceding chapter, French Governmentality has been influenced
by post-revolutionary Napoleonic rule and the latter's translation in the law
through codification. Napoleonic Govemmentality is itself a composite of
) Guillenchmidt, Chapelle, "Trusts, business trusts et fiducie", Les Petites Affiches,
76, 25.06.90, 6, (my translation). See also an interview with J de Guillenchmidt in
dissertation by T Clay, "La Fiducie au regard du Trust", D.E.A, Paris II, 1993.
Generally, see Chapter I, Section I.
2 ·b.dI I .
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several governmental rationalities, a mixture of administrative rule - or police
- and liberalism.' The imperatives of bureaucratic rule are particularly
apparent in the third section of the Bill, which was issued by the Finance
Ministry. The Bill was indeed drafted by two separate Departments, The
Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Justice, which did not share a common
view as to the aims of the proposed legislation; the former was keen to
regulate the device to avoid fiscal losses, whilst the latter mainly intended to
provide the business world and the French legal profession with a new flexible
tool." Beyond this divide between fiscal provisions and others, there was a
generalised tension throughout the proposal, between the impetus to police
this new area of transactional freedom, and the liberal aim to provide a
minimalistic framework for the exercise of liberty.
The attempt to introduce the trust, which has traditionally been held in
authoritative doctrinal writings as contrary to French law, and its failed
incorporation in the Code, nevertheless entailed the implicit activation of
questions relating to the proper role and limits of the state in economic
government (Section Il). Indeed, introducing the trust into French law would
have gone against doctrinal orthodoxy and would have been hardly justifiable
3 The word "police" has a specific meaning in Foucault's writings. It refers to a
rationality of government concerned with the broad and comprehensive aim of
securing the welfare of the governed population. The theory of police- Cameralism·
studied by Foucault, has emerged in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth
.century. Readers of Foucault "especially those brought up in the common law
administration of Britain ...are likely to think of the police as an organization whose role
is essentially constabulary: keeping the peace, protecting innocent persons from
harm ...However, the word 'police' once had a much broader usage. It referred both to
an area of government administration ...and to the objectives of that administration. In
effect, police was responsible for the comprehensive regulation of social life in the
interests of the development of society and the improvement of individuals, and it was
expected to pursue these objectives in the most rational fashion ...
Foucault's treatment of ...[the theory of police] is not intended to suggest that this was
ever the only, or even the most important, of the Western rationalities of government.
His point, rather, is that this model has been, and still remains, an influential
governmental rationality in the societies of the modern West. ..", B Hindness,
Discourses of Power, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, at pp 120·123.
4 See the presentation of the Bill in Chapter I, Section I.
155
on the basis of a formal and internally rational evolution of law. A more
instrumental vision of law legitimised the proposed new institution. Such an
instrumental view was part of Governmentality. Moreover, fundamental
constructs such as the economy and society underlie the arguments and
rationales deployed to justify the introduction of the new Bill as a proper act of
government.
SECTION I - ENFRAMING TRUST: BETWEEN SECURITY AND
POLICE
Whilst the objecti ve of the Ministry of Justice was to provide for the
recognition and general organisation of a new trust-like device, fiscal
considerations and the fear of tax avoidance and evasion brought into the Bill
a conflicting ethos of regulatory policing.
I.Securing Trust in Commercial Practice
As already argued in Chapter IV, Foucault's analysis of the notion of
security in liberal Governmentality is enlightening and particularly useful to
an analysis of Napoleonic civil codification.' The polymorphous
characteristics of the codified principles of economic government include
what Foucault has termed a general liberal strategy of security.
"The objective of a liberal art of government becomes that of securing the
conditions for the optimal and, as far as possible, autonomous functioning of
economic processes within society or, as Foucault puts it, of enframing natural
processes in mechanisms of security ...At the end of the eighteenth century, the
terms liberty and security have become almost synonymous ...Liberty is thus a
technical requirement of governing the natural processes of social life and,
S See Chapter IV at pp 114-119.
156
particularly, those of self-interested exchanges. The security of laws and
individual liberty presuppose each other"."
Hence, securing the proper functioning of mechanisms of freedom is a
technical means of government.
In liberal Governmentality, law is one of the possible means of
government. The aim of liberal government, reflected to a certain extent in
Napoleonic Governmentality, is to ensure the proper functioning of processes
relying on the exercise of freedom, such as the market for instance. Law is the
means through which processes of liberty are enframed by mechanisms of
security. The Fiducie, as a contract which relies on and should generate trust,
would have been statutorily set into a mechanics of security in four respects.
1.1 The Security of Interests
Aspects of the 1992 Bill are clearly concerned with the enframing of
the free play of individual interest for the purpose of ensuring the proper
functioning of economic and societal mechanisms, such as the free market.
Hence, the new Fiducie would have allowed French lawyers to take part on a
more equal footing in the international competition for the provision of legal
services. The Preamble refers to the internationaIisation of the economy, the
opening up of borders and the delocalisation of economic transactions, as if
these were spontaneous processes to which the national market in legal
services had to be adjusted. According to the drafters, the recognition of the
trust in the form of the Fiducie would have provided for this adjustment, and
therefore for the security of French business interests.'
6 Burchell, "Peculiar interests ...n, in Burchell, Gordon, Miller,(eds), The Foucault
Effect .., Harvester Wheatsheaf, England, 1991, at p 139.
7 See Section II, sub-section 2 for further developments on the subject of interest.
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1.2 The Security of Credit
The drafters identified another significant potential role for the
Fiducie: to ensure the security of credit transactions, and thereby their
multiplication, by providing one of the most efficient means of guaranteeing a
debt. Indeed, the full transfer of ownership of a thing to guarantee a debt to the
creditor provides a powerful security. If things go wrong and the debt is not
paid back, the creditor is sure to be able to realise his/her security and to avoid
any loss. One commentator remarked that:
"the concern to legalise practices of transfer of title for the purpose of securing
a debt, seems to have obscured ...the fact that it is rather in the field of propertl
management that the Fiducie is likely to playa significant and durable role",
The Bill was shaped by a policy concern, the history of which dates back to
the first Napoleonic codification: the security of credit.
The Fiducie was compared to already established techniques invented
as a palliative for the insufficiencies of reservation of title, bailment and
leasing techniques. One of these techniques is the Cession Dailly , a
professional practice consecrated in a 1981 Statute. This technique is a
transfer to a credit company of letters of credit belonging to a business client,
to guarantee a business loan. Hence, "the fiducie already exists in our
substantive law ...its recognition in the Civil Code would appear as the
consolidation of a partly tested institution, rather than as the reception of an
alien device"," Whether this type of transfer amounts to a fiduciary transfer
comparable to the transfer of ownership to the trustee is debatable. It is not our
purpose here to settle this technical question. The point is that the drafters
wanted to base the legitimisation of the new institution on the fact that it
8 M Cantin Cumyn, "L'avant-projet de loi relatif a la Fiducie ....", Dalloz, 1992, 14, at
~120, (my translation).
Grimaldi, "La Fiducie: Reflexions sur I'institution et sur I'avant-projet de loi qui la
consacre", JCP, (N), 1991, art 35085, 900 at p 908.
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would echo existing techniques to increase the security of credit in the
business world.
1.3 The Security of Practice
The 1992 Preamble certainly stresses that "using the Fiducie will avoid
recourse to more formalistic devices or more complex and precarious
practices". 10 Indeed, the Fiducie was intended to "provide a legal framework
for practices which have not as yet received a legal definition".'! Hence, the
purpose of the Bill was not to provide a comprehensive regulation for a new
device, but to enframe existing practices in a unifying framework which
would grant them a principled validity. The Fiducie was to ensure security in
the use of practitioners' devices, through their legal recognition.
Indeed, C Witz argued in 1981 that there are in French law numerous
practices that could be characterised as types of Fiducies.12 One of the drafters
of the Bill referred to the work of Witz to argue for the legitimacy of the new
Fiducie, as an already existing mechanism used in dispersed and as yet
unidentified fiduciary transfers of ownership. 13 According to this view, shared
by some doctrinal writers, there had long been in modem French law
mechanisms comparable to the Fiducie for the purposes of management, or
donations, or the provision of a security. However, these operations remained
either unnamed or were legally recognised but under a different category."
First, there is the liberalite avec charge, that is, a method of
administration of a deceased's estate in the form of a gift to a fiduciary who
10 AN 2583, at p 6, (my translation).
11 ibid, (my translation).
12 La Fiducie en Droit Prive Fran9ais, Economica, Paris, 1981.
13 J de Guillenchmidt, "Presentation de I'avant-projet de loi relatif ala Fiducie", Rev.
de Droit Bancaire, 19, 1990, 105 at p 105.
14 See Grimaldi, who distinguishes between practices recognised and regulated by a
statute, and practices which have not been so validated, in op. cit note 9.
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has a collateral duty to retransfer.f The donor transfers his/her estate to a
person, who will manage it for the benefit of a third party to whom the
ownership will ultimately pass. In other cases, the intermediary will have to
transfer the estate directly to an existing legal person, or to create a legal
person to which ownership can pass and which will fulfil the charitable
purpose intended. The validity of such devices has been widely recognised by
the courts. It has also indirectly been admitted by the legislator through the
regulation of the Fondation de France, the equivalent of the Public Trustee.
Hence, "the defenders of the fiducie are not so much proposing to modify
existing mechanisms but to name them differently"."
It was also stressed that the Fiducie should be distinguished from the
mandate. A mandate can be revoked and therefore "does not provide the
security hoped for by those whose profession is to manage other people's
wealth. The professional aspires to a long-term ...and exclusive mission of
management ...".17 Hence, the shortcomings of the mandate stimulated
recourse to Fiducie-like transactions, created by the legislator or generated in
legal practice.
Business practice has come up with devices which, according to some
commentators, involve fiduciary transfers, even without the Fiducie.
L'inscription de valeurs mobilieres etrangeres au nom de fa SICOVAM, is the
registration of foreign shares and bonds, for the purpose of their exclusive
management by a company, the SICOVAM, which acts as a fiduciary. The
societes d'investissement andfonds communs de placement (F.C.P) are
companies set up for the purpose of the collective and exclusive management
of shares, but which do not acquire the ownership of the securities.
15 Motulsky's view is that this institution has nothing to do with the trust, as it is not
based on split ownership. See Chap II, Section II.
16 ltop. CI ., note 9, at p902.
17 ibid, P 903.
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Thefonds communs de creances are, like the F.e.ps, investment funds
set up for the management of securities issued by the fund and representing
letters of credit for the benefit of credit companies. The corporate body
managing the fund acts as if the securities belonged to it and has exclusive
control, resembling very much a fiduciary. However, in law, the securities are
regarded as owned solely by the credit companies and the fund manager is a
mere agent."
The convention de portage is a new practice and results from a
contract by which a person undertakes to buy shares for the benefit of another,
and to eventually transfer these, either to a third party, or to the other party to
the contract. Such a convention is for the provision of services on the part of
the intermediary, who often acts to protect the identity of the principal or to
hold property for someone who cannot, for any reason, acquire the shares
immediately. ''The fiduciary nature of the [convention de] portage is self-
evident ..Although the courts have been hesitating, doctrinal law recognised
the existence of a Fiducie in such cases"." With or without the Fiducie, some
argue, practice will have recourse to fiduciary arrangements.
The legislative introduction of the Fiducie was thus justified on the
basis that it would have brought together existing and developing practices
responding to the needs and reality of business. The role of the legislation was
therefore to ensure the security of these preexisting practices by providing a
unitary framework and thus consistency in their legal interpretation and
sanctioning.i"
18 ibid, P 905.
19 ibid 9I I ,p 06.
20 However, legal recognition also allows extensive regulation. This was not the aim
of the Ministry of Justice but that of the fiscal administration which took advantage of
the proposal by the Ministry of Justice to include a heavy fiscal control of the device,
theatening the free and "secured" use of the Fiducie.
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1.4 Security in Trusting
The remaining way in which the Fiducie would have fulfilled the
liberal objective of security is by reducing the risk inherent in interpersonal
trust. Article 2070-1 of the Bill specifies that aflduciaire must act with due
regard to the confidence reposed in him by the constituant (settlor). The
Preamble stresses that the fiduciary is the mainspring of the new devices
which originates from and rests upon trust - hence the chosen denomination of
Fiducie, derived from the Latin word for trust, "fides". The fiduciary could not
have a past conviction or have been declared bankrupt or barred from any
professional organisation due to hislber prior activity, as these "would create
doubt as to their capacity to manage property for the benefit of others or be
inconsistent with the confidence invested in him by the Settlor".21 Moreover,
"this confidence requires that the fiduciary personally accomplishes his
mission, except for a limited power to delegate ...".22 One of the purposes of
the legislation, and further judicial or statutory intervention, would have been
to secure and sanction a high standard of behaviour, to encourage and protect
fiduciary relationships based on the Fiducie.
Liberal security constitutes a goal of government, relying on the proper
steering of liberty as its principal means. Hence, in order to promote the
security of newly arranged fiduciary relations, it was necessary to ensure that
the flduciaire would have made proper use of the freedom s/he had acquired
as owner of the Fiducie's assets.
" ... [legal] controls are means of reducing the risk involved in a social
relationship of trust since they legally reduce or contain the freedom of action
" 23of the trustee .
21Dyson, "The proposed new law of trusts in France", (1992), The Conveyancer and
Property Lawyer, 407.
22 AN 2583, at p4.
23 R Cotterrell, "Trusting in law ...", Current Legal Problems, 1993, at p 79.
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Trust, as both a social and a legal relationship, could be secured by enframing
thefiduciaire's liberty within standards of proper conduct/" Fiduciary
standards of conduct constitute
"an instrument of public policy ...to maintain the integrity, credibility and
utility of relationships perceived to be of importance in a society. And it is
used to protect interests, both personal and economic, which a society is
perceived to deem valuable".2
In English law, there are broadly two types of standards of fiduciary
conduct and a
"possible source of tension created between, on the one hand, a concept of
trusteeship rooted in moral obligation and, on the other, one which perceives
trusteeship as a managerial function to be financially rewarded".26
One of the common functions of each standard is to regulate the behaviour of
the trustee, thereby diminishing the risk of trusting by providing a safety net of
sanctions. The two images of trusteeship can be seen as two extreme points in
a spectrum developed by the courts. The traditional model
"is one of disinterested devotion to the gratuitous administration of a friend's
or relative's property - and a burden undertaken usually out of a sense of
obligation ...To an increasing extent professional persons, such as solicitors or
accountants, or trust corporations are appointed as trustees ...Seen from this
perspective trusteeship is more akin to a contractual market-based relation: ...
trustees appear as 'professional managers of capital' administering another's
property in exchange for a fee". 27
Security in trust is achieved differently, that is, the conduct of the trustee is
constrained in a different way, depending on which model of trusteeship is
preferred.The way in which the 1992 Bill organised the role of the fiduciaire
provides an insight into how the objective of security was implemented.
24 .... fiduciary law's concern is to impose standards of acceptable conduct on one
party to a relationship for the benefit of the other where the one has responsibility for
the preservation of the other's interest", PO Finn, "The Fiduciary Principle" (1989), at
~25..
5 ibid, at p 26.
26G Moffat, Trusts Law, second edition, Butterworth, London, 1994, at p315.
27ibid, at pp 316-317.
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Models of trusteeship identified in the common law seem to be echoed in the
Bill. R Cotterrell' s three "ideal types" or models of trust - the moralistic trust,
trust as property receptacle and trust as a capital management system - provide
a useful insight. 28
The moralistic standard of fiduciary behaviour relies on personal moral
credibility, which mayor may not be evidenced in the social or professional
status of the individual. The law related to such a standard provides security
through legally recognising the personal nexus between the parties and
providing protection for the victim of a breach of confidence. This model
encompasses the "prudent man of business" standard with its emphasis on
security and avoidance of risk in the management of trust assets. It also
explains the principle of non-delegation due to the personal nature of the
relation. Whereas the moralistic model relies only incidentally on the
professional credentials of the fiduciary, the managerial model of trusteeship
relies on expertise as a main guarantee of the trustee's worth, and as the basis
of trustees' wide discretion. This model emphasises the contractual basis of
the fiduciary relationship and the necessary flexibility of the trust. Confidence
is displaced from the person of the fiduciary to the legally guaranteed system
of expertise, which s/he represents.i"
The 1992 Bill incorporated both models of trusteeship, following two
diverging paths towards securing trust. There was an emphasis on the personal
nature of the fiduciary relationship; this is apparent in the Preamble, which
insists on the moralistic dimension of trust, in the Bill's definition of the
jiduciaire, which seems to assume that a physical person will fulfil the tasks,
and in the specification, in article 2067, that establishes a limited power to
delegate despite the personal nature of the obligations. The specificity of the
28 See Cotterrell, op. cit., note 23.
29 See R Cotterrell's proposed analysis in op. cit. note 23.
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contract of Fiducie, and an essential starting point for achieving security
through the legal control of the fiduciaire, would have been reflected in the
moral dimension of the fiduciary tie.
The Bill also incorporated, to a lesser extent, a more professional
model of trusteeship. In the Preamble, the contractual nature of trusteeship and
the importance of freely defined fiduciary powers and mission are stressed.
One of the ways in which the Fiducie would have distinguished itself from the
trust is by its definition as a contract, although this would have posed
problems as regards the interpretation of the beneficiary's rights and their role
in the enforcement of the Fiducie. Indeed, the nature and extent of the
beneficiary's rights remain ill-defined, and the Fiducie thus appeared as an
autonomous mechanism under the main authority of the managerialfiduciaire.
Itwas initially intended that only incorporated bodies could have performed
the duties of a fiduciary. This idea was dropped and is not reflected in the Bill
but does reveal the assumption that fiduciaries should be professionally
organised entities. Commentators have described the Fiducie as a contract for
the provision of professional services, rather than a mere transfer of title.3D
The Bill has also been described as constituting a new deontological
framework. However, the moralistic model is predominant in the Bill,
emphasising personal credentials as an essential means of policing the
Fiducie.31
3D A Benabent, "La Fiducie", JCP, (N), n 26, 1993, pp 275-278.
31 See Chapter I, Section I, the Bills drafters insisted on the importance of the
fiduciary's role and on its moralistic dimension.
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2. Policing Trust: the determinative role of surveillance
In conflict with the liberal and minimal aim of security was the
administrative impulse to police the new device, particularly as regards its
fiscal aspects. Some practitioners have attributed the failure of the Bill to its
onerous fiscal regulation. Many of the Bill's general provisions were designed
to complement the specific fiscal regulation contained in the third Part. A
number of sections reflect anti-tax avoidance and evasion concerns related to
discretionary trusts. Part illof the Bill contains almost 50 sections and is by
far the longest. The fiscal rules influenced the general outline of the Fiducie.
Fiscal policing through surveillance, to satisfy the imperative of preventing tax
avoidance and evasion, has a profound impact on the private law aspects of
the Bill regarding the role of the fiduciary and the limited flexibility of the
new institution. The principle of fiscal surveillance will be examined first, and
its impact on the legal constitution of the fiduciary subject will then be
discussed.
2.1 Fiscal Surveillance
Tax evasion is defined in terms of concealment to defeat the State's
surveillance of assets and the collection of information for the purpose of
determining tax liability. Concealment is one of the few well established
yardsticks of the evasion/avoidance distinction:
"...the essence of the distinction is that evasion commonly involves non-
disclosure of relevant facts: 'the concealment of material facts, leading to an
under-assessment, marks the point at which avoidance crosses the borderline
and becomes evasion' (Keith Committee Report of the Committee on
Enforcement Powers of the Revenue Departments (Cmnd 822,1983) P
162)".32
32G Moffat, ibid. note 26, at p 53. This deals with the problem of the definition of tax
avoidance and evasion in English law. Although there may be definitional differences,
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The distinction between avoidance and evasion is a legal one and its
purpose is to distinguish illegal practices from lawful tax-planning. In English
law, it stems from a literalist judicial approach to the interpretation of tax
statutes for the determination of fiscal liability. According to such an
approach, tax liability should be determined by construing the language and
form of the statute, rather than by referring to the policy underlying it. Hence,
practices which are not contrary to the formal provisions of the statute can
lawfully escape its application. However, tax avoidance has never been
defined.
As regards the interpretation of tax statutes, the literalist approach has
been questioned by the English courts. InPepper v. Hart (Lord Mackay
dissenting), the majority found that the interpretation of section 63 (2) of the
Finance Act 1976, regarding the taxation of in-house benefits for employees,
could be guided by reference to parliamentary materials containing statements
made by the Financial secretary on the scope of these provisions.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson, delivering the main speech, stated that;
"the exclusionary rule should be relaxed so as to permit reference to
parliamentary materials where: (a) legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or
leads to an absurdity; (b) the material relied on consists of one or more
statements by a minister or other promoter of the Bill ...(c) the statements
relied upon are clear". 33
This more flexible and purposive approach to the interpretation of fiscal
statutes facilitates judicial questioning of the conventional distinction between
avoidance and evasion, with the recognition of "unacceptable tax
avoidance'v'"
the general concern for the prevention and sanction of the concealment of assets is
reflected in French taxation law.33p 993] 1 AUER 42 at p69
3 See G Moffat, Trusts Law, second edition, 1999, at pp 63-67.
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It is likely that the French fiscal administration intended to prevent
avoidance as well as evasion, especially with regard of sophisticated tax-
planning methods involving off-shore jurisdictions. These methods
"can render problematic the disclosure obligation ....avoidance schemes are
rarely simple and usually incorporate several distinct legal transactions
involving the use of separate companies, trustees and, sometimes,
jurisdictions. It is here that what has been termed 'non-disclosing disclosure' -
'disclosing the relevant facts but doing so in a way which makes it
difficult...to recognise the presence or extent of a taxable transaction' - can be
effective(McBamett (1991) 42 British Journal of Sociology 323 at 331). A
corollary of the complexity of schemes therefore is that the Inland Revenue
may find it difficult to fit the parts of the jigsaw puzzle together and thereb~
discover the underlying legal and economic substance of the arrangement". 5
The French Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances, in charge of the
drafting of the fiscal provisions of the Bill, was primarily concerned to prevent
the constitution of such unclear situations through the use of the trust's
opacity, which, if introduced into French law, would generate a "black hole"
for fiscal resources. " In order to avoid this, the fiscal regulation of the new
Fiducie was to reflect the two central principles of transparency and neutrality.
Transparency entails that, for the purposes of determining tax liability,
the fiduciary device would have been ignored, and the fiduciaire could not
have been a subject of taxation. Hence, in the eyes of the fiscal administration,
economic reality would have been privileged over legal form and the
fiduciary, constituted in the rest of the Bill as the only owner and the main
element of the new device, would be from the fiscal point of view, non-
existent." The fiscal construction of the Fiducie reflects concerns connected
with the imperative of surveillance, such as the simplification of legal forms
35 G Moffat, ibid, at p 64.
36 See analysis of the fiscal provisions of the Bill, "La Flscallte de la Fiducie" , JCP,
~E), vol 13, 1991, pp 150-160.
7 Except where the beneficiaries cannot be identified.
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into a decipherable economic reality; the intermediary level occupied by the
fiduciary was ignored and the focus was on the traditional dyad, owner-thing.
The Fiducie would not have been allowed to be used as an instrument
obstructing surveillance. The possible use of the Fiducie as a discretionary
trust was perceived as particularly problematic and specifically targeted.
Hence, section 23 of Part ill states that where the beneficiaries cannot be
identified, the fiduciary will have to pay income tax at its highest rate, on their
behalf. Moreover, the names of the beneficiaries could not be changed (article
2064) and one condition of validity of the fiduciary contract was the existence
of named beneficiaries or of clear rules determining their designation (article
2062).
The transparency of the Fiducie was to be ensured through legally
required accounts, and the role of the fiduciary in drawing up and
communicating such information. Section 33 of Part illwould have
introduced an obligation on the fiduciaire to provide the Inland Revenue with
the names and activities of the beneficiaries, the nature and value of the assets
and the value and distribution of the income of a Fiducie.
The principle of neutrality was also applied. Its meaning, in French
doctrine and in the Bill itself, overlaps with the notion of transparency. It was
advocated by C Witz in his 1981 thesis." Witz argues that the transfer of
ownership to a fiduciary is specific, and in cases where it is to guarantee a debt
or to constitute a fund to be managed, should not be taxed. Indeed, the transfer
should be regarded as neutral and exempted from any tax normally incurred as
a result of transfer of ownership for consideration." As regards the use of a
Fiducie for the purposes of a gift, neutrality should entail that only the transfer
38 AN 2583.
39 These include V.A.T, stamp duties connected to the sale of land, Capital gains tax.
The exemption concerns only the transfer of ownership to the fiduciary.
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to the real beneficiary is taxable. The transfer to the fiduciary should be
ignored. Witz notes that, as regards Fiducies governed by pre-revolutionary
law, nineteenth century cases and doctrine found that a Fiducie was taxable
only once and submitted to an estate duty, the rate of which depended on the
nature of the relationship between the settlor and the legatee. The basis of this
rule was that the fiduciary was the owner only formally and in appearance and,
therefore, the transfer of title to himlher was fictitious. Witz argues that a
similar solution should be adopted for a modem Fiducie. However, it should
be grounded on the principle of fiscal neutrality of a genuine, as opposed to
apparent, transfer of ownership. Witz insists on the importance of fiscal
neutrality to the potential success of a new Fiducie.
Indeed, the neutrality of the proposed new device was declared in the
preamble of the 1992 Bill. The application of this principle comprised two
aspects: the transparency of the device for the purpose of determining tax
liability, and the lack of particular fiscal advantages connected with the use of
a Fiducie. Hence, the constitution of a Fiducie would not have entailed
inheritance or gift tax exemptions. The fiscal regulation of the Fiducie was
not perceived as an instrument of public policy and a means of encouraging
certain aspects of private activity. However, the fiscal rules were not seen as a
way of redressing inequalities and market distortions resulting from the
advantages of the Fiducie over a simple transfer of ownership. The
transparency of the device, that is the invisibility of the Fiducie andfiduciaire
in the eyes of the fiscal administration, would have posed problems in dealing
with practices equivalent to the accumulation or discretionary trust, where the
advantages of the interposition of a fiduciary would have had to be ignored.l"
40 See op. cit. note 35 and Moffat, op. cit., note 26, at pp 294-311.
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It is to be noted that the French fiscal administration did not choose to
introduce foreign fiscal rules, based on the numerous Acts on the taxation of
trusts. The Fiducie was to be regulated within the framework of existing
fiscal principles. Hence, the rationality of rule or Governmentality underlying
tax regulation was brought to bear on the general profile of the Fiducie. The
epistemological and practical dimensions of the French law of Public Finances
are exalted in the fiscal construction of the Fiducie. The primary objective was
to submit the economic subject, as distinct from the legal subject, to State
surveillance. Moreover, one of the main aims of the tax authorities was to
encompass foreign trusts involving economic subjects outside the State's
jurisdiction, but at least partly operative in France. The recognition of trusts in
accordance with the 1985 international convention would have entailed,
thanks to the 1992 Bill, further revenues for the Public purse."
The fiscal policing of the new device and the consequent application of
the imperative of surveillance prevented the constitution of the Fiducie as a
flexible instrument. Whilst the English "public law of taxation has
conventionally been adapted to the private ordering of property law", the
private freedom granted under the auspices of the Fiducie was structured and
policed by the public imperative of surveillance.f Hence, the governmental
rationality behind fiscal regulation still remains unaffected by the practices of
French private lawyers, who, unlike their English counterparts, are not given
the necessary epistemological and political space to structure the relationship
between tax payers and the fiscal administration.
41 S °tee op. CI • note 35.
42 G Moffat, op, cit. note 26, at p 311.
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2.2 The Fiduciaire and the Panoptic Diagram
The fiscal policing of the Fiducie at the same time ignored the
fiduciary for the sake of transparency, and relied on this party as an effective
means of surveillance. The flduciaire, through the requirement to produce
accounts to be submitted to the fiscal administration, was to become part of
the Panoptic Eye. Surveillance plays a part in the control of fiduciary devices
such as the English trust or Quebec's Fiducie. However, Panopticism is
applied in different ways according to the main goal in the governmental
rationality concerned.
The role of the fiduciary is to be understood as an effect of the
Panoptic diagram, applied for the purpose of the fiscal policing of the Fiducie.
Indeed, the legal definition of theflduciaire, and its uncertainties, were in part
determined by the importance of this new legal entity as an instrument of
surveillance, that is, as an extension of the central Panoptic Eye. What is
specific about the flduciaire is not the application of panoptic techniques to
control himlher, but the particularity of the Panoptic diagram applied, linked
to the specific governmental concerns of the French fiscal administration.Y A
comparison with Quebec's Fiducie will show the differences in the
organisation of the control of the fiduciary function, which, it is argued, are a
reflection of differences in the application of panoptic techniques, and
ultimately, in Governmentality.
Foucault has stressed that Panopticism is a form of power concerned
with two instrumental or technical aims: the maximisation of power through
43 As seen in Chapter IV, (pp 112-114) Panopticism according to Foucault is a neutral
and adaptable disciplinary technique, which has been combined with various
governmentalities and has never existed in its pure form. It has had various
applications and connects governmental rationalities to discipline.
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its exercise at the lowest cost, and the maximisation of the productive utility
of docile bodies." Accordingly, Panopticism is intended
" firstly, to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost
(economically, by the low expenditure it involves; politically, by its
discretion ..., its relative invisibility, the little resistance it arouses); secondly,
to bring the effects of this social power to their maximum intensity and to
extend them as far as possible ...; thirdly, to link this 'economic growth of
power with the output of the apparatuses ...within which it is exercised; in
short, to increase both the docility and the utility of all the elements of the
system".45
The maximisation of the efficiency and hold of disciplinary power is directly
connected to the techniques for creating useful individuals. However, one aim
can be privileged over the other and the way in which the panoptic schema
was applied in the case of the Fiducie betrays the dynamics of police
rationality in French Governmentality; the surveillance and maximisation of
the sovereign'S control- in the form of the fiscal administration - prevails over
the maximisation of the fiduciary's utility as a fund manager.
Accounting is the panoptic mechanism formally set up in Part ITof the
Bill to control fiduciary funds through the fiduciaire. The application of
panoptic techniques is part of the governmental practices of enfolding state
authority." Accounting techniques are used not so much to ensure that the
fiduciary would have responded to the discipline of the market in his/her
management function, but rather as a process of enfolding the principle of
44 See Chapter IV, pp 112-114 ..
45 Foucault in Discipline and Punish, Penguin Books, 1977 at p 209 and p218.
46 The expression "enfolding of authority" is borrowed from M Dean who describes in
this way Foucault's notion of government. Hence, .. Foucault's genealogies ...allow us
to analyze governmental and ethical practices as just such practices of enfolding
authority ...[one] aspect of these practices of enfolding concerns ..the governing work.
This refers to all the means, techniques, rationalities, forms of knowledge and
expertise that are to be used to accomplish the enfolding of authority" in "Foucault,
government and the enfolding of authority", in Barry, Osborne, Rose (eds), FOucault
and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism and Rationalities of Government,
U.C.L Press, London, 1996.
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state surveillance of the fund and beneficiaries. The emergence of accounting
as a panoptical technique will be briefly examined here.
One specific concern of Bentham, the creator of the Panopticon, in his
reflection on disciplinary techniques of control, lead him to stress that the
accounting technique
" 'must serve the dual purpose of control ...and decision making and that it
could do this only by providing a complete and analytical account of the
enterprise's use of resources' which required that... 'the accounts must
disclose all mistakes and all misconduct occurring within the
institution' .....Past and future, managers and the work force are all to become
subject to an accounting eye, in what is one more expression of his Panopticon
principle".47 .
On the basis of Bentham's own vision, a genealogy of accounting as a
disciplinary technique has been written by Hoskins and Macve.48
The authors stress how disciplinary examination, accounting
techniques and auto-regulation and legitimisation have merged in the
twentieth century to constitute the notion of accountable professionalism or
managerialism. Accounting techniques can be integrated into a disciplinary
system of auto-regulation of conduct for the purpose of efficiency, and by the
same token, can serve the end of professional self-legitimisation. The
importance of the audit and accounting techniques in the current power-
knowledge framework has been stressed in other writings." The widespread
use of techniques such as the audit and the growing societal importance of
accounting and managerial experts reveals, it is argued, a greater dependency
on autonomous agents through which advanced liberal government "acts at a
distance". N Rose has stressed the privileged role of audit and accounting as
neo-liberal techniques of government:
47Sentham quoted in Hoskins, Macve, "Accounting and the Examination: A
genealogy of Disciplinary Power", B Smart (ed), Michel Foucault; Critical
Assessments, Vol VII, Part II, at p 99.
48 ibid.
49See N Rose, "Governing Advanced Liberal DemocraCies", in op. cit. note 45.
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"Within these new strategies of government, audit becomes one of the key
mechanisms for responding to the plurality of expertise and the inherent
controversy and undecidability of its truth claims ...Audit, in a range of
different forms, has come to replace the trust formulae of government once
accorded to professional credentials ....Despite the fact that its 'epistemological
profile' is, if anything, even lower than the know ledges that it displaces, and
that there is nothing novel in the techniques of audit themselves, the mode of
its operation - in terms ...of apparently stable and yet endlessly flexible criteria
such as efficiency, appropriateness, effectiveness - renders it versatile and
highly transferable technology for governing at a distance'Y"
Experts playa role in government at a distance and in the process of "de-
statisation" of governmental authority. They are no longer submitted to
centralised apparatuses of government; their accountability is determined by
abstract accounting techniques and they are submitted to the sole authority of
the market.
Accordingly, the most advanced applications of accounting techniques
and their Panoptic effect are perceived to organise the auto-regulation, self-
surveillance and legitimisation of armies of experts who perform acts of
government, autonomously from the State, and in response to the purely
abstract discipline of the market. Accounting replaces policing and prescribes
efficiency and market discipline as standards of behaviour. However, the role
attributed to accounting and to thefiduciaire in the Bill was a much more
modest one and does not seem to have been inscribed in a liberal strategy of
"de-statisation". The role of accounting in the Bill reflects the prominence of
administrative and state control in French Governmentality. The panoptic
schema applied is thus inscribed in French Governmentality's bias for the
administrative policing of freedom. The fiduciary was mainly to act as a state
intermediary, as the State's accounting eye. Accounting was not envisaged as
a means of ensuring the self-regulation of the Fiducie, as it could have been
envisaged in a more liberal application of the panoptic technique. To further
50 N Rose, ibid, at p 55-56.
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argue this point, a comparison with the Quebec trust will be made. In the case
of Quebec, reliance on accounting techniques is more extensive, and seems
more connected with the acceptance of a self-regulated trust, albeit in the
shadow of the courts.
The French Bill was criticised by Canadian academics who are fully
aware of the difficulties of translating the trust into Quebecois civil terms. M
Cantin Cumyn, Professor at McGill University, criticised the first version of
the Bill, which was very similar to the 1992 proposed legislation, for its
vagueness and imprecision, particularly as regards the control of the
performance of the fiduciary purpose and the rights of the beneficiary." The
author notes that the concept of beneficial title has two main purposes: first, it
allows the beneficiary to obtain remedies against third parties - hence, the
proprietary character of the beneficiary's rights; secondly, it constitutes the
basis of the beneficiary's right to control the trustee's management and, to that
end, to require himlher to account for his/her acts. The author notes that the
rights of the beneficiary of a Fiducie were ill-defined. The beneficiary had no
title or proprietary right; however, his/her rights could have been defined with
more precision to include the prerogatives normally connected with beneficial
ownership. As a consequence, no effective control of the fiduciaire was
organised by the Bill. Hence, the surveillance of the fiduciary mission and of
the fiduciaire was placed in the hands of the beneficiary, whose primary
rights, even if they are not identified as a title, did not explicitly but should
have included this ability to require the fiduciary to comply with the mission
and to account for his/her acts.
The new Quebec trust is purposefully based on the notion of patrimony
by appropriation in order to avoid, or "transcend the notion of property
51 "L'avant-projet de loi relatif a la Fiducie, un point de vue civiliste d'outre-atlantique",
Dalloz, chronique, 14, 1992,117.
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rights".52 Indeed, to avoid any recourse to the common law notions of legal
and equitable ownership, the beneficiary's and the trustee's rights have not
been defined with reference to categories of property law; instead, their
prerogatives, rights and duties have been precisely listed, avoiding the
shorthand qualifications of title or ownership. Hence, neither the beneficiary
nor the trustee have any property rights. However, although the Quebec
Fiducie is not recognised as a trust, the drafters have actively sought to
integrate elements of the common law into the new statute.53 They have
expressly stated their intention to use common law concepts as an informal
source of inspiration, particularly as regards the inclusion into the code of "the
trust established by contract", intended to rival business trust techniques,
already authorised in specialised statutes for specific uses, and widely used in
Canadian common law states." They have arguably attempted to reproduce,
without naming it, the dynamics of the equitable-legal title distinction and the
model of fiduciary relationship it entails.Hence, Professor Brierley, one of the
members of the commission in charge of the drafting of the provisions on the
Fiducie of the new Code, has asserted that "as regards the fiducie, [the new
Code] is clearly modelled on the common law trust as regards several
important aspects".55
Quebec's Fiducie is functionally defined and specific reference to its
possible working modes is made in Section II, Articles 126 to 1273 of the
New Civil Code. It is identified generally and primarily as a mode of
administration; the relationship between the trustee and the beneficiary is
52J Brierley, "Regards sur Ie droit des biens dans Ie nouveau code civil du Quebec",
Revue Internationale de Droit Compare, 1, 1995, at p 42, (my translation).
53See B Stapleton, "Codification of Trust law: Who needs it?", in Conferences sur Ie
Nouveau Code Civil du Quebec, 1991; according to this author, the Quebec Trust will
not be recognised as the common law trust by practitioners, clients and academics.
54 See the drafters' commmentaries in La Reforme du Code Civil-Textes Reunls,
Tome I, Presse Universitaire de Laval, 1991 ,at p 751.
55"De certains patrimoines d'affectation", in ibid., at p 739.
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focused on this, rather than on relations of property. However, "the
beneficiary is much more than an ordinary creditor [of the trustee],,; he/she is
directly involved in the administration of the trust. Articles 1287 to 1292
constitute the third subsection of section illwhich is headed: "of the
Administration of Trust". Some of these provisions are designed to remedy the
past deficiencies regarding the rights of beneficiaries. The new code goes
beyond the recognition of the established rules, allowing the beneficiary to
enforce the trust or to require the replacement of the trustee. With the settlor,
the beneficiary is granted a new right to supervise the administration of the
trust. 56 It is made clear by the drafters that the right of a beneficiary to
supervise the trustee is inherent in his/her legal position.
"As the beneficiary has no property right [under the new law], it is essential
that his rights of action be explicitly established ...the beneficiaries's rights of
action are not deduced from the legal qualification of his rights as a personal
or property ....right. ..but are explicitly established by the statute,echoing the
specificity of the legal position of the beneficiary of a trust"."
The rights of the beneficiary enunciated in articles 1290 and 1291 are "the
counterpart of the duties of the trustee".S8 Hence, the beneficiary's prerogative
of surveillance is directly connected to the trustee's function of administration
and to the proper functioning of the Fiducie. The panoptic schema applied in
the case of the Quebec trust is therefore essential to an understanding of the
beneficiary's rights and relationship to the trustee. The beneficiary is a central
element of the mechanism of auto-regulation of the Quebec trust.
S6 Article 1287 of the New Quebec Civil Code: "The administration of a trust is subject
to the supervision of the settlor or of his heirs, if he has died, and of the beneficiary,
even a future beneficiary ...", Article 1290: "The settlor, the beneficiary or any other
interested person may, notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary, take action
against the trustee to compel him to perform his obligations or to perform any act
which is necessary in the interest of the trust, to enjoin him to abstain from any action
harmful to the trust or to have him removed".
S7 op. cit. note 53 at p 770, (my translation).
S8ibid at p 772.
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The panoptic schema applied in the case of the Quebec trust is very
different from that observed in the case of the Fiducie. While panoptic
techniques are relied upon in Quebec, in order to ensure a self-contained and
relatively autonomous principle of regulation, the Fiducie also would have
relied on panoptic surveillance, not as a means of disciplining the trustee, but
as a device for the administrative control of private funds. As compared with
the Fiducie, the Quebec trust relies on a more liberal application of panoptic
techniques, which demonstrates the existence of a more organised professional
body of trustees on which the self-regulation of the Fiducie can depend. The
principle of surveillance may exist in the common law trust and in its
interpretation in the Quebec Code, but it does not have the same function. This
is a reflection of differences in governmentalities, the French mentality of rule
granting more weight to administrative rule and control.
The French Bill is situated at the cross-roads of diverse political
rationalities, all forming part of the Governmentality which underlies French
legal culture. The legal profile of the Fiducie is thus better understood in the
light of the purposive governmental rationalities - or Governmentality - that
run through French legal culture. These have an impact which runs deeper
than that of the intended aims and immediate policy concerns of the drafters.
This is because Governmentality operates at the deep epistemological level. 59
This does not mean that there is a coherent logic at work and indeed the
contradictions in the Bill reflect those of French Governrnentality, A further
epistemological dimension will be explored in the next section. The
interpretation of the Bi11as part of economic government and law-making
59 The Fiducie cannot realistically be viewed as the implementation of a specific
political programme. At the level of its intended role, it remains attached to technical
rather than political preoccupations. Its revival in the Marini report does seem to
claim the Bill as part of a wider neo-liberal project of de-regulation. However, it is quite
clear that no such project was formulated in the early 1990s, in the context of the
Bill's emergence. See Chapter I, p 16.
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entails recourse to a particular discursive structure. Despite its apolitical,
technical profile, the Fiducie can be situated within a Liberal problematic.
Not only has the Fiducie been "passively" determined by
Governmentality, it also was an active, albeit minor, and symptomatic element
in the ongoing contemporary reworking of Governmentality. Hence, a further
dimension of our discussion of the relation between the Fiducie and
Governmentality is the argument that the Fiducie is implicated in changes in
the organisation and understanding of government. Foucault's interpretation of
Liberalism allows us to establish a connection between the Fiducie and the
Liberal critique of government.
SECTION II • LOCATING THE FIDUCIE IN THE LIBERAL
PROBLEM-SPACE OF ECONOMIC GOVERNMENT
This section, in its second part, explains the relevance of the liberal
problem-space to an epistemological and political understanding of the
Fiducie. Indeed, the Bill was primarily technical and destined to respond to
the particular needs of an economic sector. However, my argument is that the
Bill has, despite its technical and instrumental characteristics, and its
disconnection from any specific political reflection or programme, a
fundamental political dimension. This political dimension is inherent to the
epistemology of economic law, and therefore concerns the Fiducie in its
formulation as a measure of economic government.
M Foucault has interpreted Liberalism as a rationality focused on the
critique of government. Liberalism creates a "problem-space" as it questions
the very possibility of economic government.The liberal problem-space
constitutes a critical framework preoccupied with the limits of government. It
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is independent from, yet co-extensive with Governmentality; rationalities of
rule, which assume the possibility of implementing governmental ends
through proper technical means, are outflanked by a knowledge-savoir
questioning the very possibility of government. The first part of this section
explores these Foucauldian constructs in greater detail.
1.Real Liberalism, Liberal Governmentality and Economic Law
In the first part of this chapter, as in previous chapters, the liberal dimension
of Governmentality, reflected in French law, has been evoked. Liberal
Governmentality is a purposive rationality of rule organised around the goal of
private freedom through security. I have argued that the Governmentality
reflected in French law is a hybrid which only partly reflects Liberal aims of
government. Liberal Governmentality is distinguishable from what Foucault
refers to as political economy or "Real Liberalism". "Real Liberalism" is co-
extensive with Governmentality; it constitutes the lateral knowledge-base of
purposive liberal rationalities of government. Hence, "Real Liberalism" - as C
Gordon puts it - reflects Foucault's
"concern to understand liberalism not simply as a doctrine ...of political and
economic theory, but as a style of thinking quintessentially concerned with the
art of governing ... [Foucault's notion of] [l]iberalism can thus be accurately
characterized in Kantian terms as a critique of state reason, a doctrine of
limitation and wise restraint, designed to mature and educate state reason by
displaying to it the intrinsic bounds of its power to know".60
Rather than constituting a particular know-how guiding government,
Real Liberalism proceeds on the basis of the assumed limits of government,
which it seeks to explore.
60C Gordon, "Governmental rationality: an introduction", in Burchell, Gordon, Miller
(eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Harvester, Weatsheaf,
England, 1991, at pp 14·15.
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"[P]olitical economy announces the unknowability for the sovereign of the
totality of the economic process and, as a consequence, the impossibility of an
economic sovereignty ...what political economy cannot do for government is to
generate a detailed, deductive programme for state action. Political economy
assumes the role of a knowledge which is, as Foucault puts it, 'lateral' to ...the
art of governing: it cannot, however, in itself constitute that art".61
Rather than being a rationality of government based on the design of
policy aims and means, "Real Liberalism", or political economy, is a
particular ethos of critique of the very possibility of government. It is the
dialectical counter-part of the idea and practice of governing, which it informs.
Its "effect is to resituate governmental reason within a newly complicated,
open and unstable politico-epistemic configuration. The whole subsequent
governmental history of our societies can be read in terms of the successive
topological displacements and complications of this liberal problem-space".62
Gordon thus insists on the contemporary role of the liberal problem-space and
its epistemological function; it is part of the dynamics of the problematisation
of government. It incorporates within the problem of government the issue of
the boundaries of competence.
The invention of Real Liberalism by theorists such as Adam Smith, is
understood by Foucault as both a historical event to be explored, and an
enduring problematic which preserves its importance as a vector of political
construction. Hence, it entailed an epistemic shift which determined the very
idea of goyernment that we have today. The contemporary relevance of early
Liberalism, that is Real Liberalism or political economy, is thus explained:
" ...we live in a different world today, but a world, perhaps, in which a
recognizably liberal form of questioning remains a constitutive element of
contemporary political thought ...".63
Hence, the relevance today of early Liberalism is due to its
epistemological role in the foundation of the problematic of modem
61C Gordon, ibid, p16, his emphasis.
62 'b'd h 'I I ,my emp asis,
63G Burchell in op. cit. note 59 at p 144.
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government. Its enduring presence is due to its fundamental place in the very
conceptualisation of the notions of government, the economy and economic
government. The particular importance of "Real Liberalism" was in its
formulation of the incompatibility between a unitary juridical sovereignty and
the multiplicity of economic interests."
"What liberalism undertakes is something different: the construction of a
complex domain of governmentality, within which economic and juridical
subjectivity can alike be situated as relative moments ..The key role which it
comes to play in this effort of construction and invention is, for Foucault, the
characteristic trait of the liberal theory of civil society".65
I agree with Gordon's view that Real Liberalism's epistemological task
is therefore to constitute a domain of governmental intervention, which
recognises both the impossibility of economic sovereignty, due to the
multiplicity of interests and the opacity of the various processes informed by
such multiplicity, and the possibility of government. This task is a never-
ending questioning of the current set of boundaries. Hence, the enduring
function of Real Liberalism lies in its role as a instrument of critique and its
derived epistemological impact in the constitution of central and variable
concepts connected to the notion of civil society and its proper government.
Real Liberalism is seen by Foucault as focusing on law as the proper technical
means of government.
The relevance of Real Liberalism to the Fiducie can be explained as
follows: the proposed legislative introduction of the new device was caught,
through the discursive medium of its existence, in a problematic of
government which operates through preexisting concepts and questions. At the
forefront of this problematic of government is the liberal problem-space and
its conceptual apparatus. Hence, the Fiducie was placed at the heart of issues
64 See developments in the next sub-section
65CG don l .or on In op. CIt. note 59 at p 22.
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regarding the proper role of government in a (civil) society, more and more
dependent on international transactions. Within this problematic, the
instrumental function of legislation and its effectiveness are assumed; the
legislative introduction of the Fiducie would have provided an answer to the
specific economic problems faced by French lawyers on the international
market for legal services, and by the French economy as regard the attraction
of other jurisdictions for business and capital. At the same time, the limits of
government are touched upon. Governmental rationality is assumed
powerless before the pressures of the "internationalised" economy. The
paradox of the Bill lies in its unformulated assumptions about, on the one
hand, French economy as a governable entity, and on the other, the
international sphere as both a constraint, and a renewed challenge for
government. Hence the Fiducie indicated both the limits of government as an
activity and a rationality confined to the national, and put at the forefront of
the problematic of government, the almost mystical and non-governable entity
of the global society; 66 the latter constitutes a focus for the renewal of the
liberal problematic of government, with its dialectic tension between the
definition of the governmental domain, and the questioning of the very
possibility of government. The central conceptual apparatus of Real
Liberalism finds a new lease of life through corresponding notions such as
global society and the opacity of deterritorialised activities and actors.
66 This is so although there is no specific reference in the Bill or related literature, to
globalisation . This is arguably due to the fact that in the early 1990s, the notion had
not yet penetrated the juridical field to any significant extent.
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2. The Fiducie in a Professional and Global World: the Revival of Civil
Society and Self-interest Subjectivity
The justification of the Bill as a rational act of government is
underpinned by, and consolidates, specific representations which are, it is
argued, those of Real Liberalism. Hence, the internationalisation and
deterritorialisation of economic activity contribute to the depiction of an
apparently new variable: global society. My point is that global society is little
more than a reactivation of the Liberal epistemological construct of civil
society. According to this Liberal paradigm, civil society is an aggregate of
economic actors whose rational choices are guided by the imperative of
maximisation of material self-interest. Similarly, the Bill's focus on the needs
of practising lawyers and their clients emphasises the significance of the free-
play of self-interest. The interest-maximising subject takes the new guise of
the specialised professional, able to guide with his/her knowledge the activity
of government. The latter is aided by law as an instrument subsumed to the
good functioning of the economy, as opposed to an instrument of economic
rule. In a slightly altered state, the epistemological constructs and themes of
Real Liberalism, and in particular the idea of the impossibility of economic
sovereignty, have shaped the rationalisation of the Fiducie.
The new Fiducie was justified on the grounds that it satisfies the needs
of French lawyers and their internationally-minded clientele. The Bill was
therefore portrayed as a validation of the interest of a certain group of subjects,
on the basis of economic need.67 But the Fiducie was not simply a political
response to the demands of a specific pressure group. The Bill would have
been an act of economic government justified on the grounds of the individual
67 See Chapter I at p 10.
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economic rationality behind the need for a French equivalent of the trust.
Hence, the interest of the professional lawyer and his/her client, both
understood more as market actors than as political agents, constitutes in itself
the indicator of proper government. Individual economic rationality was
transcended into the collective rationality of economic government.
This notion of government as validation of self-interest may seem a
commonplace and neutral way of problematising governance. However, it
belongs to a particular epistemology, that of Real Liberalism. This is
emphasised by G Burchell, who writes:
"Government by laissez-faire is a government of interests, a government
which works through and with interests, both those of individuals and,
increasingly, those attributed to the population itself...the individual subject of
interest is at once the object or target of government and, so to speak, its
partner ...This individual living being, the subject of particular interests,
represents a new figure of social and political subjectivity, the prototype of
'economic man', who will become the correlate and instrument of a new art of
governmentv.f
Although this understanding of subjectivity as maximisation of one's
own self-interest has crept into the epistemology of economic law and
government, and could seem so familiar as to have become a-political, it is
important to underline its ideological and political origin. Indeed, to Foucault
this moment in political thought has deep and wide-ranging consequences.
"For Foucault, this isolation of interest-motivated choice and conduct
represents a profound transformation in Western theories of subjectivity with
critical consequences for how the individual's relation to the political is
thought".69
The enduring influence of Liberalism resides in the possibility of thinking of
subjectivity not as purely juridical and unitary but as multiple as the diversity
of self-interests. The Bill was the opportunity to invoke this version of Liberal
68 op. cit. note 59 at p 127.
69ibid. at p130.
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subjectivity in the guise of the professional, service providing lawyer and the
businessman.
The notion of economic rationality as individual, opaque and greater
than the sum of particular interests, remains central to Liberal epistemology
and ideology, and stems from the conceptualisation of the political subject as
also pursuing hislher own self-interest.
"Th[e] theme of the atomic particularity and localized conditions of interest-
motivated choice is ...an important element in the development of a model of
economic rationality as a rationality of individuals ...In their local situation
individuals calculate and thereby connect themselves to other subjects
similarly adjusting themselves to each other ...the economic positivity and
rationality of each individual's calculated actions ...is possible only if the
ultimate conditions and effects of the individual's actions escape his or
anyone's knowledge and will. This, says Foucault, is the meaning of Smith's
'invisible hand': the identification of economic men with subjects of interest
situated within a system of dependence and productivity which escapes their
knowledge and will, but which constitutes the conditions for the economic
rationality of their actions't."
Hence, the confusing political subjectivity with material self-interest
has generated a certain corollary vision of society and the economy. The
invisible hand points to the existence of self-regulating and mysterious
mechanisms within society. Civil society and its economic processes form an
opaque and fragmented entity defying the grasp of a totalizing economic
rationality. Hence, a vision of subjectivity reduced to material self-interest
"goes together ...with the epistemological and practical disqualification of
sovereignty over economic processes. It is the opacity of economic processes,
the necessary invisibility of a non-totalizable multiplicity of essentially atomic
points of calculation and action, that founds the rationality of economic agents
as individual subjects of interest ...".71
Within the epistemology encompassing this narrow understanding of
subjectivity can be located a certain vision of the role of law in government.
Government cannot be the exercise of economic sovereignty, as the latter is
70 ibid. at p 133.
71 ibid. at p 134.
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presumed to be a pointless aim. Economic law, as a tool of government,
cannot be the expression of sovereignty over society's economic mechanisms.
This does not exclude the intervention of law as a regulating mechanism.
Law's aim is to facilitate the natural functioning of such mechanisms by
allowing the variety of private interests to find a legitimate expression.
Economic law is not shaped by the logic of economic sovereignty but seeks to
govern or guide - in the Foucauldian sense of "conduite" - private interests.
There is a capitulation in the face of the multiple movements towards the
"internationalisation" of the economy, generated by rational economic agents
and supported by national state authorities in their international relations. The
skill and rationality of atomic economic agents - lawyers and businesses - are
entrusted with the capability of acting in the best interest of the French
economy. In this light, the Bill did not really attempt to protect the economic
sovereignty of the French nation; it would have protected the individual
interest of French lawyers and French businesses by increasing their choice
and margin of action. The Bill was less an act of French economic
protectionism than an attempt to protect the interests of certain French
economic agents.
Self-interested economic subjects constitute civil society. It is precisely
because of this individualistic, self-interested basis that society appears
governed by its own regularities defying economic sovereignty. Moreover,
s/he seems to live in a universe where the boundaries of national sovereignty
are of little relevance.
''There is, as it were, an inevitable quotient of deterritorialization in the
activity of subjects of economic interest. The abstract, isolated economic ego,
the 'merchant' that, as Smith puts it, every man 'becomes in some measure', is
not necessarily the citizen of any particular country".72
72ibid. at p 135.
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It is admitted that the economic rationality of interest-motivated subjectivity
expresses itself in a society which cannot confine it, a society which is not
confined to the territory of sovereignty, a deterritorialised society. A global
society? Like the notion of civil society, the global society hinted at in the Bill
is characterised by its opacity and the fluidity of its boundaries. Like civil
society, it casts doubt on the very possibility of economic government - at
least in as much as government is a national activity - and yet, it calls for a
new type of governmental intervention. As pointed out earlier, the Fiducie is
caught in this paradoxical problem-space, which the notion of global society -
or international and deterritorialised economy as it was referred to in the Bill -
seem to encompass.
The revival of civil society and the liberal critique of government is
not a purely discursive coincidence or the product of the internal evolution of
French law's Governmentality. Global society, the self-interested subject and
the liberal problem-space are discursive effects and weapons in power battles.
These discursive elements are already given and need to correspond to
acceptable formulations in French Governmentality; hence, we have argued in
the preceding section and chapter, that the Fiducie was constrained by
discursive limits and had to comply with certain themes and conceptions
resulting from the Govemmentality of French law. This shows that non-
discursive battles have to be fought according to pre-existing discursive
parameters.
Indeed, not everything is played and solved at the level of discourse
and knowledge. The "topological displacements ...of the liberal problem-
space", referred to by Gordon, correspond to a strategic use of critique in the
course of field power struggles, as will be seen in the next chapter. This is not
to say that the 1992 Bill sought to implement a particular liberal logic or
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strategy, for the benefit of a particular class. On the contrary, the Bill reflected
numerous contradictory tensions. It was located at cross-roads of
governmental rationalities; it echoed a subtle change in the equilibrium of
power relations in the fields of government and law. These field struggles and
their relevance to the legal argumentation of the Fiducie will be explored next.
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CHAPTER VI
THE FIDUCIE, GLOBALIZATION AND FRENCH FIELD
BATTLES
The purpose of this chapter is to complement the two lines of
argument developed in previous chapters and based on a discursive analysis
of the Fiducie in terms of its relation to the juridical discourse of sovereignty
and Governmentality, with an analysis which brings together discursive and
non-discursive developments. In the previous four chapters, the Fiducie was
analysed in terms of epistemological processes which explained its legal form
and the content of its regulation. In this chapter, we will attempt to connect the
current workings of French legal knowledge with the power stakes and
practices in the French and international fields of law. The notion of field,
elaborated by Bourdieu and further investigated by Dezalay, will be used to
show how the discursive dynamics of French law in the case of the Fiducie are
dependent upon and evolve according to power struggles within national fields
of legal/juridical power and government. 1
The multi-faceted, if not confusingly plural, notion of globalization
will be reappropriated, in the first section of this chapter, in order to establish
this analytical link between the discursive phenomena observed in previous
chapters and changes in the power relations between lawyers and government
at the national and "global" levels. The Fiducie illustrates the impact of
phenomena and events that can be interpreted as global, such as an
1 The notion of ''field'' is also explained in Chapter I, Section II, at pp 35·36, as a
network of relations between (discursive and non-discursive) positions defined by
their situation as regards the structure of distribution of power, be it symbolic or
economic.
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international convention for the harmonisation of laws and the pressure of
global financial practice. However, it is important to stress that the Fiducie is
not the result of a systemic evolution linked to the "global phenomenon",
understood as an all-encompassing evolutionary influence. It is connected to
specific and definable national power struggles which largely contribute to
globalization.
The first section of the chapter provides an interpretation of
"globalization" which draws upon Bourdieu's proposed notion of "fields".
Hence, "globalization" is not understood as a systemic phenomenon, resulting
from the abstract laws of evolution. Globalization is to be placed in the
context of struggles within national fields of juridical and governmental
power.
The second section of this chapter establishes a connection between
findings of chapters ITand ill on French juridical discourse, and the changes in
the power structure of the juridical field which have been revealed by the
troubled and reluctant acceptance of the possible introduction of the Fiducie.
The third section of this chapter argues that the epistemological
tensions, echoed in the 1992 Bill and discussed in chapters IV and V, as
regards the Governmentality of French law, reveal changes in the position of
law and lawyers, or at least of a certain type thereof, in the field of
governmental power.
SECTION I - THE FIDUCIE AND ITS GLOBAL
CONTEXTUALISATION
Reference is made in this chapter to the contextualisation rather than
the context of the Fiducie. The notion of "context" is avoided because it
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suggests that globalization is the objective and material setting of current
changes and evolution. The view here is that globalization is constituted by
and constitutes discursive and non-discursive struggles and competitive
conflicts. The "global phenomenon" is not a given state of affairs but is
constructed to provide an explanatory context, i.e., to "contextualise" events
and experiences. The following developments are based on an analysis of
globalization as a power-discourse phenomenon, the elements of which are
detailed below. The global contextualisation of the Fiducie takes into account
the role of the The 1985 Hague Convention on Trusts (sub-section 1). In
different ways, globalization, understood in both phenomenological and
discursive terms, offers new opportunities in professional and political
struggles at the national level (sub-section 2).
1. The Hague Convention and the Disembedded Trust Model
1.1 The Convention's aims and Strategies
In 1984,32 states unanimously adopted a draft Convention on the Law
Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition (The Hague Convention). The
Convention originates from a proposal put forward by the Permanent Bureau
of the the Hague Conference on Private International Law in January 1980.
One of the reasons invoked in favour of the Convention relates to European
harmonisation. Hence,
"[t]he need for common rules of private international law on this subject is
comparatively urgent among the EEC countries, given the fact that the
Convention of 9 October 1978 on the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the
United Kingdom to the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters presupposes that these countries
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all have 'rules of private international law' dealing with the determination of
the domicile of a trust".2
The specific mission of the Hague Conference, an organization created, in
1893, well before the European Union's beginnings, is precisely "to work for
the progressive unification of the rules of private international law't.' The aim
of the 1985 Convention is to ensure the validity and the recognition of the
trust in the non-trust countries which will have ratified the International
agreement. This does not entail that the trust institution will be introduced into
each non-trust country's national legal system. To ensure that trusts are
recognised as such, the Convention adds the trust category into non-trust
countries' private international law, thus avoiding the re-characterization or
assimilation of trusts according to other domestic law categories. The
Convention also unifies conflict of law principles, by defining the law which
will be applicable to all international trusts in countries which have ratified. It
is thus important to stress that the Convention deals only with the choice-of-
law apparatus of non-trust countries' international private law."
The declared approach of the Convention has two aspects. It seeks
firstly to make the trust an acceptable legal category to all civil law countries,
by giving a general explanatory definition of the common law trust. Secondly,
it unifies conflict of law rules by establishing that the law applicable to all
2 Special Commission on the proposed Convention, report cited by A Dyer, Deputy
Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, in a paper
"Creation and Progress of the Hague Convention on Trusts", presented at the
Conference "Hot Topics In the World of Trusts", Nov 1994.
3 Statute of the permanent Conference, quoted by A Dyer.
4For an account of The Hague Convention see D Hayton, "The Hague Convention on
the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition",(1987), 36, International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, 260; Gaillard and Trautman, "Trusts in Non-Trust
Countries: Conflict of Laws and the Hague Convention on Trusts",( 1987),35,2,
American Journal of Comparative Law, 307; Jauffret-Spinosi "La Convention de la
Haye relative a la loi applicable au trust et a sa reconnaissance (1 Juillet 1985)",
Clunet, vol, 1,27. For the text of the Convention see Underhill and Hayton, The Law
Relating to Trusts and Trustees, 15 th ed., Butterworth, London, 1995, pp 939-956;
and International Trust Laws, Statutes, 1993, Appendix 50.
194
international trusts will be the law chosen by the settlor. Moreover, the law
chosen by the settlor must be that of a jurisdiction which knows the trust. No
recognition of the trust will be imposed where the law chosen by the settlor is
that of a non-trust country (article 6), or where the trust has no significant
international dimension and is located in a non-trust country (article 13). The
settlor is granted a broad freedom to choose the law applicable, but party
autonomy is not allowed to entail the imposition of the trust institution in a
civil law jurisdiction. It was intended that the ratification of the Convention be
independent of the issue whether it is desirable for ratifying countries to have
a trust device of their own.'
This cautious approach is also reflected in the definition of the trust
provided in article 2 of the Convention which seeks to avoid provoking
controversy. Indeed, the educational function of the Convention has been
emphasised by Dyer, who justifies the convention on the basis that its role is
"to show that the trust is not the enemy of the family values or fiscal health of
countries making up a large part of the wealth-owning jurisdictions of the
world".6 However, these assumptions are debatable and have have not been
accepted by France. Nevertheless, the Convention proposed to overcome
skepticism by simply familiarising civil law jurists with the trust, to be
explained in terms which are understandable and acceptable to them.
"The Hague Trusts Convention is a first and very important step in building a
bridge between the trust and non-trust countries. The progress of the
Convention depends on the perceived need to promote tolerance and
acceptance of an unknown legal institution, even when its characteristics are
out of line with the ownership concepts ...of the countries in question"."
Hence, the definition of the trust provided in article 2 of the Convention is a
"gateway" definition, which purposefully avoids any reference to the trust's
5 A Dyer op, cit. note 2.
6 A Dyer, ibid.
7 ibid.
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equitable-legal division of ownership. The declared aim is to reconcile the
trust with the civil law notion of ownership.
"For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'trust' refers to the legal
relationships created - inter vivos or on death - by a person, the settlor, when
assets have been placed under the control of a trustee for the benefit of a
beneficiary or for a specified purpose.
A trust has the following characteristics-
a the assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the trustee's own
estate;
b title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the name of
another person on behalf of the trustee;
c the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which he is accountable,
to manage, employ or dispose of the assets in accordance with the terms of the
trust and the special duties imposed upon him by law .... "(Article 2)
The trust is thus not characterized by its ownership structure but by
alternative criteria which give effect to the division of ownership between the
trustee and the beneficiary. However, this approach brings the trustee and the
trust assets into focus, with little reference to the rights of the beneficiary and
the role of the court as regards the control of the trust and the protection of the
beneficiary's rights." No reference is made to the fiduciary nature of the
relationship between trustee and beneficiary, and the obligations of the trustee
have no source.
Article 3 specifies that the "Convention applies only to trusts created
voluntarily and evidenced in writing". Although the Convention's claimed aim
was to capture the universality and multiple identity of the trust, its application
is clearly limited to express trusts - including charitable trusts and purpose
trusts. Trusts arising by the operation of law or resulting from a judicial
decision are not automatically covered, although it is left open for the ratifying
countries to include these in their understanding of the Convention (article
20). Party autonomy principles are applied as regards the law applicable to a
8 Where the settlor has not expressly designated the law applicable to the trust. the
court will decide which law is most closely connecting having regard to a number of
factors which concern mainly the trustee and the assets (article 7).
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trust. Hence, as with contract, the law governing the trust will depend on the
implied or express choice of the settlor (article 9). Although the trust is not
categorised as a contract in the given definition, a particular functional model
of the trust shapes the convention, one which grants great discretion to the
settlor to choose favourable rules. Such discretion is particularly useful in the
international business applications of the trust, especially those relying on off-
shore havens.
1.2 The Fiducie,the "shapeless trust", and offshore/international trust
practice.
It is perhaps no coincidence that the trust model invented for the purposes of
the Convention and characterized by its shapeless, almost invisible, ownership
structure, is also a suitable representation of the international business trust. D
Hayton reminds us that the Convention, besides its general and theoretical aim
to unify private international law, aims to provide a practical solution to
contemporary problems.
"It is a fact of life that, with the increasing mobility of capital and persons,
more and more trust assets, beneficiaries and trustees, are to be found in non-
trust States. Currently, different non-trust States deal very differently with
trust problems arising in their jurisdictions ... .Inevitably, a common lawyer
from a trust State finds it very difficult to predict for a client what may happen
if some aspect of a trust comes to involve a non-trust State ..Trustees ...have
particular cause to be concerned over investing in non-trust States since, if
they lose control of or diminish the value of the trust assets as a result of
detrimentally subjecting them to some foreign law, they may be personally
liable for breach of trust. It is in the best interests of States to adopt the
Convention and harmonise their approach to trust issues, so ...producing
greater legal certainty and greater protection for property rights"."
The unilateral benefits of the Convention have often been stressed by
legal writers, who pointed out that, whereas non-trust countries will have to
99 Hayton, ''The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their
recognition",op. cit. note 4, at pp 260-261.
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modify their laws to recognise the foreign trust, trust countries do not have any
reciprocal obligation towards non-trust countrics.l'' However, the Convention
may also benefit countries which wish to introduce trust-like devices,
following the Convention's article 2 blueprint. These new devices, like the
French Fiducie, are not unproblematic ally recognisable as trusts, as they do
not reproduce the split ownership structure of the trust. These new institutions
will have to be recognised as trusts in trust-countries if they fulfil article 2
criteria and despite the lack of division of rights into legal and equitable
rights. I I
Hayton seems to suggest that, despite the apparent unilateral benefit
for common law practitioners and their clients in the (almost) world-wide
recognition of trust, non-trust countries will derive some benefit from the
promotion of certainty and the protection of property rights. According to this
author, trustees and other fund managers will be encouraged to invest in the
countries, recently "civilised" to the virtues of the trust. However, the
influence of offshore trust practices on the Convention's aims and the
resulting "shapeless trust" has not been addressed by the drafters or doctrinal
writers.
The non-charitable purpose trust is a fine example of recent
developments in offshore trust practice.12 There seem to be converging
characteristics between the latter, the Convention's shapeless trust and the
Fiducie. The trick of the purpose trust is to make beneficial ownership
disappear. It does rely on the traditional division of ownership between the
trustee and the beneficiary but
10 Gaillard and Trautman, op. cit. note 4, Jauffret-Spinosi op. cit. note 4.
II ibid.
12 See Oakley (ed), Contemporary Trends in Trust Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1996.
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"the characteristic of the true non-charitable purpose trust is that it has no
beneficiaries ...the property the subject of the trust cannot, in strict law, be said
to belong beneficially to anyone. Now there are estate-planning exercises and
commercial transactions that can make good use of this phenomenon ..".13
We have noted the Convention's and the 1992 Bill's fuzziness
regarding the precise entitlement of the beneficiary. The Fiducie altogether
avoids any formulation of beneficial ownership. This is probably due to the
fact that the beneficiary'S rights have no equivalent in French law. However,
what is significant is the lack of concern for this missing element. Beneficial
ownership was easily sacrificed as the definitional priority focused on the
contractual characterisation of the relationship between the constituantlsettlor
and the fiduciary. The perceived importance of this relationship echoes off-
shore trust practice and its emphasis on the protection of the settlor's interest
and the lack of third party beneficiary.
The definition of the Fiducie also focused on the fact that the settlor
would create a separate and autonomous fund albeit owned by the fiduciary.
As we have seen, the constitution of a separate fund, within the fiduciary's
patrimony is inconsistent with the principle of unity of patrimony. 14 The
fiduciary's ownership is of course everything but beneficial and is, in strict
legal terms, artificial, as a legal subject is only entitled to one patrimony. It
could well be argued that the French Fiducie is not very different from
Quebec's ownerless patrimony.
The offshore purpose trust could be said to epitomise the ownerless
fund. The function of this device, as statutorily introduced and regulated in
most offshore jurisdictions, is to provide a flexible and autonomous structure
for asset management and protection. The autonomy of the purpose trust has
13Matthews in Oakley, ibid. at p 19.
14 See Chapter II, Section II for an account of why the trust is contrary to the unity of
patrimony and Chapter III for an analysis of this principle in terms of the imperative of
surveillance in French governmentality.
199
been furthered by the emergence of a new figure: the Protector. IS The
Protector is chosen by the settlor to oversee the trustee in the running of an
offshore purpose trust. Recently, the Protector has become a "super trustee"
with wide powers and unaccountable to anyone, especially not to any
hypothetical beneficiary, except the settlor. A Protector is particularly useful
to organise the moving of the seat of the trust swiftly to another offshore
jurisdiction and the changing of the governing law of the trust. The Protector
has therefore a central role to play in the global use of trusts. The self-
regulating effects of the appointment of a Protector are the following: this
figure is to replace the courts as regards the emergency administration of a
trust, involving for instance the removal of trustees. Moreover, as the
Protector does not seem to be accountable to beneficiaries, his actions are
immune from litigation. This excludes the intervention of courts at the further
level of protectorship trust management.
This may be a coincidence but the drafters of the 1992 Bill have
arguably overestimated the ability of French courts to deal with issues relating
to fiduciary administration. According to nineteenth century contractual
theory, the principle of freedom of contract requires the non-intervention of
the judge in the life of a contract. Thus, traditionally, French judges have not
been encouraged to police contractual relations, except where a statute
specifically provides for such an intervention. The 1992 Bill envisaged the
role of the court in determining the standard of fiduciary duty, or the usual
content of a Fiducie contract. It seems that, intentionally or not, the drafters
had granted prominence to the judge in the life of the Fiducie. This contrasts
with the non-interventionist ethos of French courts in contractual matters.l"
15 See Waters, "The Protector: New Wine in Old Bottles?", in op. cit. note 12.
16 See C Witz, "Rapport introductif - Les traits essentiels de la Fiducie et du Trust en
Europe", Bulletin Joly, 1991, 9-20.
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Some doubts have emerged amongst professionals as to the ability of courts to
deal with litigation resulting from the Fiducie; so much so that it has been
suggested that the juges de paix, all unpaid practitioners, be reinstated.V
Could it be that, on the basis of current international trust practice,
much litigation was not anticipated? Was it simply hoped that the Fiducie
will, like the purpose trust under protectorship, run itself as autonomously as
the settlor wishes? After all the Fiducie was to be a contract and should have
provided for its own administration - in the French tradition - independently of
courts.
The Fiducie is a contractual structure. The drafters opted for this
qualification in the second draft of the Bill. The reason given was that the
Fiducie would thereby be clearly distinguished from the trust." This seems to
contradict judicial authority, according to which the trust is a contract.V
However, it was observed by a Luxembourg court that the reason why the trust
has been interpreted as a contract by French courts is that the type of trusts
involved in conflict of laws litigation are international business trusts, and this
type of trust can adequately be described as a contract." Hence, the
contractual qualification of the Fiducie echoes the French legal
conceptualisation of the offshore trust.
This conceptual analysis of the Fiducie, as compared to the purpose
trust and the shapeless trust supports our argument that the stakes here are the
opportunities of local - i.e., French - practitioners to join an international legal
elite, with the support of their national law . This particular political stake is
17 Decheix, "La Fiducie, mode de transmission de I'entreprise?", Les Petites Affiches,
n 56,1990,18.
18 See the discussions of the Bill's Preamble in Chapter I at pp19-22, and of C Witz's
rediscovery of the Roman contractual fiducia, in Chapter II at pp 71-72.
19 Court of Appeal case Courtois c. de Ganay, Paris, 10 Janvier 1970, Rev. crit. 1971,
518.
20 Tribunal de Luxembourg, jugement du 21 Janvier 1971, Rev. crit. 1973, p 51.
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reflected in both the Convention's and the Bill's embracing of the only
globalisable element of trust law: offshore trust practice.i'
2. Globalization: A Phenomenology of Instability and Opportunity
"All vogue words tend to share a similar fate: the more experiences
they pretend to make transparent, the more they themselves become
opaque".22 It is with this view firmly in mind that the concept of globalization
is referred to in this chapter. A narrow definition will be adopted; in this
writer's opinion, globalization is not a useful all-encompassing explanatory
device, but it cannot be dismissed as pure rhetoric. Although the discursive
dimension of globalization is undeniable, its grounding in the reality of social
and economic experience should not be overlooked. The globalization
discourse(s) is sustained by, and maybe even rooted in, a growing awareness
of the interdependence of markets and economies. Although globalization has
been applied to many areas of societal experience, it is easier to apply where
cross-border mobility is both structurally necessary and technically
straightforward and assisted.r' financial markets are without a doubt
globalising, combining technology and high-speed communication, with
dematerialised assets floating in cyberspace.
21 The 1992 Bill excludes judicially implied trusts and statutory imputed trusts.
22Z Bauman, Globalization The Human Consequences, Polity Press, Oxford 1998.
23 See Featherstone, Lash, Robertson (eds), Global Modernities, Sage, London,1995,
where the cultural dimension of globalization is stressed. See M Waters,
Globalization, Routledge, London1995, who identifies four main areas where
globalization discourses have developed: economics, international relations, cultural
studies and environmental studies. See also S Silbey, "'Let Them Eat Cake':
Globalization, Postmodern Colonialism, and the Possibilities of Justice", (1997), 31
Law &Society Review, 1.
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2.1 The Fiducie and Global Economic (dis)order
Globalization narratives cluster around various themes, one of the earliest and
most decisive being that focused on the triumph of the global market.i" Even
if economic globalization can seem one of the most easily quantifiable and
least questionable of all the globalization phenomena theorised about in the
past decade, there is still no consensus as to the reality of economic
globalization, nor as to the meaning to be given to such a broad notion as the
global economy.f Purely quantitative criteria are often seen as insufficient.26
Sometimes, the unique identifiable characteristic of globalization is described
as a growing state of structural interdependence between national economies,
which thereby tend to form a global economy.f The shallowness of
globalization theories has been underlined by Hirst and Thompson, who also
offer their definitional ideal type of the Global economy, in contrast with the
international economy.i" The most striking feature of a global economy
would be the disintegration of national economies into one system through
international processes. Such a new economic system would become
autonomised and socially disembedded, yet powerfully influential on national
social and political organisation. The global socially disembedded markets
would be characterised by a systemic interdependence, which would affect the
decision-making ability of political agencies. The authors conclude that,
according to their definition, the international economy does not fulfil the
criteria of a global economy.
24 see S Silbey, ibid.
25 See Higgot and Reich "Intellectual Order for the Global Order: Understanding Non-
State Actors and Authority in the Global System", paper given at the Conference on
Globalization held at Warwick University in Autumn 1997.
26 See ibid.
27 J Dunning (ed), Governments, Globalization and International Business, Oxford
University Press, Oxford,1997.
28 Globalization in Question, Polity Press, Cambridge ,1996. See Introduction:
"Globalization- A necessary myth?".
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One type of international market seems to epitomise global economic
processes, and to lead the way towards globalization: the virtual world of
finance. There is a consensus that it is indeed within the financial sphere that
globalization is the most developed. The reasons for the extent of global
integration within the financial field have been well illustrated. Capital has
become more and more mobile thanks to its fungibility and convertibility into
multiple abstract forms. This is an important structural difference from other
markets which will remain materially more space-tied.i"
Financial markets have been more sensitive to globalising
technological advances in communication, which have increased the inherent
mobility and volatility of capital. P Cerny has described the "dynamics of
financial Globalization", stressing the importance of technology as a structural
element of financial world markers.l'' Accordingly, he argues that
"the most important single independent variable in understanding the
structural significance of financial globalization is neither the changing
political context in which globalization is taking place nor the simple
expansion of transnational market processes (and capital mobility) taken in
isolation. What is central to understanding financial globalization is the
changing infrastructure - especially the technological infrastructure - of the
economic-institutional system within which not only financial exchanges but
economic processes in general are taking place in the world today"."
Due to the abstract nature of finance and thanks to technological
advances in telecommunication, trading in financial instruments has become
instantaneous, defying space-time localisation. Globalization, understood as
space-time contraction, is a structural characteristic of the financial world
29 See Bauman who stresses that investors and shareholders are less space-tied
than workers, in op. cit. note 22. P Cerny, "The dynamics of financial globalization:
Technology, market structure, and policy response", (1994), 27,Policy Sciences, 319.
30 P Cerny, ibid.
31 ibid, at p 325. P Cerny's overemphasis of the technological dimension of financial
globalization is controversial as it seems to overshadow the power stakes and
symbolic dimension of globalization, which, he also stresses, depends on political
impetus. The technological dimension is not the only factor but it is particularly
important as regards global financial markets.
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market. However, markets are not natural systems but institutional structures
dependent on political will. Hence, capital mobility is also connected to the
deregulation of financial markets since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
system in the early seventies and the extensive implementation of neo-liberal
policies in the eighties.F Financial globalization is the result of both
technological developments and political responses to the economic crises of
the 1970s.
The corollary to financial globalization has been identified as the
diminished ability for national states to direct domestic economic policy.33
The volatility of financial markets has had an impact on the stability of
national economy, illustrating both the increasing autonomy of the financial
sphere from direct regulatory intervention and its great influence on the
remaining economic and social contexts. The paradox of financial
globalization is on the one hand, its implementation at national policy level,
and its disempowering and de-Iegitimising effect on the Modem National
State. Nowhere more than in the financial sphere has globalization become the
self-fulfilling prophecy of Neo-liberalism. The power of the quite simple and
organisational process of financial globalization is visible in its impact on the
rest of the economy, society and the social sciences. Globalization is after all a
microcosmic phenomenon which has had repercussions in most fields of
human life and understanding. How could the power in world finance be
better illustrated?
32 See P Cerny, ibid.; Hirst and Thompson op. cit. note 28, and for account of
situation in France see CA Michalet in J H Dunning (ed), Governments, Globalization
and International Business, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp 311-333.
33In economic and political economy analyses of globalization, the opposition is often
made between the nation- state and global markets, and between Welfare national
policies and neo-liberal de-regulation of the world economy. See for instance, the
importance of this dialectical tension reflected in the title States against markets, The
Limits of Globalization, Boyer, Drache (eds), Routledge, London 1996. See also S Gill
who opposes neo-liberal and globalising capitalism to State capitalism in Global
Transformation, Y Sakamoto (ed), UN University Press, Tokyo, 1994.
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So what of the trust and Fiducie ? The trust device has certainly
contributed to financial globalizationr" Both the Convention, and the later Bill
intervene at a point when the volatility of financial markets have engendered a
general feeling of instability and legitimisation crisis at the level of national
economic and political structures. This diffuse and unspecific experience of
instability generates political opportunities for those who have benefited from
financial globalization and the spread of global legal structures of financial
delocalisation.
2.2 Globalization and opportunities in national fields of power
Dezalay argues that the internationalization of economic and legal
relations has raised political and professional stakes at the national level, by
creating opportunities for those who have been so far marginalised in their
own national field of power, and who are able to benefit from international
developments:
" by shaking up the borders of markets and states, it [internationalization]
compels the redefinition of these arenas, and more specifically of their
interaction; thus it sets off a giant game of musical chairs which is also played
on the field of discourse about governance".35
Dezalay prefers to refer to internationalization of law and international
regulatory competition, rather than globalization. The former allows scope for
new strategies in national struggles, for those who have a foot in the
international field. International power struggles are played at the national
level and the stake is the position of the international elite in the national
34 See Oppetit, "Trust dans Ie droit du commerce international", Revue Critique de
Droit International Prive, Doctrine et Chroniques, 1973, 1, where the use of the trust in
the context of euro-bond transactions is stressed. See also Oakley (ed), op. cit. note
12.
35YDezalay, "Between the State, Law, and the Market: The Social and Professional
Stakes in the Construction and Definition of a Regulatory Arena", in Mac Cahery,
Bratton, Picciotto, Scott (eds), International Regulatory Competition and Coordination,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, at p 60.
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equilibrium of power. Globalization is used as a rhetoric tool by this
emerging international community of experts, to justify professional strategies
which should increase their power at the local level." Globalization would
legitimise internationalisation strategies which also promote the interests of
the new elite at the local level.
Dezalay focuses on internationalization as a social reality which opens
up opportunities at the national level. In tum, this process is accelerated and
consolidated by the local strategies of the professional elites which benefit the
most from the constitution of an international field. Internationalisation,
sustained by a globalization rhetoric, is in fact a "localised" process:
"a process of reconstitution of the internal power relationships of professional
classes, in which a rising business bourgeoisie has claimed a new privileged
position by investing in a new type of professional expertise"."
Internationalization is therefore both a random external process and a product
of national professional strategies of a new cosmopolitan elite who benefit
from a position at the interstices of the national and the international fields,
and between the state and the market. However, Dezalay tends to see
globalization as the result of the exporting of the American models of
economic governance and business lawyering, by and for a dominant (North-
American) global elite." This limited perspective seems to be rooted in post-
36 Dezalay, "Vers une Sociologie de l'lnternationalisation du champ de I'expertise: du
rnarche du droit a la politique du droit", Research Report commissioned by the French
Ministry of Justice and published in 1994.
37 J Mac Cahery, Introduction, in op. cit. note 35. The "internal" relationships are, for
Dezalay, French and the type of professional expertise may be new in terms of
French legal practice but, on the contrary, traditional in terms of many common law
~urisdictions.
8 This view is stated in op. cit. 36 but also in Marchands de Droit- La Restructuration
de I'ordre juridique international par las multinationales du drOit, Fayard, Paris, 1992.
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war fears of American colonization, also and paradoxically reflected in
Motulsky's doctrinal rejection of the truSt.39
Globalization, understood as a set of transformations in the financial
sector of the economy, resulting in real and experienced economic instability,
opens up the possibility of challenging existing power structures.
Globalization offers opportunities regarding, in Dezalay's own terms, the
restructuring of French national fields of power.
3. The Fiducie in the restructuring of French fields of power
In our view, globalization has roots in social and economic reality. It is
more than a mere rhetorical device subsumed under professional strategies of
Americanization of French law by a new legal elite. Dezalay's view according
to which" '[g]lobalization' offers an excuse or a banner for strategies of
symbolic imperialism", through which the American model of lawyering
would be imposed, leaves unexplored a further consequence of
globalization.t" Globalization offers specific as well as indeterminate
opportunities. The Hague Convention has been seized as an opportunity by a
sector of the French legal profession to push for an adaptation of the law to
their own professional needs and that of their international clientele." This is
part of a more general collective strategy to enhance the position of a new
legal elite in the national fields of expertise and regulation. Whether this
39 Motulsky's article, discussed in Chapter II, was written in 1948, just after the war,
when the reconstruction of Europe depended upon the american funds of the
Marshall plan.
40 Dezalay, op. cit. note 35 at p 80.
41 See Chapter I, Section I, pp 9-10. The research on behalf of practitioners as
regards the Fiducie started after the adoption of the Convention and with the 1992
deadline for the ratification in mind.The preamble refers to the necessity to introduce
the Fiducie before the convention is ratified. However, the ratification does not
necessitate the introduction of a trust-like institution. The convention is more likely an
opportunity for the introduction of such an institution.
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strategy is consciously formulated or the result of a concerted approach is
doubtful. It is the result of an emerging habitus, that is, an emerging logic of
practice adapted to dynamics of the legal field, in which practice is turned
toward the survival and promotion of professional interests.f
Dezalay identifies two types of political and professional struggles
currently occurring in France. The first places agents of political and economic
power as opponents in the field of economic regulation. The second and
parallel competition is a symbolic conflict of representations regarding the
proper means and ends of economic regulation. The agents who, in the latter
part of the twentieth century, have dominated the field of power in France are
the state technocracy. As a consequence, their instruments and views as to
proper government have been paradigmatic: the legislative and administrative
regulation of the economy has been the paradigm of economic government in
the twentieth century.
However, internationalization - or Globalization - has entailed a
restructuring of economies which weakened the position of the Welfare state
as an ideal and as an organisation.
" 'palace wars' both nourish and feed off the political battles provoked by a
process of internationalization which upsets the revenue redistribution
processes established by the welfare state to guarantee social peace. Thus,
international competition provides a convenient excuse to justify the
elimination of a wide range of regulations or of bureaucratic interventions ..".43
The important technocratic structure around the French interventionist state
has been challenged.
"[T]his state technocracy loses much of its politicallegitimacy ...it is not only
a regulatory model which is in crisis, it is also the credibility of those who
embody it".44
42 For a discussion of the notion of habitus see Chapter I, Section II, pp 36-38.
43 See Dezalay, op. cit. note 35, at p 81.
44ibid at p 83.
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New strategies of government and new types of expertise have come to the
fore. They are no longer centred around bureaucratic rule, but are inspired by
American legalism and central role of law and the lawyer in the regulatory
arena.45
Dezalay stresses the two levels of his analysis which address both the
competition between experts as producers of rule in the national "field" of
state power and in the international "field", and the competition as regards the
structures of production and legitimacy of regulation in the field of symbolic
power. His argument addresses several other "fields" where professional and
political struggles are played out; struggles occur in the field of legal expertise
at both national and international levels, but most importantly such turf wars
have an impact in the national field of state power, which is embodied as a
national regulatory space. It is regrettable that the structure and dynamics of
the international legal field is not explained by Dezalay, who simply refers to a
"cosmopoli tan technostructure". 46
According to this analysis, the international legal field stems from the
interactions between national legal fields and Dezalay does not explore the
possibility of global dynamics of legal fields, transcending the existing
international dimension of all national legal fields. A strict application of
Dezalay's approach to our domain would lead to the argument that the Fiducie
is the product of the hegemony of one national field - the American - over
another - the French - in the international legal arena. However, the Fiducie is
arguably the product of the "civilisation" of the trust, that is, the processing of
the trust in French civilian legal culture's own terms, The power of the
epistemic structures of less commercially dominant legal cultures, such as the
45 ibid.
46 po. cit. note 36.
210
French one, should not be underestimated.Y The Fiducie is not understood in
our analysis as the victory of one legal culture over another, but as a hybrid
borne out of power struggles at the interstices of national laws.
Dezalay's analysis in terms of fields must be situated with regard to P
Bourdieu's own socio-theoretical analysis of French law. Bourdieu addressed
law as an empirical object of study in a 1986 article, in which he defined his
understanding of the juridical field. 48 This field encompasses practices and
discourses which result from a specific logic of power, in which the main
stake is an official and legitimate exclusive right to state the law. The resource
over which a monopoly is claimed is the symbolic power of the legal text. The
struggle is played out between two types of agents: the theoretician and the
practitioner. For Bourdieu, the the judge is a practitioner as s/he is concerned
with the practical application of law. The role of the legal practitioners, which
in France is distinct from the judiciary, is not identified. Dezalay's work has
broadened Bourdieu's approach to include the practice of lawyers.
The societal significance of the juridical field can only be fully
appreciated by exploring its external relationship to other fields, in addition to
its internal dynamics. Hence, the object of Bourdieu's suggested analysis is
two-fold; the internal struggles within the juridical field on the one hand, and
the relation of the juridical field with the field of state power on the other.
47 Nor should it be overestimated. Professor P Legrand, for instance, argues that
within the European Union, there seems to be a tendency towards the colonisation of
the common law tradition through the typically civilian aim of creating a universal law
for Europe. The common law would find itself absorbed by the civilian tradition. See
paper given at the 1997 SPTL Annual Conference, at Warwick University, "Are
Civilians educable?".
48 "La Force du Droit", Actes de la Recherche en SCiences Sociales, vol 64, 1986, 3.
I have translated "champ juridique" as "juridical field" rather than legal field. This is
because Bourdieu's analysis defines this particular field as a site of discursive and
power struggles in which the stake is the absolute prerogative over the truth of law.
The object of the struggle is mainly symbolic and refers to the privileged position of
juridical dogmatiCS and the jurist as the oracle, the truth-teller. This is similar to the
dynamics of the juridical discourse, as defined in Chapter II.
211
Bourdieu's conception of law and the juridical field is almost Austinian and
overemphasises the symbolic authority of law as capital. Very little attention is
paid to the material or economic role of law. On the other hand, Dezalay
seems to focus solely on the economic and political power of law, which
seems to have been "commodified". The following interpretation bears these
analytical shortcomings in mind. It attempts to connect the symbolic juridical
force of law with the material and economic context of turf wars, so well
described by Dezalay.
On the bases of Bourdieu's and Dezalay's analyses of the
juridical/legal fields, the following describe this writer's own understanding of
the fields involved in the emergence of the Fiducie. The attempt to adopt the
trust in its adapted form as the Fiducie illustrates a change in the discursive
and power dynamics of the French juridical field. The possibility of such
change results from the opportunities opened up by the discursive construction
and phenomenological impact of globalization at the local level. We have seen
that these opportunities created by globalization are translated at the local
level by the possibility to act on the existing structure of the juridical field and
and its relation to the field of power. The term juridical should be understood
as it was defined in chapter II. As in Bourdieu's definition, the agents of the
juridical fields are struggling for the exclusive privilege of stating the law.
These agents comprise the academic jurist-logician and the practitioner. This
juridical field is in dialectical tension with what Dezalay calls the field of
(state) power. For our purposes, the field of power will be identified as the
governmental field. Its discursive and power dynamics are those of
Governmentality, as defined in chapter IV. It is the arena of confrontations
between diverse representations and rationalities of rule, and diverse agents of
government.
212
Section ITof this Chapter will locate the Fiducie in the current
dynamics of the French juridical field, connecting the epistemic force of the
juridical discourse of sovereignty to the structure of power of the juridical
field. Section illwill argue that the Fiducie also emerges from a restructuring
of the French field of Governmentality in the "context" of globalization.
SECTION II· GLOBAL TRUST IN THE FRENCH JURIDICAL
FIELD: THE FIDUCIE AND THE CHANGING FACE OF DOCTRINE
The argument here is that the movement from rejection to acceptance
of the trust, albeit as the Fiducie, results from changes in the French juridical
field. Chapter IThas explored the epistemic rejection of the trust and its
resurrection as the Fiducie. This paradoxical movement of rejection and
acceptance reflects non-discursive tensions in the French juridical field, that
is, tensions <?pposingagents and their own particular expertise in a particular
struggle over symbolic power. The first part of this section defines the double
dimension (discursive, and non-discursive) of the juridical field, and the
particular internal tensions that the introduction of the Fiducie has brought to
the fore. The second part explores the continuities and changes the new
Fiducie seems to point to in this confrontation of the French juridical field
with the global trust.
1. From discursive resistance to political overcoming: the Fiducie and
tensions in the French Juridical field
The fact that the introduction of the trust into French law, even in a
modified form, was for so long unthinkable, and that it suddenly became
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possible for French doctrine to accept (or at least to attempt to accept) the
Fiducie, is of significance. This opening up of French legal connaissances to
the trust may be a detail in contemporary legal history, but it indicates a
change or evolution in French law. However, this change does not result from
a spontaneous, systemic evolution of French legal knowledge. It is linked to
changes in the power of agents of legal expertise. The notion of juridical field,
which will be defined in the following developments, enables us to establish
the connection between epistemic change and power struggle between experts.
Bourdieu identifies the struggle within the closed universe of the
juridical field as a struggle over symbolic power." Symbolic power relies on
the intangible force exerted by the legal Text and its icons over those who are
captured in the discourse which supports such power. I would suggest that
juridical capital relies on the symbolic and discursive power of law as truth,
whereas legal capital is less discursively based and incorporates a vision of
law as instrument and practical resource. The existence of different types of
juridical/legal capital is recognised by Bourdieu, although the types are not
defined by him; the social/cultural capital of practitioners is distinguished
from that of the professors. Bourdieu also identifies the commercial stakes
involved in the constitution of a juridical field which results from the
establishment of a monopoly situation of legal experts over the production and
commercialisation of legal services. The overall respective weight of legal
formalism and legal pragmatism in a legal culture will depend on the relati ve
status in the juridical/legal field of the legal doctrine, as a body of agents, as
compared to that of the practitioners.
Dezalay's understanding of the legal/juridical field is much more
focused on the role of legal experts as private sector professional lawyers. It
49 Bourdieu, op. cit. note 48.
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seems that the notion of "legal" field is more appropriate to Dezalay's interest
in the role of the legal profession in the overall societal organisation of
economic governance. 50
It is argued here that professional legal expertise is becoming an
increasingly valuable social capital, opening doors of private economic power
structures as well as those of public governance. The struggle is less over
law's means of "legitimate symbolic violence" - as Bourdieu would put it 51 -
than over strategic positions of material power. However, securing a position
in the field of power depends also on symbolic production, that is, in the
constitution of representations wielding symbolic power
The French field of law, where different types of legal expertise and
experts struggle and compete for a dominant position, is more juridical than
legal. This is well illustrated in the "internal" debates about the trust and its
necessary processing into the Fiducie,· the ascendancy of doctrinal principles
in the rejection of the trust and in the formulation of the Fiducie have been
highlighted in Chapter Il. The epistemological components of French law are
dominated by the mytho-logical role of doctrine, as a body of works and
men.52
The mytho-logical dimension of the French juridical field is supported
by other legal experts such as judges and professional lawyers. Indeed, it is
essential to the legitimacy of law, in which all lawyers need to invest.
However, as the debate about the Fiducie shows, there is a tension between
the doctrinal need to maintain the symbolic power of legal coherence and self-
sufficiency, and the more materially based practical knowledge of experts. The
50 At least in Dezalay's previously cited works, notes 35 and 36. See also, Dezalay,
Garth "Law, Lawyers and Social Capital: 'Rule of Law' versus Relational Capitalism",
Social and Legal Studies, vol 6 (1),1997,109-141.
51 B dl °our leu op. CIt., note 48.
52 On French legal doctrine see Jamin, Jestaz, "The entity of French doctrine: some
thoughts on the community of French legal writers", (1998), 18, 4, Legal Studies, 415.
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resistance to change, the conservative character of legal knowledge is a
necessary and logical aspect of the nature of the symbolic power in which law
is inscribed. Doctrine, as men and knowledge, has invested in the immutability
of law. On the other hand, legal practice, as men and knowledge, has based its
legitimacy on its responsiveness to the changing needs of the wider society.
On the one hand, the trust was rejected for as long as the doctrinal arguments
remained unchallenged. The increasing weight of international legal practice
in the French juridical field has allowed the slow and progressive questioning
of the dogmatic rejection of the trust. The constitution of the Fiducie as a
possible object of legal knowledge and as a possible element of French law
results from a change in the division of legal labour.
Empirical research supports the view according to which practical
knowledge is gaining unprecedented importance in the dynamics of the French
juridical field; practice and practitioners have gained symbolic authority with
the development of a new relationship between law professors and business
law firms.53 The Fiducie, it is argued, illustrates this evolution. The
importance of convergent research by various professional organisations of
legal, financial and business experts, and by young academics - particularly
with the work of C Witz - has been stressed elsewhere.i" This phenomenon
fits into a wider trend regarding the production of knowledge in the area of
commercial law .
Bancaud and Dezalay's empirical study argues that the
internationalization of law has undermined the traditional model of production
of commercial law doctrine, which was based on a rigid division of tasks
53 P Jestaz, "Declin de la Doctrine?", Droits, 1994, 20, 85. Bancaud, Dezalay, "Des
'Grands Pretres' du droit au marche de I'expertise juridique - Transformations
morphologiques et recomposition du champ des producteurs de doctrine en droit des
~lfaires", Revue Politiques et Management Public, vol 12, n 2, Juin 94, 203.
The work of Witz was acclaimed by professional research in the late 80s by private
business aSSOCiationsand the Council of Notaries. See Chapter I, Section I.
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between professionals and academics. The latter formed a body of full-time
and permanent professors who prided themselves in their autonomy from the
world of practice. They traditionally dominated the production of legal
knowledge. The emergence of a new breed of qualified professors-lawyers,
"avocats-agreges", is illustrative of a structural transformation in the field of
producers of doctrine, i.e. what we have called the juridical field.55
The authors show that big international law firms are currently
investing in the training of lawyers as well as in legal research and publication.
They also recruit young professors who combine their university (mainly
teaching) duties with in-house production of legal research oriented toward
international legal practice. This has an impact on the type of legal research
being produced as well as as the structures of legitimisation of law. There are
fewer theoretical works on fundamental and timeless legal concepts, and more
short and technical texts on the latest legal innovations. Doctrinal work tends
to become more obsolete. According to the authors, this has an impact on the
grounding of the authority of legal knowledge, which is increasingly assessed
on the basis of its relevance to business practice.
This state of affairs stands in stark contrast with the traditional view of
the incompatibility between legal practice and academic knowledge in the
French University system. Bancaud and Dezalay stress that it was usual for a
candidate to a lectureship in law at the prestigious Parisian universities to give
up any involvement in legal practicer" In fact, they gave up involvement in
"bread and butter" cases but would ensure a doctrinal input in landmark cases.
The autonomy from practice was never a reality. Renowned professors have
55 In France, it is possible to become a professor very early on in one's academic
career through the agregation, which is a state-run and nation-wide competition
selecting new professors solely on their academic skills and knowledge, quite
independently of publications and administrative management achievements.
56 . .op. CIt. note 53 at p 208.
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always had contacts in the business arena. These contacts were concretised by
consultancy work. The consultation, an argued opinion on a specific legal
issue, was expensively sold by academic lawyers. This was a way of trading
legal authority and symbolic power. The price for such abstract values
depended on the reputation in the juridical field of the professor concerned.
Such a cohesive and self-regulated doctrinal body has long been
undermined, particularly in the late 60s with the reform of the hierarchical and
disciplinary university structure.The monopoly of university professors over
doctrinal production is long gone. The constitution of a new breed of lawyers-
professors attached to big business firms confirms this trend and exacerbates
the struggle to recover a dominant position in the juridical field. However,
Bancaud and Dezalay believe that the traditional "keepers of the temple" and
privileged places of production of.doctrinal knowledge have been definitively
marginalised. The connection through avocats-agreges of juridical/doctrinal
legal knowledge with the world of (international) legal practice is the
illustration, the result and the means of a reconstruction upon different bases
of "the networks of information and power which ground doctrinal
authori ty". 57
There is no empirical evidence of the role of avocats-agreges in the
genesis of the Fiducie. However, this new institution illustrates the
unprecedented status and influence of international legal practice. The latter
has gained more symbolic authority as practitioners have become more
involved in the production of doctrinal knowledge receptive to legal practice.
The Fiducie's very existence is linked to the fact that practical legal
knowledge has acquired a better status and a greater role in the juridical field's
division of labour.
57 op, cit. note 48.
218
2. Reembedding Trust: (Dis)continuities in the mytho-logical labour of
law
The notion of division of legal labour was posited by Bourdieu in his
1986 article and pursued by Dezalay. Bourdieu identifies on the one hand a
monopoly of lawyers over the work of interpretation of the Legal Text, and on
the other, a division between theoretical interpretation and practical
adaptation. This division corresponds to a symbolic struggle between two
types of interpreters, who embody different interests and approaches. There is,
however, a functional complementarity between these two types of
interpretation; theoretical interpretation ensures the legitimacy of law
. represented as an autonomous system of formal rationality; practical
interpretation, understood by Bourdieu as the result of judicial activity,
ensures that ~aw is adapted to reality and changing circumstances. However,
the legal effect of law in practice is :
"the result of a symbolic struggle between professionals with unequal social
and technical abilities who are therefore unable to use legal resources in an
equal way".58
The meaning and legal effect of a given rule at a given time reflect a
particular configuration of power relations between legal experts and
professionals, as well as between the clients they represent. Hence, the content
and impact of a legal rule are by-products of professional struggles regarding
legal/juridical capital. Such struggles no doubt echo client conflicts over
economic and symbolic capital.i" As an illustration of Bourdieu's point, it
could be argued for instance that the potency of the doctrinal rejection of the
58B dl °tour leu, op. CI • note 48, at p 9, (my translation).
S9 See Chapter I, note 54 for definition of capital.
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trust illustrates the dominant position of the orthodox jurist in the division of
legal labour, and the relative weakness of international business and
professional interests in the fields of power and law. This perspecti ve will be
further refined by looking at Dezalay's analysis.
Dezalay's chosen focus is on the production of legal expertise, which
consists of two categories of knowledge: academic knowledge or traditional
doctrinal knowledge and the practical expertise of business lawyers. Dezalay
observes a "revolution" in the French division of legal labour with a
restructuring of doctrinal work around the activity of the biggest and/or most
prestigious business law firms.60 The impact of the Anglo-American model of
legal education and the emerging importance of practical legal knowledge,
because of its direct involvement in regulation, are highlighted. The
importation of such a model into French legal organisation is the result of the
creation of a new class of international business lawyers who trained in France
and in the US and who have realised the professional advantages that would
result from recreating a structure similar to that of the Anglo-American
lawyer's rule. Dezalay notices a fundamental change in the ways in which
doctrinal authority is supported by new networks of information and power.
Doctrinal knowledge is not totally marginalised or instrumentalised. There is
still a mutual dependency between doctrine and legal practice:
"By investing in academic law, the big law firms secure their position in the
location where the law's Policy is defined. At the same time, for the
academics who have lost their privileged relationship with the field of
power .... , this coming together with new centres of power such as big
international law firms represents a second chance to build on different bases,
information and power networks founding doctrinal authority't."
60 Dezalay, op. cit. note 36, at pp 42-46, see above discussion.
61 ibid., at p 46, (my translation). I translated "Ia politique du droit" as "law's Policy".
The term policy should not be understood as a set of identifiable goals of intervention.
It is used in the sense of a rather abstract political problematic.
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The emergence of the Fiducie illustrates this change in the dynamics
of the division of legal labour. It could even be argued that one of the causes
of the attempt to introduce this new device is the outcome of a struggle to
reinforce the power of practitioners in the juridical field - although the main
stake is in the field of economic power, as will be argued next. The legitimacy
of the new Fiducie has been established in doctrinal terms thanks to the
emerging interaction between doctrine and business practice, as identified by
Dezalay and described above. The process of "reembedding" the trust into the
French legal system was partly successful because it confirms and feeds off
current changes as regards the division of labour in the juridical field and the
growing importance of international legal practice. Paradoxically, the limits of
the "revolution" in the French juridical field are also made clear with the
unchanging value given to mytho-Iogicallegal function.
The reference to the reembedding is borrowed from Giddens' analysis
of globalization as "the 'lifting out' [disembedding] of social relations from
local contexts of interaction and their restructuring [reembedding] across
indefinite spans of time-space't'''' Expert systems constitute one of the two
main disembedding mechanisms identified by Giddens.
The trust, through its diverse applications in international business and
financial transactions, can be said to have been 'disembedded'. Indeed, the
very usefulness of the trust in the contemporary context lies in the fact that its
basic conceptual fragmentation of rights allows, and always has allowed, the
restructuring of ownership across time and space. The global use of trust
exploits these two intangible resources of time and space, by lifting out
ownership from its national (fiscal) context. The trust operates a
"disembedding" of ownership relations and is also itself a disembedded
62 A Giddens, The Consequences of Modemity, 1990, Polity Press,Cambridge, at p
21.
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institution: A particular model of the trust has been adopted as a global
instrument in numerous off-shore jurisdictions. These jurisdictions have not
adopted Equity's trust as it has grown out of the common law tradition, but the
globalisable features of the disembedded trust.
The Hague Convention has formalised and formulated the
disembedded trust in its definition of a 'universal' and minimalist trust. The
construction of the Fiducie is a process of reembedding of the shapeless,
global trust. This process has a discursive dimension, that is, the epistemic
processing of the shapeless trust in French law's mytho-logical terms; the trust
must be modified and formulated according to the requirements of epistemic
legitimacy of French law.63 The non-discursive dimension of this process of
reembedding is the anchoring of trust as a system of expertise by generating
trust in legal experts. The Fiducie's aim is also to channel trust in the
jiduciaire's legal expertise by institutionalising trust and setting up a system of
legally protected and controlled relations. Legal safeguards are provided
against the risk of trusting. French law is called in to facilitate the operation of
a legal device by providing legal guarantees of the trustworthiness of the
experts involved. The beneficial by-product of reembedding the trust is a
consecration of the function of legal experts involved in fiduciary
management.
The reembedding of the trust was unsuccessful and our hypothesis is
that this failure is due to the loss of a fundamental advantage for international
trust practice: the division of ownership and its possible dissemination across
borders and time. Before beneficial ownership can be made to disappear for
business and fiscal purposes, it seems that, paradoxically, it must exist as a
legal concept. The disembedding of the trust and its reembedding in French
63 See discussion in Chapters II and III.
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juridical soil was fatal to this concept. Without beneficial ownership, the
Fiducie cannot compete with the trust in the global market for legal services.
On the basis of Dezalay' s work, it has been argued here that the
Fiducie is the product of international field battles; it is a stake in struggles for
influence in the national and international legal arenas. The "naturalization" of
the trust would have provided a tool for French lawyers to compete in the
international area, but also to reinforce their role in enhancing the position of
French law; the latter would have been brought up to date, through the
introduction of the Fiducie which would have also validated French law's
fundamental epistemic mechanisms.
Indeed, the attempted reembedding of the trust required an investment
in the mytho-logical power of law. The legitimating function and symbolic
power of law were thus consolidated. The investment of legal practice in the
area of doctrinal and legislative work of validation illustrates a "re-
legalization", a "restoration of the rule of law" which entails a valorisation of
preexisting epistemic functions of legitimisation." This is evidenced in the
case of the Fiducie by the importance attributed to the notion of absolute
ownership, the need to establish a genealogical link with Roman law and the
reassertion of nineteenth century principles.
Legitimisation remains an important function of the labour of law; this
function has not been totally "privati sed" and remains closely connected to the
workings of the state. It has been observed that "French doctrine remains a
power allied to Power, which gives form and life to the creation of the
latter ...".65 The "Power" referred to is that of the state and its administrative
machinery. The mytho-logical work of doctrine, whether accomplished by
64 See Dezalay op. cit. note 35. "Tosell legal services, they [legalexperts] are indeed
forced to invest in the legitimacyof law",at p 84.
65 op. cit. note 52 at p 428.
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academic jurists or business lawyers, is harnessed to a certain conception and
form of Power: that of the State. The increasing influence of private and
transnational economic interests that business lawyers may try to represent,
has not yet undermined the mythical figure of the State in French law.66
SECTION III· THE FIDUCIE AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE
FIELD OF GOVERNMENTALITY
One of the issues identified by Bourdieu in his attempt to define a
sociological approach is the problem of the position of the juridical field as
regards the field of power. It is related to the issue of the power of juridical
capital. Bourdieu does not define precisely the agents and logic of the field of
power. Dezalay, on the other hand, has specifically focused on the relation of
legal experts with State "technocrats", the latter being identified as the main
players in the French field of economic government and regulation."
This analysis in terms of field will be supplemented by Foucault's
conceptual innovations regarding Governmentality. This notion has been
explored in Chapters IV and V. As previously seen, Governmentality
crystallises both discursive and non-discursive aspects of government as a
form of power. As such it can be interpreted as a field, as understood by
Bourdieu, where symbolic representations and agents of power compete. The
juridical/legal field interacts with the field of Governmentality. Its position in
66 The "Sociologie Juridique du Patrimoine" , a 1995 report commissioned by the
Justice Department as part od the on-going work on the Fiducia, highlights the
attachment of practitioners to doctrinal principles and their reluctance as regards the
trust, Legal education in France is the main way through which the mythology of law is
perpetuated and incorporated in the habitus of the practitioners who will remain quite
powerless to challenge the mytho-Iogical power of doctrine. See discussion on the
principle of unity of patrimony in Chapter IV, Section II.
67 op. cit. note 35.
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the exercise of government as power is dependent on the outcome of two types
of interconnected struggles.
Firstly, the power struggles between lawyers and other agents of
government, of which the Fiducie is symptomatic, and the respective
technologies of government they support are examined. The prevalence of a
technology, and of its "technicians", depends on establishing the
representations and symbolic constructions upon which this technology is built
as paradigmatic. The second battle is thus one of representations and it will be
asked whether the Fiducie signifies the victory of a certain technology and its
accompanying societal model.
1. The Fiducie, the Globalization myth and competing representations of
. social spaces
As argued in the last section of the previous chapter, the notion of
globalization, although not specifically invoked, underlies the "policy" reasons
behind the 1992 Bill on the Fiducie.68 Globalization, as understood by the
promoters of the Bill, is not an entirely new notion as it seems to resurrect the
nineteenth century Liberal vision of Civil Society. As such, it does not incur
the risk of.rejection as a transplant from a foreign, newer body of knowledge.
By this is meant that the notion of globalization is comparable to the
traditional liberal construct of Civil Society and thus, is less likely than a
completely novel and culturally alien concept, to be rejected. The notion of
globalization is connected to the political culture which forms the backbone of
French legal savoir. However, it also is greatly influenced by economic and
68 A N. 2583. In the Preamble, it is said that there is a need for the Fiducie because of
the internationalisation of economic life; the opening up of borders has entailed a
drain on French business with the delocalisation of numerous activities. Chapter I,
Section I.
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financial representations of reality. This shows the growing importance in the
juridical field of a body of legal connaissances based on practice and
extremely sensitive to financial and economic rhetoric. As the notion of field
allows us to argue, the increasing influence of the mythology of globalization
in the field of French Governmentality reflects the expanding role of business
lawyers in the struggle for the power of government in France.
In one of the reports drafted by a sociological research unit and
commissioned by the French Ministry of Justice as part of the process of
drafting the 1992 Bill, it was argued that French law was slowly being
colonised by financial and management culture." The Fiducie is a response
to a demand based on an instrumental vision of law, according to which law's
legitimacy does not depend on its consistency as a system of self-sufficient
rules, but on its adequacy as a set of flexible instruments adapted to the needs
of reality. To the financial expert, this reality is globalization and the
challenges it sets to the inventive financial mind. Indeed, "the financial expert
would probably dream of a world without legal regulation, open only to his
imagination and only submitted to a deontology of which he would be the
master and expert".70 According to its legitimisation in policy terms, the
Fiducie fits the bill. As seen in previous chapters, it is aimed to provide a
light-weight framework for an institution to be shaped through its practical
application. One of the three main conceptual axes of the Bill are the legal
guarantees relating to the vaguely defined function of the fiduciaire. The Bill
seems to rely on the deontological self-regulation of the fiduciary function. It
thus grants the financial wish by validating a certain vision of law, which is
itself based on a certain vision of society. Such a vision has recently been
dominated by the globalization myth.
69 op. cit. note 66.
70ibid at p 94 (my translation).
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The myth of globalization is a counter-perspective, a negative ideal,
one which implicitly stands against a paradigmatic representation of society.
The economic discourse of globalization presupposes a society which
transcends the limits of the modem, territorially defined political and
economic unit of the State-governed society. The privileges of globalization
lie in mobility, "and mobility means the ability to escape and evade".71 What
is being evaded? National legal orders and their territorial confines. The
Fiducie fits into this logic of evasion, as the reaction of the fiscal
administration demonstrates. It allows the possibility to exploit off-shore
centres which are themselves organised as a negative mirror image of onshore
markets's regulatory restrictions.
The international and national legal orders are not contradictory but
mutually constitutive. Hirst and Thompson describe the process in the
following way:
''The rise of the modem state, as a territorially specific and politically
dominant power, .... [has] depended in part on international agreements. The
doctrine of the 'sovereignty' of states in the new international law and the
mutual recognition of their internal powers and rights by European states thus
played a central part in the creation of a new relationship between power and
territory, one of exclusive possession".72
The original impetus for this international constitution of the Modem State
was the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which was the first international
recognition of national sovereignty. Globalization stands in contrast to the
interdependent national and international legal constitution of state
sovereignty. It constitutes an anti-state ideal which is better anchored in
economic and market narrative, and which, nonetheless, is colonising French
legal discourse.
71 Z Bauman, op, cit. note 22, at p 125.
72Chapter 8, op. cit. note 28, at p172.
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This discursive tension is echoed in a competitive relation in the
French field of Governmentality between the State technocracy and the
emerging international and stateless epistemic community of business lawyers.
The mythical figure of the state is challenged as the established state
technocrats have to face the growing influence and legitimacy as lawyers as
brokers of rules and technologies of government.
2. The Fiducie or the victory of liberal legalism and business lawyers in
the French field of Governmentality?
Dezalay has demonstrated the connection between the international
restructuring of economies and the opportunity for the marginalised legal
professionals to regain lost ground in the field of national governance.f This
process of "recomposition of ruling elites" at the local level is accompanied by
changes in legitimating representations of society, as seen previously, and an
evolution as to the respective weight of technologies of economic government.
The latter constitute a central stake in the epistemic and power struggles
between technocrats and a new international legal elite.74 The Fiducie, it is
argued, can be understood in terms of such a struggle, although there is no
clear victory of one technique or one type of agent over the others.
Dezalay observes that in France and in most European countries, the
triumph of the Welfare State in the aftermath of the second world war has
confirmed the traditional marginalisation of lawyers in the area of economic
governance.P Moreover, this lack of power in politics also meant a loss of
73 op. cit., notes 35 and 36.
74 Dezalay mentions the report of the European Working Group on Corporate
Professionals, which highlighted that the competition between professionals is played
mainly in the area of the reworking of national and international regulatory institutions
and instruments, op. cit. note 36 at p 14.
75 "t 3op. CI "note 5, pp 69-76.
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influence in the area of private business as the role of intermediary between
the State and the private sphere was no longer held by lawyers but by a State
technocracy.
The ideology of neutrality which shapes the self-imagery of the French
legal profession - traditionally, the Bar - is rooted in the post-revolutionary
social composition and practice of this body of experts. This ideology
underlies the intention to establish a clear distance between the world of law
and that of business.
"Rejected by their peers, the lawyers who became interested in the business
world had no option but to join it officially by themselves becoming 'men of
affairs' ...they acted as intermediaries in commercial transactions which they
helped to 'put into legal form' but they remained rejects from the world who
were largely responsible for the the rise of the processes of self-regulation 'in
the shadow of the law' ".76
The French legal field is therefore historically marked by its marginalisation
from the field of economic and business power.
The economic field was placed in the hands of a trained administrative
elite. This state technocracy was constituted and trained independently from
the world of lawyers, and was destined to strengthen the hold of the state on
the economy and civil society. At the end of the nineteenth century,
"the creation of the Free School of Political Sciences (1872) demonstrates
that the most intellectual and dynamic la1ersof the ruling class also arekeeping remote from a world of law ...".7
The constitution of a 'state bourgeoisie' through the the elitist training of the
intellectual and urbane bourgeoisie into 'government professionals' was
intended to be the opposite of the corporatism and doctrinal traditionalism of
legal studies and career. However, the legitimacy of this emerging state
aristocracy was being built on the juridical model. Law maintained its
76 ibid at p 73, (So Picciotto's translation).
77 'b'dI I .
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legitimating function despite these transformations in the juridical field and in
the field of governmental power. This state technocracy's power and influence
is ensured through its intermediate position between law, administration and
business - or civil society.
"French-style planning perfectly illustrates this close interaction between the
state and the economy where the legitimacy of the state nobility depends on its
ability to handle the technological advances which underpin social
progress"."
The singularity of French economic government reflects indeed the
domination of a State technocracy in the field of Governmentality. The role of
the state in economic management is deep-rooted and finds its origins in the
seventeenth century.
Indeed, the hold of the of the state on economic management has been
characterised as "Colbertist", because of its historical roots in this seventeenth
century royal minister's policies. Michalet has summarised the Colbertist
approach as follows:
''The Colbertist conception assigns a preeminent role to the state in the
formulation and implementation of industrial policy ...The French model fits
quite well with the 'hierarchical-capitalism' type ...what makes the French case
so special is that in the areas of economics, industry and finance effective
power is in the hands of an elite produced by the competitions held by the
upper-echelon administration and the engineering schools. Technocrats head
the major departments of the ministries, which is what they were recruited for,
but they are also in charge of the large enterprises and the major banks".79
The contemporary position of the state technocracy has to be
understood in the context of nearly 30 post-war years of striving for economic
self-sufficiency through state planning. During this time, the state technocracy
was a legitimate guarantor of economic stability and a main player in the field
of government and economic power. But from the early eighties, the situation
78 ibid, P 75.
79C-A Michalet in Governments, Globalization and International Business, Chapter
10, in op. cit. note 27. The following developments are based on Michalet's views.
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evolved to reveal a weakening of the paradigmatic model of government and
of its elite.
From the 1960s to the early eighties, French economic policy was
characterised by a general strategy of independence and the will to build a
self-reliant economy through a productivist approach sustained by a strong
national industrial system. Export performance was less important than
controlling external constraints and maintaining monetary stability. Hence,
foreign investment was viewed with suspicion and French investment abroad
was discouraged.
Economic policy objectives were assigned to the State and a large
public sector, large industrial projects and a high level of public spending were
the main policy tools. "The industrial priority reflected the concerns of the
technocratic elite, keen to secure independence ...".80 The model of economic
government which dominated during this period echoed the strategies of
professional power of the ruling elite of the time. The threat to this model,
entailed by the growing necessity for the French economy to open up,
represented also a threat to the structure of power within the field of
Governmentality.
The current period, which started in 1982, a year after the socialist F
Mitterrand's electoral victory, is characterised by a
"weakening of the economic role of the state ....evident at two levels: first, in
the economic orthodoxy adopted from mid-1982 onwards, which no longer
tolerated the state interventionism that had characterized the previous period;
and, secondly, in a shift in industrial initiative from the state to business as a
consequence of the great upsurge of French investment abroad and the
increased presence of foreign enterprises"."
A (neo)liberal model was to be preferred to the Colbertist tradition, as
a result of the increasing importance of French investment abroad and the
80 ibidI I •at p 315.
81 ibidI I •at p 320,
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associated need to attract foreign investment. In 1992, the year of the Bill,
French investment abroad reached 18 percent of the world total. In the same
year an official document was published advertising "Seven Reasons to Invest
in France". Economic liberalization was thus a well-established promotional
vehicle. There seems to be a long-lasting change in the structure of French
government as "[s]uccessive governments, regardless of their ideological
orientation, repeat that there is only one possible economic policy".82
The weakening of this French model of capitalism has also entailed a
weakening of the technocratic elite on which the legitimacy, performance and
very functioning of the Colbertist style of government relied. It is difficult to
determine which one of these two phenomena came first, or whether one
caused the other. There is no doubt that the two are interconnected. The
challenge to the model of government and to its ruling elite within the field of
Governmentality is rooted in international or global phenomena and its
weakening of national structures of power. It allows emerging international
elites, who have a foot in both the international field constituted by
international business, and in the French national field of Governmentality, to
seize the opportunity to challenge from within existing structures of power.
Thus, the Colbertist model of government, with its reliance on bureaucratic
rule, has been challenged by liberal legalism, advocated by a new legal elite
supporting and supported by the needs of international business.
The experts involved in this recomposition of the French field of
governmental power bring with them institutions and technologies with which
they identify and "which they have helped to produce, and which define their
means of intervention and their status in the power hierarchies'V" The Fiducie
82ibid., at p 331.
83 Dezalay, op. cit., note 35 at p 77.
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is such an institution, caught in the competition between technologies of
power in the context of opportunities created by globalization.
This chapter's purpose has been to demonstrate how the discursive
phenomena linked to the problematic translation of the trust into the Fiducie
(described in Chapters Il and ill, and IV and V), are connected to power
struggles in the French juridical field, themselves directly implicated in
changes in the French field of governmental power. The Fiducie is not simply
the expression of a systemic adaptation of French law and legal knowledge to
global change. It is the symptomatic outcome of the emergence of a new elite
of lawyers who has exploited the opportunities triggered by the
discursive and non-discursive development of globalization. However the
introduction of the Fiducie was so problematic that the 1992 Bill failed,
leaving a number of questions open as regards the real winners of the battles
described above. Why this should have been the outcome is considered further
in the Conclusion.
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CONCLUSION
EPILOGUE OR EPITAPH?
It is hoped that this study has contributed to an understanding of
French legal culture's epistemic processes and their social milieus, through the
specific angle of its confrontation with the common law (and global) trust; the
result of this confrontation was the 1992 Bill's Fiducie. The Fiducie
crystallises a moment of change in the conflictual discursive and power
dynamics of French legal culture. These dynamics are two-fold.
In the first place, the Fiducie illustrates the necessity for practical legal
knowledge to combat doctrinal resistance against the trust. But this struggle
must be conducted according to the rules of the juridical discourse of
sovereignty. The trust must be reformulated into a new institution which fits
into the mythology of the juridical discourse of sovereignty. Absolute
ownership is an important figure in this mythology and cannot be dismissed or
disregarded. Its symbolic power is such that the Fiducie could be envisaged
only if it did not reproduce the dual ownership structure of the trust. Strict law
conceptualisations of ownership were both an obstacle against and a means to
the establishment of a new form of knowledge stemming from international
legal practice. The epistemic tension described above echoes the struggle
between "the Keepers of the Temple" and the "Merchants of law", as Dezalay
would put it, for the ultimate authority and legitimacy of law's "symbolic
violence", With the Fiducie, the stake was the acceptance by French legal
culture of an instrument which would allow the emerging French international
legal elite to compete in the global legal arena and gain more economic power.
This goal was not achieved and the weight of doctrinal orthodoxy still seems
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overwhelming. But the emerging economic power linked to international legal
practice has an impact on doctrinal production.
Dezalay observes:
"To rekindle with the merchants, and become (again) the great brokers of the
business world, the 'high priests of the law' must accept a radical questioning
of their ideals and modes of functioning which goes well beyond mere textual
refurbishment". 1
Paradoxically, the Fiducie seems to reinforce the ascendancy of the juridical
discourse of sovereignty but it also indicates that the pressures from a new
legal elite and their knowledge cannot be and are not ignored. There is a will
to accommodate this new knowledge which may lead to deep changes within
the juridical discourse of sovereignty.
Changes in the juridical/legal field are therefore connected to the
second level of powerlknowledge dynamics, that is, those of Governmentality.
Indeed, it is because the international legal elite is gaining power in the field
of economic government, which we have called the field of Governmentality,
that the terms according to which the "Temple" of law must be guarded are
changing. It has been argued that the rejection of the trust and the regulation of
the Fiducie, particularly regarding its fiscal aspect, were both heavily
influenced by the imperative of surveillance in French legal culture.
Fragmentation and concealment of ownership were not allowed by the 1992
Bill which seemed to reflect a bureaucratic impulse to firmly place any
potential Fiducie user into a grid of visibility. However, the Fiducie also
reflected a contradictory tension towards a more liberal problematic. Indeed,
the Fiducie sought to provide a minimalistic framework for the recognition
and organisation of a new area of transactional freedom. As a whole, the Bill
reflected the liberal doubt about the possibility of economic sovereignty, in
1Dezalay, Marchands de Droit, Fayard, Paris, 1992, at p 19, (my translation).
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particular as regards its overall rationale based on the discourse of
globalization, just emerging at the time. Indeed, the introduction of the
Fiducie was justified on the basis of the changing needs of the legal profession
in the face of the internationalisation of the economy and the competition with
other jurisdictions for legal business. But the power of such argumentation
only reflects and consolidates that of those it benefits: the international legal
experts.
The Fiducie fits into the liberal legalist rhetoric which favours
technologies of government wielded by experts such as fund managers. It was
intended to be a new contractual structure, offering new opportunities for
businesses wishing to avoid the rigidities of the regulations governing
corporations. It would have gone beyond the avoidance of bureaucratic
constraints by allowing contractual self-regulation. It would have been more
like a contract for the provision of a service, than one for the transfer of
ownership.i As such, it would have put thefiduciaire, likely to be a lawyer
with extensive commercial and financial experience, at the forefront of the
fund management activity. The latter is likely to become the most profitable
and stable activity of developed economies.
In many ways, the Fiducie illustrates the emerging power in the
governmental field, as well as in the juridical/legal field, of a new epistemic
community of business lawyers. It also highlights the limits of such
emergence. Indeed, the Bill failed. This failure seems to signal the complex
nature of the struggles involving legal entrepreneurs, technocrats and
professors. Moreover, it may be that these agents at times work together rather
than against each other.
2 Benabent, "La Fiducie-Analyse d'un projet de loi lacunaire", JCP (N), 26, 1993, 275.
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The reason for the failure of the 1992 Bill can be attributed to its fiscal
regulation as well as to the fact that it lacked the dual ownership of trust.
Without this and the possibilities of fragmentation and concealment it entails,
the Fiducie cannot compete with the trust; indeed, this division of rights is
functionally essential to the international/offshore applications of the trust. We
have argued that it is in the perspective of such competition and of the rewards
it entails for the emerging international elite, that the Bill was introduced.
Why, within this perspective was the Bill unsuccessful? Two possible
responses, which are not mutually exclusive, can be envisaged.
First, the Bill was unsuccessful as it did not manage to reproduce the
trust. In tum, this could be explained by the fact that the emerging
international elite in question does not benefit from an esprit de corps which
would enable it to mobilise itself and act in a concerted fashion when an
opportunity, such as the Fiducie, arises. The latter's chequered history seems
to demonstrate that the emerging cosmopolitan legal elite in France does not
as yet form a collective entity bound together by a defined and established
habitus which could sustain a strategy of collective and professional self-
promotion. The impact of legal studies on the habitus of French lawyers
remains considerable. Indeed, the ascendancy of doctrinal principles such as
absolute ownership demonstrates the hold of legal mythology on legal practice
and practitioners.
Itmay be then, and it is the second proposed reason for the failure of
the Bill, that this legal mythology needs to change from "within", abandoning
absolute ownership as an ideal, rather than compromising the very functioning
of myth by allowing it to be ignored or violated. This fundamental
modification within legal mythology would have to be performed by those
with sufficient discursive authority within the epistemic tradition, but with
237
also a stake in such change. The avocat-agrege with one foot in academia and
the other in practice, would be the right type of agent to influence legal
mythology in favour of legal practice. Indeed, one such avocat-agrege has, in
a seemingly orthodox thesis, proposed to challenge absolute ownership with
the concept of economic ownership; this concept could "contribute to the
enriching and even the renewal of the [French] jurists's vision of property
rights't.'
G Blanluet observes that "the notion of economic ownership is starting
to emerge in French private law and particularly in tax law".4 This new
concept is defined as:
"the relation of a legal subject to an asset of which he is not legally the owner;
this relation, in the first place, results from a contract between this subject and
the legal owner, and in the second place, grants him exclusive beneficial rights
as regards the totality of the economic substance of the asset".s
This new notion of economic ownership is described as a general conceptual
tool intended to reflect the reality of various legal situations, including that of
the beneficiary of the Fiducie. Thus, French legal doctrine is starting to
formulate the notion of beneficial ownership necessary to the introduction of
an effective Fiducie. This is a sure sign that "high priests", described by
Dezalay, are more than ever willing to accept a radical questioning of the
ideal of absolute ownership and pave the way for a successful reception of the
trust's divided ownership structure.
3 G Blanluet, Essai sur la notion de propriete economique en droit priv9 fran9ais,
Recherches au confluent du droit fiscal et du droit civil, Thesis, Paris II, 1998. Extract
of the abstract,( my translation).
4 ibid.
S ibid., (my translation).
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EXPOSE DES MOTIFS
MESOAMES. MESSIElJRS.
Le code civil ne connait pas dinstituuon analogue au -trusr- des
pays de droit anglo-americain qui perrnette :i une personne. le
constituaru, de transferer la proprictc de biens lui appartenant a un
-trustee-, avec mission de les administrer, non dans I'interet propre
de ce trustee mais dans celui de beneficiaires designes a l'ucte. La
particularite essentielle de ce mecanisme est que les biens mis en trust
constituent une forme de patrimoine d'utfectarton. insaisissable par les
crcanciers personnels du trustee comme par ceux du consrituant.
Certains palS de .tradition rornano-germunique, la Repubhque relic·
rule d 'Allemagne, le Luxembourg, Ia Suisse notarnmenr, parvienncnt
il un resultat voisin avec la pratique, consacree soit par la jurispru-
dencevsoit par la loi, des contrats fiduciuires.
L'internationalisation de 13 vic economique a conduit les prati-
ciens du droit francais a se familiariser avec ceue pratique et a en
apprecier I'utilite, dans la vie des affuires comme dans 13 gestion et la
transmission de patrimoines prives.
L'ouvcrture des trontieres pcut ccpcndurn [air c cruindre une de-
localisation des operations economiques vcrs des pays plus attrayunts
d'un point de vue' fiscal cornme dun point de vue juridique. Au
cours de ces ,dernieres annees, en effet, on a pu constater que les en-
treprises fr3n~aises, lorsque Ie hesoin s'en faisait sentir, n'hesitaiel1t
pas a utiliser Ie mecanisme du trust, en crfcctuant, en toute legalite,
leurs operations juridiqu'CS dans des Etats connaissant I'institution.
La pratique du trust cst aujourd'hui d'une utilisation si fre·
quente qu.'um: .convention internationale sur Ics effets internationaux
des trusts et leur reconnaissance- a ete elaboree dans Ie cadre de la
conference de La Haye et ouverte a la ratification Ie 25 juillet 1985.
La France, soucieuse notamment de mieux resoudre les pro-
blemes de droit international prive qui sc posent lorsque les juridic-
tions fran<iaises sont confrantees a un trust comportant un element
fran<iais, a participe a I'elaboration de celie convention et I'a signee.
A ce jour, celie convention a etc ratifice par trois Etats, Ie Royaume-
Uni, I'ltalie c:t l'Australie, et est entree en vigueur entre eux Ie
lor janvier 1992. L'autorisation de 1a ratifier ne pourra etre deman- ,
dee au Parlement que lorsque notre droit positif se sera effectivement
enrichi de I'introduction du contrat de fiducie.
Le prajet de loi se compose de qllatre chapitres, consacres res.
pectivement aux dispositions generales. aux dispositions comptahles,
aux dispositions [bcale, et it des dispositions diverses.
APPENDIX
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Chapitre premier - Dispositions generales
Le chapitre premier du projet formera au livre troisieme du
code civil relatif -aux differentes manieres dont on acquiert la
propriete- un titre XVI bis intitule -De la fiducie-. II fixe les regles de
base applicahles a taus les cant rats de fiducie, quel qu'en soit I'objet.
La fiducie est definie comme «un corurat par lequel un constituant
transfere tout au partie de ses biens cI droits 11un fiduciaire, a charge
pour celui-ci d'agir, dans un hut determine, au profit de beneficiaires,
Le consrituunt peut etre beneficiair e •.
Le "mjet ne pn!c'i,c que I,,, i""'lIcularitcs propres de ce contrat
qui sera, s'il ncn est dispose uurrcmcnt, soumis aux principes gene-
raux du droit des obligations. La Iiducie doit en effet s'Iniegrer dans
I'ordre juridique preexistant. dont elle ne saurait bouleverser la
coherence.
I -Us parties
Le contrat de fiducie est passe entre un constituant et un fidu-
ciairc. Le au les beneficia ires du contrru ne sent pas parties il celui-ci.
II est admis que Ie consuruunt peut Iuirc une Iiducie il son profit ct
eire par consequent Ie beneficiuire.
En ce qui concerne Ies hencfici,,;re>, Ie contrut peut les designer
de fat,:on precise au prevoir seulement les regles de leur designation.
Lorsqu'il s'agit d'une fiducie ayallt pour ohjet la transmission de
hiens au droits II des bcnc!fki"ires "utre~ que Ie cOllstituant, I'indica-
tion de ces beneflciaires, au moment de la signature du contrat au
ulterieurement, ne peut plus etre modifice par Ie constituanl. II est
indifferent que ces Ileneficiaires aient au non accepte la transmission
decidce en leur faveur. Celie regie, qui devrait permettre d'identifier
plus aisement Ie rcdevable de I'impot, se justifie par Ie fait que les
biens transmis sortent definitivement <lu patrimoine du constituant des
la signature <lu contrat.
Le fiduciaire, pivot de I'institution, peut etre une personne phy-
sique au une personne morale. II ne doit pas avoir subi certaines
eondamnations penales ou <lisciplinaires, qui feraient suspecter sa
capacitc a gerer des biens pour Ie compte d'autrui au qui seraient
incompatibles avec la con fiance que Ie constituant place en lui. Celie
confiance exige que Ie fiduciaire exerce personnellement sa mission,
sous reserve d'une faculte de delegation pour des taches ponctuelles
il des personnes placees sous son autoritc. Le mot fiducie, derive du
mot latin fides - qui signifie la confial1<.:e comme Ie mot anglais trust -
rappclle que la con fiance nccessaire entre Ies contr:lI:tants est inhe-
rente II ct! <.:ontral.
EnCin, si les activites que Ie fidudaire est appelc il exer<.:er en
celie qualite sont reglementees, Ie fiduciaire est soumis it celie regie-
mentation,
Elles sont au nombre de six et concernent :
1° L'mdication des biens et droits transferes.
A cet egard, il convient de preciser que la fiducie ne transfere
pas une universalite avec une masse active et une masse passive mais
seulernent des acrifs.
2° La mission du Iiducuurc ct lercuduc d~ ~(;~pouvoirs.
La mission du fiduciaire constitue Ia cause du conrrat, son mo-
bile en quelque sorte. Celie mission pourra etre de conserver les biens
it. titre de garantie, d'agir au mieux des inlerels pecuniaires d'un
mineur, de proceder dans les meilleurs conditions it. la transmission de
I'entreprise confiee en fiducie,
La definition de la mission, terrne souvent repris dans Ie projet
(articles 2064, 2070), perrneura au juge d'apprecier plus commode-
men I la responsabilite du fiduciaire en verifiant que les acres qu'it
accornplit sunt bien cunforrncs ~I cctt c mission.
Quant 11I'etendue des pouvoirs du fiduciuire, die devra etre
precisee dans Ie contrat puisqu'elte est laissee ilia tibcrte des parties.
3° La designation des beneficiaires ou les regles de leur desi-
gnation.
Le fiduciaire, bien que proprietaire, gere les bien, irunsferes non
pas dans son interet mais dans celui des beneficiaires. II est donc
necessaire que Ie contrat perrneue d'identifier ces beneficia ires.
4° Le sort des biens it. I'issue du contrat.
II s'agit d'une information esseruielle, ne serait-ce que pour
['npplication du dispositif fiscal, qui prevoit un regime differencie, en
matiere de droits d'enregistrement, selon que les biens reviennent au
constituant en fin de contrat ou sont allrihues a des tiers heneficiaires.
5° La du~ee, limitee a 99 ans.
En droit anglais, Ie trust ne peut exceder 80 ans ou la duree de
vie de I'une des personnes mentionnees it I'acte, a laquelle on ajou-
tera 21 ans apres son deces. L'idee est qu'j) ne faut pas favoriser Ie
gel des patrimoines pendant une dun!e qui excederait deux gene-
rations.
6° La forme du contr:.l.
Lc contrat est passe par eerie S'agissant d'une operation com-
plexe, la preuve en est ainsi plus aisement rapportee. De plus, lorsque
la fiducie est conclut: 11 de, fins dt: transmission 11 titre! graluil, Ie
contrat doit etre passe en la forme authentique.
III - ()objet du contrat
L 'objet du contrat est un transfert de biens ou droits, accom-
pagne d'une mission de gestion ou d'administration definie dans Ie
contrat. Les biens transferes vont former un cpatrimoine separe.,
distinct du patrimoine personnel du fiduciaire. Les biens ne poul"ront
etre sa isis ni par les creanciers du constituant, ni par ceux, personnels,
du fiduciaire. II s'agll done d'un patrimoinc o·af(",tation. C't:st I'ori-
ginalite essentidle d" ee nouveau contrat qUI peut etre conclu aux
fins les plus diverses, regroupees generalement autour de trois
fonctions. celles de gestion, de surete et de IibCralites.
C'cst sans doute en matiere de gestion ou de surele que le~
utilisations les plus nombreuses sont allendues. Le recours a la fiducie:
permellra bien souvent d'cviter de recourir it des institutions juri-
diques plus formalistes ou a des montages complexes et fragiles.
Elle constituera un cadre juridique ada pte 11 des operations.
telles It: portage ou la mise en pension de lilrcs. qui n'onl pas il Ce!
jour re<;u de definition legale.
IV - Protection des creanciers
Le projet ne prevoit pas de puhlicite specifique au contrat de
fiducie. Pour les biens dont la mutation esl soumise II publicite, cellJ!-
ci se fera selon Ie droit commun au nom du fiduciaire es-qualite.s.
Celui-ci cst repute, vis-ii-vis des tiers de bonne foi, disposer des
pouvoirs les plus etendus sur les biens transferes.
Les creanciers du constilUant qui seraient leses par Ie transfert
en fiducie des biens de leur dcbiteur pourront recourir a ('action pau-
lienne de I'article 1167 du code civil qui, selon la jurisprudence de la
Cour de cassation favorable ala victime de la fraude, n'exige pas que
Ie creancier apporte la preuve de la mauvaise foi de son debiteur. lis
pourront egalement faire annuler Ie contrat lorsqu'il aura ctc passe
pendant la periode qui separe la date de la cessation des paiements de
celie de I'ouverture d'une procedure collective. L'article 107 de la loi
du 25 janvier 1985 relative au redressement et a la liquidation judi-
ciaires des entreprises est amenage pour faciliter Ie succes de celie
action. I
v - Protection des herltfcrs rescrvataires
La fiducie trouveru dans le domaiuc de Ia truusrnission du
patrimoine il titre gratuit de nornbreuses occasions de s'uppliquer.
Un consuruaru pourra, par exemple, prevail' qu'a compier lie
son deces un de ses biens sera affecre au service d'ullc rente it son
conjoint survivunt. La fiducie pourra egulerncnr etre urilisce en ma-
tiere de transmission d'entreprise dans le cas ou Ie dirigeunt qui sou-
haite se decharger de la gestion de celle-ci ignore quel sera l'heritier
Ie plus apte it reprendre,
Afin d'offrir une plus grande souplesse en ce domaine, Ie projet
de loi perrnet de subordonner les effets de la fiducie au deces du
consrituunt. Ce Iaisaru, Ie texte deroge expressernent it trois principes
enouces par Ic code civil: interdiction des donations 11cause de mort
(article XCHdu code civil). des subsurutions (urucle X'JI,.Iu L'll,it: civ il)
et des pactes sur successions futures (article IDo du cudv (1\ "I,
Toutefois. dans ce domaine cornme dans les autres, la fiducie ne
saurait consumer un instrument a I'dfel de cuntourner les reglcs
d'ordre public: la fidude s'insere done dans It: droil des successions
et des liberaliles sans en modifier I'ordonnaneement. C'esl pourquoi
Ie projet de loi prevoil que la fiducie ne peut en aucun cas porter
atleinte aux droits des heriticrs reservataires.
En consequence, ces derniers pourronl. des lors quc Ie contrat
de fiducie ponerait attcintc: a I" rc,cr\'c. agir cn reduction ufin d't!tre
remplis de leurs droils. Celie action pourra tendre 11reconstituer la
reserve face a des liberalites qui pourraient "entamer. Tel pourrait
eire Ic cas lorsque Ie contral de fidueic a pour objet la transmission
de biens ou droils a titre gratuit au lorsqu'il est conclu 11des fins de
gcstion el que les biens n'ont vocation il n:integrer Ie patrimoine
suecesssoral qu'en fin de contrat.
Quelques amenagements ont neanmoins ete neecssaircs pour
lenir compte du caractere triangulaire dc la.fiducie, qui n'opere pas
de transfert immediat de biens au beneficia ire.
Ainsi, Ie defendeur a I'action en reduction inlentee par Ics reser-
vataires sera Ie beneficia ire du contrat de fiducie lorsque Ie contrat
aura opere transmission des biens el droits a son profit, ou Ie fidu-
ciaire si cette transmission n'a pas encore eu lieu ou en cas de fiducie
geslion.
De meme, Ie lexle a prevu les modalites d'applicalion des ar-
ticles concernant Ie calcul de la reserve et de la quotite disponible
(article 922 du cooc civil) ella reduction des liberaliles (article 925
du code civil) s'agissant de la fiducic.
Toujours dans Ie soud d'ecarler lOUie atleinle aux droils des
heriliers reservataires, Ie texle n ehoisi de ne pas deroger au principe
general selon lequel la reduction se rait en nalure.
Neanmoins, une derogation a cctle reglc est prevue lorsquc It:
contral de fiducie porte sur Ie transferl a un fiduciaire d'une entrc-
prise individuelle a. caraclere industriel, commercial, artisanal, agri-
cole ou liberal, ou de parts ou actions de societe ayant I'un de ces
'objels. Ceue exception vise il faciliter In Iransmission des entrepriscs,
laquelle se trouverait fortemcnt compromise par I'action des hCritiers
reservataires si ceux-ci pouvaienl demander la reintegration dans
I'actif successoral de I'enlrcprise elle-meme et non simplemenl d'un
droit de creance representatif de la valeur de celle-ci.
VI - Controle juridictionnel
Des droits concurrents sur un meme patrimoine Iiduciaire
conduisent a organiser, ell cas de conflit, un arbitruge entre eux. Cet
arbitrage ne peut eire it levidcnce que juridicuonnel.
10 Responsabilite du fiduciaire.
Ainsi, en cas de munquements graves du fiduciaire il ses devoirs,
Ie juge pourra etre saisi par les beneficiaires ou Ie constituant. Le
projet lui donne Ie pouvoir de :
- designer un administrateur provisoire ;
- rem placer Ie fiduciaire ;
- rnettre fin a la Iiducie.
II faut noter que le texte prevoit une incriminariun penale
specifique, qui vise l'usage contraire a !'interet des beneficiuires ou il
des fins person nelles, par un fiduciaire de mauvaise foi, des biens
transmis en fiducie.
20 Modification et fin du contrat.
Le projet renvoie aux articles 900-1 il 900-8 du code civil afin de
permettre au juge de modifier le contrat lorsque l'execution de celui-
ci serait rendue difficile ou impossible par suite d'un changement de
circonstances.
Outre la survenance du terme ou la realisation du but poursuivi,
Ie contrat pourra prendre fin par decision de justice pour les motifs
mentionnes a l'article 2072 du projet, par exemple deces ou liqui.-
dation judicia ire du fiduciaire.
Cette fin de la fiducie est cependant suppletive de la volonte des
parties, Ie contrat pouvant prevoir les conditions de sa poursuite. En
outre, a la demunde du constituant ou du beneficiaire, le juge pourra
prendre toute mesure permeltant la poursuite du contrat.
Chapitre II - Dispositions complables
Le mecanisme du transfer! fiduci;aire doit etre accompagne dt!
regles qui en assurent la transpart!nct! : pour la securite des tiers
com me pour celie des beneficiaires, il doit etre possiblt! de .suivre.
les biens et d'apprecier les operations que genere leur gestion.
Ainsi, Ie::principe est pose que tous Ie::sfiduciairc::s devront eta-
blir, pour chaque:: contrat de fiducie, de::ux etats : Ie premie::r decrivant
les biens et droils transferes ainsi que les creances et les dettes liees il
I'execution du contrat, Ie second les produits el les charges afferents
a ce contrat.
Le beneficia ire pourra obtt!nir la communication dt! ces etats sur
simple demamlc.
Lorsque Ie heneficiairt! sera, pour ulle autre activit.!, >oumis :lUX
obligations comptables prevues par les articles 8 et suivants du code
de commerce, les etats fiduciaires seront compris dans ses comptes
annuels. Des reg[es sonl par ailleurs deCinies pour assurer [a
transparence de [a fiducie conclue a des fins de gestion.
Chapitre III - Dispositions flSCales
L'inlroJul:tion en droit frant;ais de: la fidu.:ie impliquc la tidini-
lion de son regime fiscal. La stricte application de regles fiseales de
droit commun aurait ele un frein au developpement de I'institution
mais [a fiducie ne do it pas non plus etre un mecanisme favorisant
I'evasion fiscale.
Les dispositions fisca[es sont done guidees par Ie soud de placer
les operations fiduciaires dans une situation fisca[e aussi proche que
possihle de celie des operations comparab[es.
La section [ definil [e regime applicable en matiere de:: droits
d't!nregistrement. Lorsque Ie conI rat prevoil la Iransmission des actif~
mis en fiducie 11une personne designee autre que Ie constiluant, les
droits de mUlalion sonl per~us immediatement seton Ie hareme
applicable en fonclion du lien de parente du constiluant et de [a
personne iI laquelJe les biens sont transmis. Les droits de mutation
sont alors dus par Ie fiduciaire.
Lorsqu'aucun beneficiaire n'est designe, le contrat de [iducie
n'entraine pas de perception de droits. Mais dans cette hypothese, ies
biens mis en fiducie font partie de la succession du consutuant.
L'imp6t de sclidarite sur la fortune est dii soil par Ie beneficiaire
designe de la fiducie, soit par Ie consiituunt. Toutefois, Iorsque la
fiducie opere une transmission et que Ie beneficiaire n'est pas ne ou
nommernent designe, I'I.S.F. est !ill par le tiduciaire au taux le plus
eleve.
L'enregistrernent d'un acre ou du nc declaruuon consiatant la
formation d'une fiducie se fait moyennant la perception d'un droit
fixe de 5000 F.
La section 2 concerne les irnpots directs. L 'object if de neutralite
fiscale de la fiducie a conduit 11retenir le principe scion lequel les
resultats de la fiducie sont compris dans le revenu ou le resultat
imposable de la personne beneficiaire.
Mais, lorsque la fiducie se fait au profit du constituam ou de son
foyer fiscal parce qu'il a droit au retour des biens transferes, parce
que ces dcrniers sent consommes 11son profit. ou qu'il a des pouvoirs
importants sur la tiducic, son rcsultat est imposuhle entre les mains du
constuuant.
Dans I'hypothese ou aucun beneficiaire n'est en vie ou consutue,
Ie fiduciaire est imposable 11I'impet sur Ie revenu au tau x maximum.
Les resultats de la fiducie sont determines et imposes selon Ics
regles applicables a la nature de l'aclivilC ufferente aux biens ou
droits en fiducie. Toutefois, lorsque Ie beneficiaire est une entreprise,
Ie resultat esl determine selon les regles appliquees 11I'entreprise (I.S.,
B.I.C., B.N.C., B.A.).
Lorsqu'une enlreprise conslitu3nte est imposable. la plus·value
ou la moins-value constatee lors du transfert des biens en fiducie n 'est
pas comprise dans Ie resultat imposabk
La remuneration du fiduciaire est imposable dans la categoric
des henefices industriels et commcrci:JUx scion un regime de benefice
red.
La section 3 concerne la taxe sur la valeur ajoutee. Pour I'appli-
cation de cet impet, il est pleinement lenu compte des consequences
du transfert de propriete. Le fiduciaire esl done regarde comme I'ex-
ploitant du bien, eventuellement imposable 11ce titre. En outre, Ie
fiduciaire est considere comme un prcstataire de services imposable
sur sa remuneration. Des precisions sont apportees sur Ie cas parti-
culier des operations portant sur des immeubles.
La section 4 precise que la taxe profession nelle, lorsqu'elle est
due au titre d'une activite mise en fiducie, est acquiuee par Ie fidu-
ciaire, chaque fiducie faisant I'objet d'une imposition autonomc.
L 'activite de fiduciaire est par ailleurs assujellie 11la taxe profession-
nelle.
La section 5 traite de diverses dispositions il caractere fiscal.
Les fiducies suretes entrainent la perception des impets et taxes
qui seraient dus en cas de cession iI titre onereux.
Les regles applicables en matiere fiscale a la fidu..:ic: s'al'pliquent
aux trusts selon les regles de territorialite prevues au code des impelS .
. Les regles de recouvrement de I'impel et nOlammc:nt cdles rda-
tives it la solidarite entre Ie fiduciaire et Ie constituant sont precisees
afin que la fiducie ne puisse p'ermettre de faciliter des organisations
d'insolvabilite.
II est cree une sanction specifique a I'encontre du fiduciaire qui
aura contrevenu aux obligations declaratives lui incombant.
Par ailleurs, pour permettre I'action de contr61e et de recouvre-
ment de J'administration, Ie fiduciaire domicilie it I'ctranger devra
faire accrt!diter un representant fiscal en France, tenu aux memes
obligations et passible des memes sanctions.
Chapitre IV - Dispositions diverses
L'introducuon du contrat de Iiducie implique de modifier un
certain nombre de textes pour eviter que ceue institution soit uulisee
iI I'effet de contourner des reglernenturions d'ordre public.
I - Les articles du code civil, ci-dessous enumeres, soru
completes par I'adjonction des -transferts fiduciaires- aux operations
de disposition qui y sont rncnuonnccs :
- I'article 220-1, qui concerne l'Iruerdicuon faite par le juge a un
epoux de faire des acres de disposition sur ses biens propres ou sur les
biens communs ;
- I'article 389-5, qui concerne I'interdiction faite nux parents de
disposer des biens d'un enfant mineur sans I'autorisation du juge des
tutelles ;
- I'article 457, relatif aux acres que le tuteur ne peut faire sans
autorisation du conseil de famille ;
- les articles 1422 et 1424, relatifs aux acres que les epoux ne
peuvent faire I'un sans I'autre sur les biens de la cornmunaute ;
. - les articles 1432 et 1540, relarifs au mandat tacite entre epoux
qUI ne couvre pas les actes de disposition.
II - La loi n" 84-46 du 24 janvier 1984 est cornpletee pour eviter
que Ie contrat de fiducie ne soit utilise par des entreprises pour
effectuer des operations que seuls les etablissements bancaires sont
autorises it realiser. Ainsi les fonds recus par Ie fiduciaire pour son
activite propre sont assimiles it des fonds recus du public,
III - La loi du 2 aour t9119a introduit en droit francais la notion
d'action de concert. qui sera presurnee en cas duccord conclu entre
actionnaires, dirigeants ou societes cotees, en vue d'une action com-
mune. Les consequences attachees 11ceue presomption sont irnpor-
rantes puisqu'elles font peser sur les parties ii l'acuon de concert
I'obligation, notamment, de faire les declarations de franchissement
de seuil ou de declcncher une O.P.A.
Un contrat de fiducie pourrait permeUre d'eluder ccs obligations;
aussi la presomption s'appliquera-t-elle au fiduciaire, et au benefi-
ciaire lorsque ct: dernier sera egalt:ment Ie constituant.
D'une mGniere generale, la fiducie devrait etre largement utilisee
dans les operations bancaires, financieres et boursieres. II va de soi
que la reglementation qui existe en ces domaines s'appliquera ipso
facto en cas d'utilisation du contral de fiducie, celui-ci ne pouvant
deroger aux regles d'ordre public. Un balayage des textcs existants en
ces matiere~ sera cependant necessaire pour n:duire autant que faire
se peut les incertitudes d'interpretation.
IV - Enfin plusieurs dispositions de nature fiscale doivent etre
adaptees pour tenir compte de I'introduction de la fiducie :
_ I'article 750 ter du code general des impots est complete pour
preciser les regles de territorialite des droits de mutation a titre gratuit
pour les fiducies et [rusts;
_ it I'article 762 du code general des impots, Ie bareme de
.I'usufruit est modifie en ce qui concerne I'usufruit a duree fixe. La
valeur t:5t desormais egaIe a un dixieme de la propriete entiere par
periode dt: cinq ans (au lieu de deux dixiemes par periode de dix
ans);
_ les articles 784, 795, 1726 his et 1649 A du code general des
impots sont modifies pour tenir compte tit: I'introduction de la fiducie
en droit fran~ais ;
_ enfin plusieurs articles du livre des procedures fiscales preci-
sent les consequences de I'autonomie de la masse fiduciaire au regard
du droit de controle de I'administration. lis ont pour objet d'adapter
les principes de droit commun (identification el acces aux comptes,
droit de communication, droit de verification, garanties des contri-
buables ..,) it la specificite des operations fiduciaires.
PROJET DE LOI
Le Premier ministre,
Sur Ie rapport du garde des sceaux, ministre de In justice.
Vu l'article 39 de la Constitution,
Decrete :
Le present projet de loi instituant la fiducie, delibere en Conseil
des ministres apres avis du Conseil d'Etat, sera presente it l'Assem-
blee nationale p:tr le garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice. qui est
charge d'en exposer Its motifs et d'en soutenir lu discussion.
Chapitre premier
Dispositions generales
Article premier
II est insere dans Ie livre troisieme du code civil un titre seizierne
bis inutule -De la fiducie- ct comprcnant lcs arucles :!U6:! it 207U-11
rediges ainsi qu'il suit:
.TITRE XVI SIS
.DE LA. FIDUCIE
cArt. 2062. - La fiducie est un contrat par lequel UI1 constituant
transfere tout ou partie de ses biens et droits a un [iduciaire qui,
tenant ces biens et droits separes de son patrimoine personnel, agit
dans un but determine au profit d'un ou plusieurs beneficia ires
conformement aux stipulations du contrat.
cLe constituant peut etre beneficiaire.
-Lorsque la fiducie est conclue a des fins de garantie, Ie fidu-
ciaire peut etre le beneficiaire dans les conditions fixees au contrat. ,
-La fiducie est soumise aux regles ci-apres enoncees sans preju-
dice des dispositions particulieres d'ordre public propres 11la matiere
concernee. .
.Art. 2063. - Le contrat de fiducie doit comporter II peine de
nullite les stipulations suivantes :
.10 iI determine les biens et droits qui en sont I'objet ;
.~o il definit la mission du fiduciaire, ainsi que l'etendue de ses
pouvoirs u'auministration et de disposition;
.3° il designe les beneficiaires ou fixe les regles de leur desi-
gnation;
.4° il indique les conditions duns lesquelles les biens et droits
doivent etre representes ou transmis aux beneficiaires ;
.5° il determine la duree de 101fiducie, qui ne peut exceder
quatre-vingt-dix-neuf ans iI cornpter de la date du contrat.
-Le contrat de fiducie est passe par ecrit, Lorsqu'il est conclu II
des fins de transmission a titre gratuit il est, a peine de nullite, passe
devant notaire .
•La fiducie doit etre expresse .
•Art. 2064. - Lorsque le contrat de fiducie a pour objet la trans-
mission de biens et droits a un ou des beneficiaires autres que Ie
constituant, la designation de ce ou ces beneficiaires ne peut eire
modifice.
«Art. 2065. - Si Ie contrat de fiducie conclu a des fins de garan-
tie n'en a pas dispose autrement, la valeur du bien transfere au fidu-
ciaire doit, en cas de defaillance du debiteur, etre determmee a dire
d'expert, sauf s'i1 s'agit de sornrnes d'argent, de creances, de valeurs
mobilieres ou de contrats cotes sur un marche organise .
•Arl. 2066. - Nul ne peut etre fiduciaire ou dirigeant d'une per-
sonne morale fiduciaire, s'il a ete I'objet d'une mesure d'interdiction
de diriger, gcrer ou controler une entreprise ou d'une mesure de fail-
lite personndle, ou s'il a subi une condamnation penale ou une sanc-
tion professionnelle pour des faits contraires a I'honneur, a la probite
ou aux honnes moeurs .
•Arl. 2067. - Le fiduciaire doit executer personnellement sa
mission. Toutefois, il peut deleguer I'accomplissement de certains
actes a une personne restant sous son controle et sa responsabilite .
•Arl. 2068. - Dans ses rapports avec les tiers, Ie fiduciaireen.
repute disposer des pouvoirs les plus etendus sur les biens et droits
objet du contrat, II moins qu'j( ne soit demontre que les tiers avaienl
connaissance de Ja limitation de ses pouvoirs. .._!
cArt. 2069. - Le fiduciaire doit prendre toutes mesures propres
II eviter Ja confusion des biens et droits transferes ainsi que des deues
s'y rapportanl, SOilavec ses biens personnels, SOilavec d'autres biens
fiduciaires .
•Sans prejudice des droits des creanciers du constituant titulaires
d'un droit de suite attache a une surete publiee anterieurement au
contral de fiducie et hors Ie cas de fraude aux droits des creanciers du
constituanl, les biens transferes au fiduciaire ne peuvent etre saisis
que par Ics titulaires de creances nees de la conservation ou de la
gestion de ces biens par Ie fiduciaire.
-Art. 2070. - t.orsque la liducie porte sur des droits et bien, doni
la mutation est soumise it publicite, celle-ci doit mentionner Ie nom
du fiduciaire es-qualues.
-Art. 2070-/. - Le fiduciaire exerce sa mission duns le respect de
la confiance du constituant.
-Si Ie fiduciaire manque gravement it ses devoirs ou met en peril
les interets qui lui sont confies, le constuuant au les beneficiaires
peuvent demander en justice Iii nomination d'un administrateur
provisoire ou Ie remplacernent du fiduciaire. lis peuveru egalernent
demander qu'j( soit mis fin il la fiducie. La decision judiciaire faisant
droit it la dernande em porte de plein droit Ie dcssaisissement du
fiduciaire .
• Les disposuions de J'itlinca I'rcccdclH sont :tpp!I\"·~lbh.·~L'Il ..':1" de
violation des dispositions de l'urricle 2066 .
•Art. 2070-2. - En cas de deces du fiduciaire, Ics biens et droits
objet de la fid ucie ne font pas partie de sa succession. En cas de
dissolution d'une personae morale fiduciaire, les biens et droits ohjet
de la fiducie ne font pas partie de I'actif partageable ou transmissible
it titre universe].
.Art. 2070-3. - La fiducie ne peut porter atteinte aux droits des
heritiers reservataires. Si, lors du deces du constituant, la valeur des
biens et droits transferes au Iiduciaire excede la quotite disponihle. I:.
Iiducie est reducrible suivant les regles applicables aux donations
entre vifs, sous les particularites prevues aux articles 2070-5, 2070-7 er
2070-8 .
•Art. 2070-4. - La valeur des biens et droits transferes au fidu-
ciaire s'impute sur la reserve ou sur la quotite disponible de la succes-
sion du constituant selon les distinctions operees aux arlicles 864 et
865 .
•Arl. 2070-5. - L'aetion en reduction est exercee contre Ie bene-
ficiaire lorsque I~ biens et droits lui ont ete transmis et contre Ie
fiduciaire dans Ie cas eontraire .
• lorsque Ie contrat de fiducie porte sur une entreprise a carae-
tere industriel, commercial, artisanal, agrieole ou liberal ou sur la
majorite des parlS ou actions d'une societe ayant ('un de ces objets, la
reduction peut toujours eIre faile en valeur .
•Art. 2070-6. - Lorsque Ie contrat de fidueie prevoit la trans-
mission de biens el droils iI titre graluit au beneficiaire, il peut etrt:
stipule, par derogation aux articles 893, 896 et 1130, que la
transmission prendra effet au deces du constituant .
•Art. 2070-7. - Pour ('application de I'article 922, il est tenu
compte, apres en avoir deduit les dettes, de la valeur et de ("etat des
biens fiduciaires au jour du deces du constituant s'ils n'ont pas ete
transmis au beneficiaire. Pour les biens transmis au beneficiaire, il est
tenu compte de leur etat au jour de cette transmission et de leur
valeur au jour du deces du constituant. Si les biens ont ete alienes par
Ie beneficiaire, il est tenu compte de leur valeur ill'epoque de I'alie-
nation et, s'il y a eu subrogation, de la valeur des nouveaux biens au
jour du deces du constituant .
•Art. 2070.8. - Pour I'application de I'article 923, il est tenu
compte, pour les biens transmis au bCneficiaire, de la date a laquelle
la designation de ces derniers ne peut plus etre modifiee et de la date
du deces du constituant pour les biens non encore transmis aux
beneficia ires .
•Arl. 2070-9. - Le flduciaire peut demander la revocation ou I~
revision du conlr~1 de fidude dans les condilions de:, article, 9t){I·1 :i
900-8 .
•Arl. 2070-/0. - La fiducie prend fin par la survenance du terme
fixe ou la realisation du but poursuivi. quand celle-ci a lieu avant cc
terme .
• La fiducie prend egalement fin par une decision de justice,
lorsque en I'absence de stipulations prevoyant les conditions dans les-
quelles Ie contrat se poursuivra, se produit I'un des evenements ci-
apres :
_lola renoncialion de: I~ lOla Iii': des beneficiaires ;
.20 Ie deces c.lu fiduciaire ;
.3° la liquidation judiciaire du fiduciaire ;
.4° la dissolution de la ~rsonne morale fiduciaire, Ie COntrOl
pouvant cepcndant se poursuivre jusqu'a la cloture des operations de
liquidation;
.5° la disparition de la personne morale fiduciuire, par suite
d'une absorption ou d'une cession prononcee dans Ie cadre d'un
redressement ou d'une liquidation judiciaire .
•Toutefois dans les cas prevus a I'alinea precedent, Ie juge peut,
t. la demande du constituant ou du beneficiaire, (lrentlre toutes
mesures permettont la poursuile du conlra!.
.~r~.2070-//. - Lorsque la fiducie prend fin, et en I'absence de
bCn~ficlalres pour quelque cause que ce soit, les hiens et droits
subslstants fonl retour uu constiluant ou a ses ayants cause .•
Chapitre II
Dispositions comptablcs
Art. 2.
Le fiduciaire etuhlit pour chuque contrat de fiducie :
10 un etat des biens et droits ainsi que des creances et des dettes,
concernant l'execution du contrat. Cet etat decrit separement les
elements actifs et passifs de la masse fiduciaire ;
20 un etat des produits et des charges afferents au corurar de
Iiducie sans qu'jJ soit tenu compte de leur date d'encaissemeru ou de
paiement. Cet etar fait apparaltre, par difference apres deduction des
arnortissements et des provisions, It: resuluu de la masse fiduciaire.
Ces eiats sont ctablis conforrnement ;tUX rcglcs dcfinics par Ie,
articles 'J et suivants du code du commerce, pour Ie bilun ct lc
compte de rcsultat,
II ne peut etre precede a aucune reevaluation des elements de la
masse fiduciaire.
Art. 3.
Les etats prevus ci-dessus sont communiques au beneflciaire a sa
demande.
Art. 4.
Lorsque Ie fiduciaire est soumis aux dispositions des articles I! et
suivants du code de commerce, ses comptes annuels comprennent,
outre Ie bilan, Ie compte de resultat et I'annexe prevus a ces articles,
les etats mentionnes II Particle 2 ci-dessus,
Le fiduciaire precede de maniere autonome it .I'enregistremenr>
cornptable des mouvements affectant la masse fiduciaire. -
Art. S.
Les personnes qui executent a titre habituel des missions
fiduciaires sont soumises aux dispositions des articles 8 et suivants du
code de commerce.
Art. 6.
Lorsque Ie conslituanl est soumis aux dispositions des articles 8
el suivants du code de commerce et que Ie contrat preVOil que ks
biens t:l droits lui font retour ou sont consommes dans son interet, il
constate une cr~nce a regard du Cidudaire lors du transfert des biens
et droits il cclui-ci. Le bilan fail apparaitre distinctement, a la date du
transfert, la valeur brute de la cre~nce, egale il I~ valeur que les biens
et droits avaient a I'origine ou apres reevaluation, et Ics amort is-
semenls el provisions de toule nature afferents a ces biens el droits,
tels qu'ils figuraienl dans les comples annuels du constituant.
Le Ciduciaire inscrit sur les etats menlionnes a I'arlicle 2 ci-
dessus les biens et droils tranferes ainsi que les amortissemenls el
provisions de louIe nalure y afferenls, leis qu'jJs figuraient dans les
com pIes annuels du consliluant.
En cas d'absorption du filludairc ou d'operation assimilce, Ics
biens et droits en fillude sonl trall,fer';, il lc:ur valeur dans Ic:s
ecritures tiu fitiuciairc en mt:nlionnanl la v~leur brute el les ~mor-
tissemcnls ou provisions de toule nature praliques a raison de ces
biens.
Art. 7.
Lorsque le contrat prevoit que les biens et droits seront transrnis
a un beneficia ire autre que Ie constituant et soumis aux dispositions
des ankles 8 et suivants du code de commerce. le beneficiaire cons-
tale, lors du transfert au fiduciuire, une creance il regard de celui-ci
ega!e il la valeur venule des biens et droits rransferes.
Art. 8.
Lorsque Ie contrat prevoit que les biens et droits seront transmis
a un beneficiaire et que celui-ci cede sa creance sur Ie fiduciuire, ces
biens et droits sont inscrits dans les elals fiduciaires rnenuonnes 11
I'article 2 a leur valeur venale a la date de la cession.
Art. 9.
Le beneficiaire soumis aux dispositions des articles 8 er suivants
du code de commerce inscru iI son bilan les biens er droits qui lui
sont transmis ainsi que les amortissements et les provisions y afferents,
tels qu'ils figuraient dans les eiats fiduciaires rnentionnes 11I'article 2.
Art. 10.
Un decret precisera les rnodalites d'etablissement des erats
fiduciaires.
Chapitre III
Dispositions flscales
Art. II.
Pour I'application desdispositions du present chapitre :
1° le beneficiaire est dit -beneflcialre des biens. lorsqu'il s'agit
de la personne a qui seront transmis de, biens ou droits ohjet de la
fiducie;
2" Ie beneficiaire est dit .beneficiaire des fruits· lorsqu'il s'agit
de la personne qui re~oit des fruits provenant de ces biens ou droits
pendant la duree de la fiducie.
Sl:ction I
Enregistrement, publicile fonciere
et impot de salida rite sur Lafortune
Art. 12.
I - Le transfert a un fidudairl: de biens ou droits de toute nature
donne ouverture aux droits de mutation a titre gratuit lorsque Ie
contrat de fiducie prevoit la transmission de ces biens ou droits, sans
contrepartie equivalente, it une personne designee par Ie constituant
et distincte de ce dernier.
([ - Lorsque Ie contrat de fidude ne remplit pas les conditions
prevues au I, les biens ou droits transferes a un fiduciaire et leurs
fruits sont consideres, pour I'application des droits de mutation et de
I'impot de solidarite sur la fortune, com me demeurant la propriete du
constituant.
Art. 13.
Les dmits de mutation a titre gratuit exigibles lors du transfert
en fiducie vise au I de I'article 12 sont assis sur les valeurs des biens
ou droits transferes au fiduciaire. lis sont liquides en fonction du lien
de parente entre Ie constituant et Ie l>eneficiaire des biens.
Lorsque Ie beneficiaire des biens et Ie heneficiaire tks fruits sont
differents, les. droits sont liquides en fonction de leur lien de parente
avec Ie constlluant et scion les reglcs prevucs a I'article 762 du code
general des impots, les droits du benCfidaire des fruits etanl assimiles
a ceux de I'usufruitier et les droits du beneficiaire des biens a ceux du
nu-proprietaire.
Art. 14.
Lorsque Ie contrat prevoit des beneficiaires des fruits successlfs,
I'impot est liquide en fonction des drous du premier beneficia ire des
fruits, sans tenir compte de ceux des beneficiaires futurs des fruits.
L 'ouverture des droits d'un nouveau beneficiaire des fruits
donne lieu au paiement des droits de mutation a titre gratuit sur la
fraction de la valeur en pleine propriete. i< la dale de ceue ouverture,
des biens ou droits en fiducie qui correspond a la part de I'usufruit
definie a l'article 762 du code general des irnpots.
Le cas echeant, l'impOt acquiue lors du transfert en fiducie au
utre des droits du beneficia ire des biens donne lieu it restitution pour
la fraction qui excede Ie montant de l'Irnpot qui aurait ete acquitte
d'apres I'age du nouveau beneficiaire des fruits.
Art. 15.
Lorsque les biens ou droits sont transmis effectivement it une
autre personne que Ie premier beneficiaire des biens prevu ou ses
ayants cause, iI est precede, en fonction du lien de parente entre Ie
constituant et le beneficiaire effectif des biens, a une nouvelle liqui-
dation des droits de mutation it titre gratuit sur la valeur que les biens
ou droits avaient lors de leur transfert au fiduciaire.
L'impor acquitte lors du transfert en fiducie sur les droits du
premier beneficiaire des biens est impute sur celui qui est dil par Ie
beneficiaire effectif des biens. Le cas echeant, I'excedent est restitue.
L'impot net resultant de cette nouvelle liquidation est majore de
I'Interet de retard prevu it I'article 1727 du code general des impots,
calcule It compter dela date du transfert au fiduciaire.
Art. 16.
Lorsque Ie beneficiaire des biens ou Ie beneficiaire des fruits
d'un contrat de fiducie vise au I de I'article 12 transmet ses droits it
titre gratuit, I'Irnpot est liquide en Conction de la valeur en pleine
propriete des biens en fiducie au jour de cette mutation et selon les
regles prevues a I'article 762 du code general des impots, les droits du
beneficiaire des fruits etant assimiles a ceux de l'usufruitier, et les
droits du beneficia ire des biens a ceux du nu-proprietaire.
, Art. 17.
I - Les biens ou droits faisant I'objet d'un contrat de fiducie vise
au 11de l'article 12 font partie de la succession du constituant, sauf
lorsque Ie beneficiaire des biens est designe en cours de fiducie et
avant Ie deces du constituan!. Dans ce dernier cas, ils donnent
ouverture aux droits de mutation a titre gratuit pour leur valeur en
pleine propriete au jour de cette designation, dans les conditions
prevues a l'article 13.
" - Les Iiberalites consenties en execution d'un contrat de
fiducie mentionne au 11 de I'article 12 sont soumises nux droits de
mutation a titre gratuit. L'impot est liquid!! en fonction du lien de
parente entre Ie constitunnt el Ie beneCiciaire oe ces liberalites.
III - Lorsque Ie bCneficiaire des biens ou Ie beneficiaire des fruits
n'est pas designe au deces du constituant, I'impot est Iiquide en
Conction du tariC applicable entre non-parents au titre dl:s droil~ uu
i>eneficiaire des biens ou du beneficiaire des fruits non designe.
II est procede a une nouvelle liquidation de I'impot sur In Crac-
tion de la valeur des biens ou droits correspondant aux droits du
bCneficiaire des biens ou du bCneficiaire des fruits au jour de leur
designation, en fonction du lien de parente entre ceux-ci et Ie consti-
tuan!. La ~rac~ion. de la valeur des biens au droits retenue pour celie
nouv.elle hquldauon est majoree du montant de I'impot qui a ete
acqullte lors du deces du constituant en application des dispositions
de I'alinea precedent.
L'impot acquitte du fait du deces du constituant au titre des
droits du bCneficiaire des biens ou du beneficiaire des fr'uits non desi-
gne. est impute sur celui qui est dil lors de leur designation. Le cas
echeant, I'excedent est restitue au fiduciaire.
Art. 18.
Les biens ou droits transferes II une fiducie mention nee au I de
I'article 12 sont compris dans Ie patrimoine imposable a I'impct de
solidarite sur la fortune du beneficiaire des fruits, qui est repute
proprietaire de ces biens ou droits.
Lorsqu'au ter janvier d'une annee, Ie beneficiaire des fruits n'.est
pas ne ou n'est pas nommernent designe, la valeur neue en pie me
propriete des biens ou droits en fiducie est soumise a I'impot de soli-
darite sur la fortune, quel que soit Ie montant de cette valeur. L'im-
pot est du par Ie fiduciaire au tarif le plus elevc du harerne prevu 11
I'urticlc HXSU du code general des irnpots.
Pour l'upplicution des dispositions du premier alineu du present
article, la reduction prevue 11l'urticle KK5 V his du code general des
irnpots n'est pas applicable, lorsqu'uu titre du premier alinea de
I'article 24 les produits des biens et droits transferes en fiducie sont
compris dans Ie revenu imposahle du constituant,
Pour I'applicarion des dispositions du deuxierne alinea du pre-
sent article, les reductions prevues aux articles 8K5 V et 885 V bis du
code general des irnpots ne sont pas applicables.
Art. 19.
La mutation a litre onereux des droits d'un beneficiaire des
fruits d'un contrat de fiducie donne ouverture nux droits proportion-
nels ou progressifs d'enregistremcnt sur la valeur des droits cedes et
selon Ie regime qui serait applicable 11 la cession des biens ou droits
en fiducie. Pour la liquidation des droits proportion nels et progressifs,
la valeur des droits cedes est repartie au pro rata de la valeur des
biens et droits en fiducie au jour de 13 cession.
La meme regie est applicable pour les mutations a titre onereux
des droits d'un beneficiaire des biens. Toutefois I'impot est assis sur la
valeur des droits cedes, augrnentee de la fraction du passif corres-
pondant aux droits cedes.
Lorsqu'elles donnent lieu au paiement de la taxe sur la valeur
ajoutee en vertu des dispositions du dernier alinea du t du 7° de
I'article 257 du code general des impots, les cessions des droits d'un
beneficiaire des biens sont soumises a la taxe de publicite fonciere ou
au droit d'enregistrement au taux de 0,60 %.
Art. 20.
Doivent etre enregistres dans Ie delai d'un mOls a compter de
leur date Jes actes ou declarations constatant la formation, la modi-
fication ou I'extinction d'un contrat de fiducie, J'ouverture des droits
d'un nouveau beneficiaire des fruits, les mutations par un beneficiaire
des biens ou un beneficia ire des fruits de tout ou partie de ses droits
et les liberalites visees au 11 de I'article t 7.
Lorsque Ie contrat de fiducie prend effet au deces du consti-
tuant, it doit etre enregistre, a la diligence des heritiers legataires ou
fiduciaires, dans un delai de trois mois a compter du deces du
constituant.
Art. 21.
Les actes ou declaratiolls enumeres 11 I'article 20 doivent etre
enregi,st.res ala. recelle des impelS du domicile du constituant ou des
non-reSIdents Sl ce dernier n'cst pas domicilie en France.
Art. 22.
II ne peut etre per~u moins de 5 000 F lors de "enregistrement
d'un acte ou d'une declaration constatant Ja formation d'une fiducie
et de 1 000 F lors de I'enregistrement des autres acres ou declarations
vises it I'anicle 20.
P~ur la pe~cepti.o.n des droits de mutation it titre gratuit et par
e~ceptlon aux. ~ISPOSItIOns de I'article 676 du code general des im-
pots, Jes conditions suspensives stipulees dans les contrats de fiducie
ou dans leurs avenants ne sont pas opposables 11I'administration.
Section 2
lmpots directs
Art. 23.
Sous reserve des dispositions de I'article 24, les resultats de la
fiducie sont compris dans Ie revenu ou Ie resultat imposable de la
personne qui en beneficie en application du contrat de fiducie.
Tant que les termes du contrat ne permettent pas d'identifier un
beneficiaire des resultats en vie ou constitue, ceux-ci sont imposes
separement au nom du fiduciaire, es-qualites, selon les regles appli-
cables a I'impot sur Ie revenu et a son taux maximum.
Art. 24.
Lorsqu'un contrat de fiducie rend possible I'utilisation au profit
du constituant, de son conjoint ou de ses enfants mineurs, de tout ou
partie des biens ou droits en fiducie ou des resultats de la fiducie, ces
resultats sont compris dans Ie revenu ou Ie resultat imposable du
constituant pendant la duree de la fiducie. II en est de merne lorsque
Ie contrat rend possible Ie retour au constituant de tout ou partie de
ces memes biens ou droits ou resultats ou lorsqu'j( confere au consti-
tuant des pouvoirs de decision ou d'administration.
Lorsque Ie contrat de fiducie designe Ie constituant comme
beneficiaire des biens ou lorsqu'il rend possible I'utilisation it son
profit des biens ou droits en fiducie, sans que I'Interesse beneficie des
resultats et dispose de pouvoirs de decision ou d'administration sur la
fiducie, la cession par Ie constituant de tout au partie des droits dont
il est detenteur en vertu du contrat a pour effet de sournettre
I'acquereur au regime prevu au premier alinea.
Nonobstanl les dispositions du premier alinea, si Ie constituant
cede a titre onereux ses droits sur les resultats des biens ou droits en
fiducie, les resultats realises apres la cession sont compris dans Ie
revenu ou Ie resultat imposable du cessionnaire des droits ou, en cas
de nouvelles cessions, des cessionnaires successifs.
Lorsqu'une fiducie est constituee par des tiers au profit d'une
entreprise ou d'une exploitation non commerciale, celle-ci est consi-
deree comme Ie constituant au sens du premier alinea meme si elle
n 'a pas cette qualite contractuelle.
Art.2S.
I - Les resultats de la fiducie sont constitues par les produits nets
de la gestion des biens et droits en fiducie et par les plus-values resul-
tant de leur cession. lis sont determines et imposes selon les regles
applicables a la nature de I'activite afferente aux biens ou droits en
fiducie.
Toutefois si, en application des dispositions des articles 23 et 24,
ces resultats sont imposables au nom d'une personne morale passible
de I'impot sur les societes dans les conditions de droit comrnun, o~
d'une personne qui exerce une activite industrielle, cornmerciale, aru-
sanale, agricole au non commerciale et qui est passible de I'impot sur
Ie revenu selon un regime de benefice reel, its sont determines selon
les regles applicables au benefice realise par ceue personne. Si Ie
contrat de fiducie prevoit plusieurs beneficiaires, celte disposition est
applicable a la part du resultat imposable revenant it chacun d'eux.
Les dispositions de I'article 238 bis K du code general des
impots s'~ppliquent aux droits mentionnes a cel article qui sont en
fiducie par reference a la qua lite du redevable de I'impot designe aux
articles 23 et 24.
II - Pour I'application du present article, les amortissements et
les provisions pratiques par Ie fiduciaire ne sont pris en compte pour
la determination de la quote-part de resultat revenant au redevable de
l'imp6t que si, en application du contrat de fiducie, ce redevable sup-
pone la charge effective de la depreciation ou de la perte qu'i!s sont
censes couvrir.
III - Toute variation ou depreciation du montant de la creance
ou des creances sur Ie fiduciaire demeure sans incidence sur Ie resul-
tat imposable du titulaire de la creance.
IV - Les benefices professionnels sont soumis a un regime reel
d'imposition.
V - Les resultats determines selon les modalites prevues au
present article sont imposes, au titre de chaque annee ou de chaque
exercice, au nom des personnes designees aux articles 23 et 24. Dans
la situation visee au deuxieme alinea du I du present article, les resul-
tats a prendre en compte sont ceux des exercices clos au cours de
I'exercice du beneficiaire ou de l'annee au titre de laquelle it est im-
pose. lis demeurent sans incidence sur les revenus ou les resultats
imposables personnels du fiduciaire.
VI - Sauf dans Ie cas prevu au deuxieme alinea de I'article 23 :
a} it est fait masse, pour I'application des articles 69, 69 A, 72 et
96 du code general des irnpots, de I'ensemble des recettes et, pour
I'application de I'article 92 B du meme code, .de I'ensemble des pro-
duits de cessions realises par Ie redevable de I'impot, tant a titre
personnel ou comme associe d'un groupernent ou d'une societe non
soumis a I'impot sur les societes que dans Ie cadre de la fiducie, pour
determiner les regles de son imposition;
b) Ie chiffre d'affaires qui provient de la gestion des biens ou
droits en fiducie s'ajoute a celui qui est realise par Ie redevable de
I'impot designe aux articles 23 et 24, pour I'application des articles
5()..{), 151 septies, 302 ter, 302 septies A et 302 septies A bls du code
general des imp6ts.
Art. 26.
Pour I'application de l'rmpot sur Ie revenu, les constituants ou
les personnes qui beneficient des resultats, autres que les entreprises
industrielles, commerciales ou agricoles et les exploitations non com-
merciales, sent consideres comme proprietaires des biens ou droits en
fiducie dont les resultats sont imposables a leur nom.
Art. 27,
I - Lorsqu'une entreprise transfere a un fiduciaire des biens ou
droits inscrits a I'actif immobilise de son bilan, les plus ou moins-
values correspondant a la valeur reelle des biens ou droits qui doivent
lui faire retour ou etre utilises a son profit ne sont pas comprises dans
son resultat imposable de I'exercice de transfert, si les conditions
prevues a I'article 6 de la presente loi sont satisfaites.
II - Les moins-values ou plus-values definies au I ne sont pas
comprises dans Ie resultat imposable de l'exercice de transfert :
a) du contribuable qui transfere son fonds de commerce a un
fiduciaire, si I'interesse produit chaque annee, en annexe a sa decla-
ration de revenus, un bilan au sont inscrits, selon les modalites pre-
vues au premier alinea de l'article 6, la creance sur le Iiduciaire et les
amortissements et provisions de toute nature afferents aux biens au
droits mis en fiducie ;
b) du contribuable exer~ant une activite non commerciale qui
transrere a un fiduciaire des biens ou droits faisant partie de son
patrimoine professionnel. Dans ce cas, la creance sur Ie fiduciaire
dont it est titulaire est inscrite sur Ie tableau des immobilisations et
reputee acquise pour un montant egal au prix de revient des elements
transferes sous deduction des amortissements pratiques ;
c) de I'exploitant agricole soumis au regime du forfait qui met_
en fiducie des biens profession nels. La creance sur Ie fiduciaire dont
il est titulaire est inscrite sur la ded~ration prevue a I'article 65 A du
code general des impots et reputec acquise pour la valeur d'origine
des biens au droits mis en fiducie. L 'exploitant agricolc, qui a trans-
fere a un fiduciaire des biens ou droits faisan! partie de son patri-
moine professionnel el clevant lui faire relour ou eIre utilises a son
profit, et qui cesse d'etre soumis au regime du rorfait, inscrit a I'actif
de son bilan la creance sur Ie fiduciaire dont il est titulaire, selon les
modalites prevues a I'article 6.
Art. 28.
Lorsque la plus-value ou la moms-value correspondent i1 la
valeur reelle des biens ou droits mis en fiducie est soumise au regime
defini a l'article 27 :
10 les amortissemcnts et provisions deductibles pour la determi-
nation des resultats imposables resultant de I'exploitation de ces biens
ou droits par Ie fiduciaire ne peuvent pas exceder ceux que Ie consti-
tuant aurait pu lui-rnerne deduire s'il avait conserve ces biens ou
droits ;
20 la fraction de la plus-value realisee lors de la cession par le
fiduciaire des biens ou droits en fiducie ou de In cession par Ie consti-
tuant des biens ou droits qui lui ont fait retour est consideree comme
a court terme pour I'application des dispositions de I'articl~ 39 duo-
decies du code general des impots a concurrence des arnorttssernents
prariques sur ces biens ou droits tant par Ie constituant que par Ie
fiduciaire. Le delai de deux ans prevu a cet article est determine a
compter de la date d'acquisition par Ie constituant des biens ou droits
mis en fiducie ou a partir de la date d'acquisition par Ie fiduciaire,
pour les biens ou droits acquis en remploi.
Art. 29.
I - Lorsqu 'une entreprise industrielle, commerciale ou agricole
ou une exploitation non commerciale, beneficiaire des biens, cede ou
transmet it titre gratuit tout ou partie des droits qu'elle derieru du
contrat ou qu'elle a acquis, les resultats de la fiducie sont determines
et imposes au nom du ou des redevables de I'impot rnentionnes aux
articles 23 et 24, a la date de la cession ou de la transmission, dans les
conditions prevues aux articles 201 et suivants du code general des
impots.
La difference entre Ie prix de cession des droits du beneficia ire
des biens et leur prix de revient n'a pas d'incidence sur les resultats
imposables du cedant,
II - Lorsqu'un beneficiaire des biens qui u'cst p;JS au nombre de
ceux qui sont menuonnes au I ci-dcsxus cede lOUI au partie des droits
qu'il detienr sur les biens ou droits en fiducie en vertu du contrat ou
qU'il a acquis ulterieurement, Ie gain net retire de cette cession releve
du regime d'imposition prevu pour ces biens ou droits. Le prix de
cession s'entend de la valeur reelle du bien ou droit a la date de la
cession; Ie prix d'acquisition s'entend ue la valeur du bien ou uroit
dans les ecritures comptables du fiduciaire.
Toutefois, si les biens ou droils en fiducie sont affectes II une
activite industrielle, commerciale, agricole ou non commerciale, les
dispositions du I s'appliquent.
Art. 30.
Lorsqu'une entreprise industrielle, commerciale ou agricole ou
une exploitation non commerciale est beneficiaire des resultats affe-
rents a des biens ou droits en fiuucie, Ie prix de cession des droits sur
les resultats qu'elle detient du contrat ou, en cas d'acquisition ulte-
rieure, Ie profit resultant de la vente de ces derniers droits, est com-
pris dans Ie resultat ou Ie revenu du cedant, imposable a I'impot sur
les societes au taux normal ou a I'impot sur Ie revenu par application
du tarif prevu a Particle 197 du code general des impOts.
Pour les autres contribuables, Ie gain net retire de la cession de
droils detenus sur la fiducie par Ie btneficiaire des resuhats est sOumis
a l'impOt sur Ie revenu dans la categorie mentionnee au I de I'article
92 du code general des impots.
Art. 31.
Lorsque les droits dormant vocation a I'attribution des biens ou
droits en fiducie sont apportes dans Ie cadre d'une fusion ou d'une
operation assimilee placee sous le regime special defini aux articles
210 A et 210 B du code general des irnpots, les plus-values imposables
en application de I'article 29 ne sont pas soumises a l'Impot sur les
societes, si les resultats ulterieurs de la fiducie sont determines en
tenant compte des engagements er Obligations que la societe bene-
ficiaire du transfert aurait dCl respecter si les biens ou droits en cause
lui avaient ete directement apportes, Ces engagements ou obligations
sont pris conjointement par Ie beneficiaire des apports et Ie fiduciaire
et satisfaits par ce dernier.
Art. 32.
La remuneration du fiduciaire est imposable annuellement a son
nom dans la categorie des benefices industriels ou commerciau x scion
un regime de benefice reel.
Art. 33.
I - Dans Ie mois qui suit la conclusion du contrat de fiducie, Ie
fiduciaire informe Ie ou les beneficiaires, autres que Ie constituant lui-
meme, de leur qua lite ainsi que des consequences du contrat au
regard de leurs obligations fiscales et leur en transrnet une copie. Le
fiduciaire determine, pour chaque contrat de fiducie, Ie ou les resul-
tats de I'exploitation des biens ou droits en fiducie dans les conditions
prevues pour les exploitants individuels, com pte tenu des regles
prevues a I'article 24.
Chaque masse fiduciaire, correspondant a un contrat, est
identlfiee par une appellation permanente falsant apparaitre sa nature
fiduciaire.
II - Le fiduciaire produit au service des impOts dont it releve,
avant Ie 31 mars, une declaration qui mentionne la designation et
I'activite des beneficiaires, la nature et la consistance des biens ou
droits en fiducie ainsi que Ie montant, la nature et la repartition des
resultats par redevable de l'impOt.
Le fiduciaire produit egalement, dans Ie meme delai, en vue de
I'etablissement de l'impOt de solidarite sur la fortune, une declaration
faisant apparaitre, au premier janvier de chaque annee, la nature et la
. consistance des biens ou droits en fiducie.
. III - Le fiduciaire est, en outre, ienu aux obIigations qui
incumbent normalement aux exploitants individuels. II exerce seul les
options eventuelles,
IV - Un decret fixe les rnodalites d'application du present article,
notamment Ie. modele et Ie contenu des declarations prevues au II,
ainsi que la Iiste et Ie contenu des documents qui doivent y etre
joints.
Art. 34.
.Pour I'application des dispositions du code general des impots el
du Irvre des procedures fiscales, les etats mentionnes a I'article 2
tiennent lieu de bilan et de compte de resultals pour chaque masse
fiduciaire.
Art. 35.
I - Les dispositions des articles 44 sexies, 44 septies, 208 quater A,
208 quinquies et 208 scxies du code general des imp6ts ne sont pas
applicables aux aetivites exercees dans Ie cadre d'une fiducie ou a
l'activite exercee par Ie fiduciaire es-qualites,
11- Le redevable de I'Irnpot designe aux articles 23 et 24 est
considere com me proprietaire des biens ou droits en fiducie ou
repute exercer directement I'activite en fiducie pour "application des
dispositions du code general des impots prevues au 3° du 1 de l'ar-
ticle 39, it I'article 44 sexies, aux deux premiers alineas de I'article 44
septies, aux articles 154, 202 ter pour ce qui concerne Ie changement
d'acuvite reelle ou d'objet social, 208 quater A, 20g quinquies, 208
sexies, a la deuxierne phrase du quatrieme alinea du I de I'article 209,
au premier alinea de I'article 209 B, a I'article 212, au troisierne
alinea du c) et au deuxierne alinea du d) du 11de "article 220 quater
A, au 5 de I'article 221 et a l'article 223 A pour ce qui concerne la
detention du capital de la societe mere du groupe.
11en est de meme pour I'application des articles 145 et 216 du
code general des impots si Ie contrat de fiducie prevoit que Ie bene-
ficiaire des titres ouvrant droit au regime prevu a ces articles est
egalement Ie beneficiaire des revenus de ces titres, L'engagement
mentionne au c) du lOde I'article 145 du meme code est pris par Ie
fiduciaire pour les titres acquis en fiducie : si cet engagement a ete
pris par Ie constituant pour les titres transferes en fiducie, Ie fiduciaire
s'engage a conserver ces titres jusqu'a la fin du delai de deux ans
pour lequel s'etait oblige Ie constituant.
III - Lorsqu'un contribuable transfere les elements corporels et
incorporels de son fonds de commerce a un fiduciaire en vue de son
exploitation au profit d'un tiers qui est egalement beneficiaire des
biens, les dispositions du II de l'article 41 du code general des impots
sont applicables si les conditions prevues a ce dernier article sont
satisfaites par Ie fiduciaire lors de la mise en fiducie et par Ie bene-
ficiaire des biens en fin de fiducie : lu transmission est a titre gratuit
au sens de ce dernier texte si le contrat de fiducie ne prevoit aucune
contrepartie it la charge du tiers.
Art. 36.
Le transfert a une personne ou a un organisme d'elements de
"actiC d'une entreprise industridle, commerciale, artisanale ou agri-
cole ou d'une exploitation non commerciale en vue de les gerer dans
"interet de cette entreprise ou exploitation ou d'assurer pour Ie
compte de celle-ci un engagement existant ou futur cst, sur Ie plan
fisCill. considere comme effectue dans Ie cadre d'une fiducie dom
I'cntreprise a la qualite de constituant et de oeneficiaire et la per-.·
sonne:: ou I'organisme celie de fiduciaire. L'entreprise e::stalors person-!'
nellement soumise a l'impOt a raison des resultats qui proviennent des
placements ou de I'exploitation de ces actifs ou des biens ou droits
acquis en remploi.
Section 3
Taxe sur la valeur ajoutee
Art. 37.
I - Le III de I'article 256 du code general des impots est ainsi
redige:
_III - Les operations autres que celles qui sont derinies au II,
notamment la livraison de hie::ns meubles incorporels, les travaux
immobiliers, I'execution des obligations de fiduciaire, les operations
de fa~on et les operations de commission autres que celles qui portent
sur des dechets neurs d'industrie ou des matieres de recuperation sont
considerees comme des prestations de services .•
II - Le 1 du 70 de I'article 257 du code general des impots est
complete par un dernier alinea ainsi redige :
-Les cessions de ses droits par un beneficiaire des biens, 10r'Gue
les droits cedes portent sur un immeuble ou sur des actions ou parts
d'interet dont la possession assure en droit ou en fait I'attribution en
propriete ou en jouissance d'un immeuble ou d'une fraction d'im-
meuble .•
III - Le 2 du 7° de I'article 257 du code general des impots est
complete par un alinea ainsi redige :
. -Aux operations visees au dernier alinea du I, lorsque les
Immeubles ou parties d'immeubles sont achev6s depuis plus de cinq
ans ou lorsque Ie::simmeubles ou parties d'immeubles, actions ou parts
d'in!erets ont deja fait I'objet, dans les cinq ans de I'achevement de
~es Immeubles ou parties d'immeubles, d'une cession a titre onereux
a une personne n'intervenant pas en qua lite de marchand de biens.>
..
Art. 38.
I - Le I de I'article 266 du code general des impots est complete
par un i ainsi redige :
.i. - Pour les prestations d'un fiduciaire, par la remuneration
versee par Ie constituant ou retenue sur les receues de I'cxploituuon
des biens ou droits en fiducie .•
II - Au b) du 2 de l'article 266, apres les mots: -La valeur
venale reelle des biens», sont ajoutes les mots: -ou des droits cedes
par Ie beneficiaire des biens en fiducie .•
Art. 39.
II est ajoute au code general des irnpots un article 21!5 bis ainsi
redige :
.Arl. 285 bis. - Pour les operations relatives 11 I'exploitation de
biens ou droits consutues en fiducie, Ie fiduciaire est considere
comme un redevable distinct pour chaque contrat de fiducie, sauf
pour I'application des Iimites de regimes d'impositions et de fran-
chises pour lesquelles est retenu Ie chiffre d'affaires realise par
I'ensemble des fiducies ayant un meme constituant..
Section 4
Taxe professionnelle
Art. 40.
I _ Le lOde I'article 1467 du code general des impots est
modifie ainsi qu'j( suit:
.10 Dans Ie cas des contribuables autres que les titulaires de
benefices non commerciaux, les agents d'affaires, les fiduciaires pour
I'accomplissement de leur mission et les intermediaires de commerce,
employant moins de cinq salaries ;. (Le reste sans changements:
II - Le 2° du merne article est rnodifie ainsi qu'Il suit:
.2° Dans Ie cas des titulaires lie benefices non cornmerciaux, des
agents d'affaires, des fiduciaires pour I'accomplissement de leur
mission et des interrnediaires de commerce, employant moins de cinq
salaries :- (Le reste sans changement).
Art. 41.
L'article 1476 du code general des impots est complete par un
alinea ainsi redige :
-Les fiducies sont imposees distinctement au nom du fiduciaire .•
Art. 42.
Le code general des irnpots est complete par un article 1518 C
ainsi redige :
.Art. 1518 C -. Les transferts et transmissions resultant de
I'execution d'un contrat de fiducie sont sans incidence sur la valeur
locative des biens con cernes, sauf lorsqu'il sont soumis aux droits de
mutation a titre gratuit ; dans ce dernier cas, pour la determination de
la ~aleur locative en application des articles 1469 et 1499, Ie prix de
revient est retenu sous reserve des dispositions de I'article 1518 B.»
Section 5
Dispositions communes
Art. 43.
La transmission definitive au creancier, par defaillance du
debiteur, de biens constitues en fiducie II fins de garantie entraine la
perception des impots et taxes exigibles en cas de cession it titre
onereux,
Art. 44.
Les dispositions du present chapitre s'appliquent aux biens ou
droits qui font I'objet d'une fiducie, d'un trust ou d'une institution
comparable revetant ou non la forme contractuelle et selon les regles
de territorlalite prevues au code general des impots.
Toutefois, les biens ou droits trunsferes a un trust ou 11 une
institution comparable a une Iiducie, etablie ou non par acte
contractuel, avant I'entree en vigueur de la presente loi sont soumis
aux droits de mutation a titre gratuit lors de leur remise au
beneficiaire des biens si Ie constituant uvait son domicile fiscal en
France au sens de I'article 4 B du code general des impots a la date
du transfert de ces biens au fiduciaire ou II une personne exercant
une mission assimilable it celie de ce dernier.
Art. 45.
I - Le fiduciaire acquitte les droits de mutation dus lors de la
formation du contrat de fiducie et dans les hypotheses prevues aux
articles 14 et 17.
II - II est solidaire pour Ie paiement des irnpots dus par Ie
consuruant et Ie beneficiaire qui correspondent aux biens en fiducie
et a leurs fruits ainsi que pour Ie paiement des impots de toute nature
dus par Ie constituant au titre d'une periode anterieure A la formation
de la fiducie, ou, s'agissant des fiducies conclues a des fins de
garantie, au titre d'une periode anterieure a I'appropriation definitive
des biens en fiducie par Ie fiduciaire.
III - En ce qui concerne les fiducies visees a l'article 24, la
solidarite du fiduciaire s'etend a I'ensemble des dettes fiscales du
constituant.
IV - La solidarite du fiduciaire est limuee nux biens et droits
faisant I'objet du contrat de fiducie et aux biens acquis en cours de
fiducie ainsi qu'a leurs fruits en sa possession.
Art. 46.
Pour les fiducies visees II I'article 24, Ie constituant ou ses ayants
cause sont solidairement tenus au paiement des dettes fiscales dues
par Ie fiduciaire au titre de la propriete, de la gestion et de l'ex-
ploitation des biens ou droits en fiducie.
Art. 47.
Lorsque Ie recouvrement des impositions de toute nature et des
penalites fiscales dues par le fiduciaire au titre des biens en fiducie a
etc rendu impossible par des manoeuvres frauduleuses ou I'inob-
servation grave et repetee de ses obligations fiscales, Ie fiduciaire peut
cUe declare personnellement tenu au paiement de ces impositions et
penalites.
A ceue fin. It: comptable du Tn!sor ou Ie comrtable de la
direction genera Ie des imrots assigne Ie fiduciaire devant Ie president
du tribunal de grande instance dans Ie ressort duqucl sc trollve Ie
service ou doivent etre acquittes Icsdits impots et penalile~, qui statue
scion la procedure it jour fixe.
Les voies de recours qui peuvent eIre exercees contre la decision
du presidenl du tribunal de grande insl"nce ne font pas ohstacle iI ce
que Ie comptable prenne des mesures conservatoires en vue de
preserver Ie recouvrement de la creance du Tresor.
-
Art. 48.
Le fiduciaire domicilie ou etabli hors de France est tenu de faire
accrediter au moment de I'enregistrement des acres ou du depot des
declarations enumerees au premier alinea de I'article 18, un repre-
sentant dornicilie en France qui s'cngage personnellement a remplir
Ics Iorrnulites incombant au fiduciaire et a acquiuer pour Ie compte
de .:e dernier toutes les impositions et penalites dues par celui-ci ;
cette personne doit justifier qu'elle est en mesure de prendre eet
engagement.
A defaut de designation d'un representant dument accredite, les
impositions et penalites sont dues:
1° pour les fiducies visees au I de l'article 12, par Ie constituant
ou, en cas de disparition de celui-ci, par Ie beneficiaire des fruits au,
lorsque Ie contra: de fiducie est arrive a echeance, par Ie beneficia ire
des biens;
2° pour les fiducies visees au II de I'article 12, par le constituant
ou, en cas de disparition de celui-ci, par Ie beneficiaire des fruits.
Art. 49.
I - Le fiduciaire qui n'a pas soumis a .. enregistrement les actes et
declarations vises a l'article 20 ou qui n'a pas designe de representant
en France conforrnernent aux dispositions de "article 48 est person-
nellement passible d'une amende egale a 6 % de la valeur de la
masse fiduciaire par periode de douze mois ecoulee de la date de
conclusion du contrat a la date de constatation de I'infraction.
Pour Ie ealcul de I'amende, la valeur de la masse fiduciaire est
appreciee au jour de la transmission des biens et droits ou, si celle-ci
n'est pas intervenue, au jour de la constatation de I'infraction.
II - Le taux de I'amende prevue au I est rarnene a 1 %, sans
qu'elle puisse etre inferieure a 20 000 F ni superieure a 50 000 F,
lorsque Ie fiduciaire ou son .representant en France ont accompli dans
les delais prescrits les obligations decturauves qui leur incumbent en
application du II de I'urticle 33.
Arl.50.
En cas de non respect des obligations declaratives prevues au II
de "article 33, le fiduciaire est redevable d'une amende egale a 6 %
de la valeur de la masse tiduciaire appreciee comme iI est dit au
deuxierne alinea du I de "article 49.
Le taux de cette amende est ramene it I %, sans qu'elle puisse
etre inferieure a 10 000 F ni superieure a 30 000 F lorsque Ie
fiuuciaire apporte la preuve que les beneficiaires de la fiducie ont
regulierement accompli leurs obligations de declaration aupres de
"administration fiscale.
L'amendc prevue au present ;trticlc:: nc pellt etre .:unlUl~e :t\CC
edit: prevue au I de I'artick 49.
An. 51.
I - Pour I'application des amendes prevues a I'article 49, Ie delai
de prescription prevu au dcuxieme aline;t de "article L. Ill!! du livre
des procedures fiscales court a eomplcr uu terme du contrat ue
fidueie, a moins que Ie riduciaire appone Iii preuve de la date a
laquelle "administration a eu connaissance certaine de I'existence de
la fiducie. Le delai court alors de cette date.
II - L'application des amendes prevucs au I est imiepcndante de
I'exercice du droit de reprise par I'administration a I'egard des rcde-
vables legaux des impets et taxes dus au titre du contrat de fiducie,
des biens et droits en fiducie et de leurs fruils.
Toutefois, lorsque I'administration a eu connaissance de I'in-
fraction au plus tard un an avant I'expiration du delai de reprise
prevu aux articles L. 169 et suivants du livre des procedures fiscales,
I~ t~ux des ~mendes est fixe il I % par annee non prescrite, dans les
hmlles mentlonnees aux articles 49 et 50.
III - Les amendes envisagees SOnt notifiees au fiduciaire dans les
eon~iti~ns prevues par la loi nO 79-587 du II juillct 1979 relative a la
motivation des actes administrati(s. Leur mise en recouvrement ne
peut intervenir avant I'expiration d'un delai de trente jours pendant
lequel Ie fiduciaire peut presenter ses observations .
. . Elles sont recouvrees et Ie contentieux est assure selon les regles
apphcables aux taxes sur Ie chiffre d'affaires.
Art. 52.
Pour l'npplication des dispositions de l'article 2069 du code civil,
les operations se rapportant aux biens et droits en fiducie doivent etre
enregistrees sur des cornptes financiers disrincts et ne pouvant etre
rattaches a aucun autre compte professionncl ou prive ouvert au nom
du fiduciaire ou d'une autre fiducie. L'mtitule du compte mentionne
I'appellation definie a I'article 33.
Art. 53.
I - Au 10 et au 2° de I'article 750 fer du code general des impots
les mots: «, Ie constituant d'un contrat de fiducie- sont inseres upres
les mots: «lorsque Ie donateur •.
II - Le II de I'article 762 du meme code est rernplace par Ic~
dispositions suivantes :
«II - L'usufruit ccnstitue pour une duree fixe est estirne a un
dixieme de la valeur de la propriete entiere pour chaque periode de
cinq ans de la duree de l'usufruit, sans fraction et sans egard a I'age
de I'usufruitier .•
III - L'article 784 du merne code est complete comme suit:
-Les dispositions du present article s'appliquent aux parties a un
contrat de fiducie .•
IV' - L'article 795 du me me code est complete par les dispo-
sitions suivantes :
-L'exoneration dont beneficient ces organismes s'apptique, dans
les memes' conditions, aux liberalites effectuees en execution d'un
contrat de fiducie .•
V - II est insere au code general des imp6ts un article 1020 bis
ainsi redige :
«Art. 1020 bis. - Les transferts et transmissions menrionnes au I
de I'article 12 de la loi nO ... instituant la fiducie, qui portent sur des
droits reels immobiliers, sont assujettis a une taxe de publicite
fonciere ou a un droit d'enregistrement de 0,60 %.,
Art. 54.
Le II de Particle 1716 bis du code general des imp6ts est
rem place par les dispositions suivantes :
.n - La procedure de dation en paiement prevue au I est
applicable aux droits dus sur les mutations a titre gratuit entre virs,
aux droits de mutations a titre gratuit exigibles a ('occ(lsion d'un
contrat de fiducie ainsi <Ju'au droit de partage .•
Art. 55.
I - Le code general des impots est complete par un article 242
ter B ainsi redige :
cArl. 242 ter B. - Lorsque le~ personnes definies aux articles 240
a 242 ter versent des sommes a une fiducie ou interviennent a un acte
.au~uel est partie un fiduciaire, eUes doivent porter sur les decla-
rallons prevues a ces articles I'appellation mention nee au I de I'article
33 de la loi nO du instituant la Ciducie .•
II - Le premier alinea de I'article 1649 A du meme code est
complete par les dispositions suivantes :
. cLes .comptcs d'lIne ritlucie et ceux qui sont utilise::; pour sa
gcstton dOlvent pOrter I'appdlation mention nee au f ue I'article 33 de
la loi nO du instituant la fiducie .•
. III - Le deuxieme alinea du meme article est modifie ainsi qu'il
SUI!:
.Les personnes physiques, les associations, les fiduciaires ...• (Le
reSfe sans changemenl).
Art. 56.
Le livre des procedures fiscales est complete et modifie ainsi
qu'il suit:
. I - Le troisierne alinea de I'article L. 10 est complete par les
dispositions ci-apres :
«Les memes demandes peuvent etre adressees au fiduciuire pour
Ie controle des declarations prevues a l'article 33 de la loi n° du
instituant la fiducie .•
II - L'article L. 12 est complete par un alinea ainsi redige :
«Lorsqu'un contrat de fiducie ou les actes Ie modifiant n'ont pas
etc enregistres dans les conditions prevues II l'article 20 de la loi n"
du instituant la fiducie, ou reveles a I'administration fiscale avant
l'engagement de I'examen contradictoire de l'ensernble de Ia situation
fiscale personnelle d'un contribuable qui y est partie ou en tient des
droits, la duree d'un an est decomptee a partir de l'enregistrernent
des actes.»
III - II est insere un article L. 14 A ainsi redige :
-Art. L. 14 A. 0 Pour l'applicauon des dispositions du present
livre, les procedures applicahles ;l une Iiducic, it chaque partie a un
contrat de fiducie et it route personne en tenant des droits sont
independantes .
• Pour la verification de tout ou partie des reven us ou resu ltats
d'une fiducie, I'administration precede au corurole des declarations
des fiduciaires prevues II I'article 33 tie la loi nO du instituant la
fiducie, des cornptes financiers en fiducie et des etats er cornptes
prevus aux articles 2 et 52 de la loi n° du instituant la fiducie dans
les conditions prevues it I'articte L. 13. Les dispositions de l'article L.
48 ne sont pas applicables a ces verifications.
cLes dispositions des articles L. 50 et L. 51 nc font pas obstacle,
pour une meme periooe et un memc imp6t, au controlc des rcvenus
ou des resultats :
c- d'une ou plusieurs fiducies, puis tie loute personne partie au
contral ou en tirant des droits ;
c- de !'une ou plusieurs de ces personnes, puis d'une ou
plusieurs fitlucies .•
IV - II est insere un article L. 54 A bis ainsi redige :
cArt. L. 54 A bis. - Les procedures de contrale et de red res-
sement des actes et declarations incombant au fiduciaire sont suivies
entre I'administration et Ie fiduciaire .
• Les consequences des redressements sont notifiees, dans les
conditions de droit commun, au beneficiaire des biens, au beneficiaire
des fruits, au constituant ou au fiduciaire, chacun en ce qui Ie
concerne .•
V - L 'article L. 73 est complete ainsi qu'jJ suit:
I ° II est ajoute, avant Ie dernicr alinea, un 4° ainsi redige :
.4° Les resultats des fiducies, lorsque la declaration prevue au II
de I'article 33 de la loi n° du instituant la fiducie n'a pas ete
deposee dans Ie delai legaL.
2° Au dernier alinea du meme article, la mention: .1 ° et 2°. est
remplacee par la mention: .1°,2° et 4°,.
VI - II est insere un article L. 85 B ainsi redige :
.Art. L. 85 Bo - Le fiduciaire communique a I'administration, sur
la demande de celle-ci. tous documents relatifs aux biens et droils en
fiducie .•
-
Art. 57.
La loi n? 114-46 du 24 janvier 19114relative a l'activite et au
controle des etablissements de credit est rnodifiee ainsi quil suit:
I - Le premier alinea de ['urt ide 2 est complete par les dispo-
sitions suivantes :
-Sont consideres comrne fonds recus du public les fonds qu 'une
personne recueille d'un tiers, notamrnent sous forme de depots, avec
Ie droit d'en disposer pour son propre compte rnais fa charge pour
elle de les restituer, et les fonds recus en qualite de fiduciaire et
employes pour son activite propre ...• (Le reste sans changements.
(( - Le premier alinea de l'article 3 est rem place par les dispo-
sitions suivantes :
«Constitue une operation de credit. pour l'application de 13
presente loi. tout actc par lequcl une personnc, agissunt a titre
onereux pour son propre com pie::ou en quulite de Iiduciuire, met OLi
promet de rnettre des fonds a la dispositions dune autre personne ou
prend, dans ('interet de celle-d, un engagement par signature tel
qu'un aval, un cautionnement ou une garantie .•
Chapitre IV
Dispositions diverses
Art. SX.
I - Le deuxierne alinea de I'article 220-1 du code civil est ainsi
redige :
.11 peut notamment interdire a cet epoux de Caire, sans Ie
consentement de I'autre, des actes de disposition, meme a titre
fiduciaire, sur ses propres biens .... (Le rcste sans changemenl).
(I - Le troisieme allnea de l'article 389-5 du code civil est ainsi
redige :
.Meme d'un commun accord, les parents ne peuvent ni vendre
de gre a gre, ni transferer a titre fiduciaire, ni apporter en societe un
immeuble .... (I.e reSle sans changemenl).
III - Le deuxieme alinea de I'article 457 du code civil est ainsi
rwige:
"Sans celte autorisation, iI ne peut, notamment, emprunter pour
la pupille, ni aliener meme a titre fiduciaire, ou grever de droits reels
les immeubles ...• (i.e resle sans changement).
IV _ L'article 1422 du code:: civil est ainsi n!dige :
-Arl. /422. - Les epoux lie peuvent, ('un Silns ('autre, mcme a
titre fiduciaire, disposer entre vifs. it titre gratuit. des hiens de 101
communaute .•
V _ L 'article 1424 uu coue civil est ainsi redige :
-Arl. /424. - Les epoux ne peuvent, ('un sans ('autre, aliener.
meme a titre fiduciaire, ou gn:ver de droits reels Ie::simmeuhles ... • (Le
resle sans changemenl).
VI _ Le premier alinea ue I'article 1432 du code civil est ainsi
complete: .ni les transferts a titre fiduciaire •.
VII _ Le premier alinea de I'article 1540 du code civil e}t ainsi
complete; .ni les transferts a titre fiduciaire •.
.---XX,-
Art.5Y.
Apres l'article 40H du code penal, est insere un article 40H-I
ainsi redige :
cArl. 408-1. - Sera puni d'un emprisonnement d'un a cinq ans et
d'une amende de 2 000 F a 2 500 OOOF ou de rune de ces deux
peines seulement, Ie fiduciaire qui, de mauvaise foi, aura fait des
biens qui lui auront ete transleres par un contra: de fiducie un usage
qu'il savait contraire a ('interet des beneficia ires, ou au but deter-
mine dans Ie contrat, ou aura utilise les biens a des fins personnelles
ou pour favoriser une personne morale dans laquelle il etait
interesse .•
Art. 60.
Le deuxierne alinea de I'article 356-1-3 de la loi n" 66-537 du 24
juillet 1966 sur les societes cornmerciales est remplace par les dispo-
sitions suivantes :
-Un tel accord est presume exister :
.1° entre un e societe, Ie president de son conseil
d'administration et ses directeurs generaux ou les membres de son
directoire ou ses gerants ;
.2° entre une societe et les societes qu'elle controle au sens de
I'article 355-1 ;
.3° entre des societes controlees par la meme personne ;
«4° entre Ie fiduciaire et le beneficia ire, s'il est Ie constituant,
d'un contrat de fiducie lorsque des actions ou droits de vote de la
societe, objet ,de la prise de participation ont ete transferees a ce
fiduciaire .•
Art. 61.
1- Le 1° de l'article 107 de la loi n" HS-98 du 25 janvier 1%5
modifiee relative au redressernent et a la Iiquidation judiciaires uc,
entrepriscs est modifie ainsi qu'il suit:
.1° Tous lcs acres a titre gratuit translatifs de propriete mobiliere
ou irnrnobiliere ainsi que les contrats tie Iiducie conclus 11des (ins de
lihCralite ;.
II - Le 6° UUmerne article de la merne loi est rnodifie ainsi qu'il
suit:
.6° Toute hypotheque convention nelle, route hypotheque
judiciaire ainsi que (,hypotheque legale ues epoux et tout Jroit ue
nantissement constitues sur les biens uu uebiteur pour detles ante-
rieurement contraclees, toul l'onlrat tic fitlueit conclu par It delliteur
a des fins tie garantic pour dcs uctle~ ant~ricurCIl1Cl1t COl1tWCtCc~;.
Art. 62,
II est insere, a I'artkle: 38 de la loi du ler juin 1924 mcttant cn
vigueur la legislation civile fran~aise dans les departements du Bas-
Rhin, du Haut-Rhin et de la Moselle, un 1° ainsi redige :
.1° constitution, modification ou extinction uc fiuueic".
Art. 63.
II est insere 11I'artide 211du deeret nO 55-22 uu 4 janvier 1955
portant reforme de la puhlicite fonciere, un c) ainsi redige :
cc) constitution, modification ou extinction de fiuude.-
An. 64.
La prescntc loi cst, a I'exception uu chapitre III ct Ue I'article
63, applicable dans Ics tcrritoires d'outre-mer et dans la collectivite
territoriale de Mayotte.
Fait a Paris, Ie 19 fevrier 1992.
Signe : EDITH CRESSON,
Par Ie Premier ministre :
u garde dcs u·calLf. IIIUtis,rt de III jllsli<'e.
Signc: HENRI NALLET.
